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The objective of this thesis is to identify various determinants of human capital 
development among Canadian youth. Three mediating agents are examined: parents, 
schools, and government. Considerable attention is paid throughout to identifying 
causal relationships with empirical data.  
 
The first chapter introduces the thesis by discussing its main goals, as well as the 
importance of the topic. This chapter also summarizes each of the following 
substantive chapters. 
 
I explore the relationship between family size and various components of the child 
quality production function in the second chapter. The findings suggest that larger 
families lead to reduced parental investments in children. Despite this, standardized 
test scores do not decline with family size. Three possible reasons for this puzzle are 
explored.  
 
In the third chapter, I estimate the relationship between fertility and the allocation of 
paid and unpaid labour among couples. Results indicate that additional children lead 
to a reduction in paid hours and to an even larger increase in unpaid hours among 
mothers. Additional children are not related to paternal paid hours, although fathers 
spend slightly more time performing unpaid childcare.  
 
In the fourth chapter, I estimate the impact of schooling on academic performance in 
high school. Additional schooling is associated with significant improvements in 
 iii
reading, mathematics, and science performance, but it confers the same benefits in 
each area to students across the conditional distribution of academic performance, as 
well as to both sexes and to students from high and low income families.  
 
I examine the relationship between prospective student debt load and postsecondary 
attendance in the fifth chapter. The results indicate that reduced prospective debt load 
raise university enrolment only among students facing lower net returns to attending.  
 
The final chapter summarizes the findings, highlights the contributions to the 
literature, discusses policy implications, and sets forth directions for future research. 
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In this thesis, I investigate the process of acquiring human capital at different stages in 
young people’s lives. I do so by looking at three mediating players: parents, schools, 
and government. In the first two essays (Chapters 2 and 3), I estimate the relationship 
between family size and various aspects of child quality, such as academic test scores 
and parental investments in children (including financial and time investments). In the 
third essay (Chapter 4), I estimate the impact of schooling on academic performance 
for different groups of students. In other words, to what extent does more schooling 
generate improved academic performance, and how do returns vary by student 
characteristics? In the fourth essay (Chapter 5), I estimate the impact of prospective 
student debt load on postsecondary attendance among youth from low-income 
families, holding liquidity constraints constant. The contribution of the thesis is to 
provide empirical evidence to the relevant literatures. As a result, there is a strong 
focus on identifying causal relationships (rather than mere correlations) throughout 
the chapters. The thesis also has a Canadian focus throughout.  
 
Understanding the process of human capital development has important policy 
implications. First, the benefit of human capital to individuals and society is largely 
unquestioned in the economics literature. For example, studies estimating the causal 
impact of schooling on individual earnings have yielded estimated returns in the 
neighbourhood of 10% per additional year of schooling (Card, 2001). This result also 
holds in Canada based on causal evidence by Lemieux and Card (2001). Recent 
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studies have also linked education to improved civic participation. Using exogenous 
variation in compulsory school laws to instrument for education, Milligan, Moretti, 
and Oreopoulos (2004) find that educational attainment is linked to political interest 
and involvement in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Higher 
educational attainment has also been linked to reduced hospitalization rates. Arendt 
(2008) uses a Danish school reform to identify the relationship, and finds that higher 
education reduces the probability of being hospitalized for women, and reduces the 
probability of being diagnosed with selected lifestyle related illnesses for men.  
 
Second, there are also macroeconomic benefits to human capital. Literacy 
performance, one measure of human capital, has been linked to economic growth (as 
measured by Gross Domestic Product—GDP—per capita). Coulombe and Tremblay 
(2006) use data from 14 countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and create synthetic cohorts based on literacy scores and GDP 
per capita. They find a positive and significant association between the two, although 
the authors readily admit to the possibility of endogeneity.   
 
Third, understanding the factors associated with human capital acquisition provides 
policymakers with the instruments for influencing academic achievement and 
educational attainment. For example, in Chapters 2 and 3, I examine the role of family 
size on academic outcomes of children and parental investments in child well-being. 
However, family size can itself be a policy target since fertility may be malleable 
through financial incentives. In Chapter 4, I estimate the impact of schooling on 
academic outcomes. Many provincial jurisdictions in Canada and the world monitor 
academic progress of children by administering standardized tests to students in 
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various school grades. However, as students age, their academic performance may 
improve for many reasons, including learning through the school system, but also 
perhaps through interactions with their parents, siblings, friends, or self-learning 
(watching television, reading, etc.) I adopt an approach that allows for estimating the 
role of additional schooling in shaping academic performance, essentially answering 
the question “How much learning occurs in schools?” Policymakers can use this 
information to determine if more resources need to be devoted to schools, or if other 
avenues should be explored. Finally, in Chapter 5, I estimate the impact of 
prospective student debt load on postsecondary access. This has obvious implications 
for policy, as governments around the developed world are heavily involved in 
determining not only the level of total aid provided to students, but also the mix of 
loans and grants.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to briefly summarizing each of the essays. In 
Sections 1.2 to 1.5, I describe Chapters 2 to 5, respectively. I then conclude this 
chapter by setting the stage for the remainder of the thesis in Section 1.6. 

!"#!
 
In Chapter 2, I estimate the impact of family size (i.e. number of children) on child 
quality measures, including academic performance (as measured by a standardized 
test in reading), as well as parental investments in the child (i.e. savings earmarked for 
postsecondary education—PSE, private school enrolment, and the number of 
computers in the home per child). All child quality measures are garnered at age 15 
from a survey of youth. 
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The identification of the causal relationship between family size and child quality is 
an important consideration. Preferences for child quality may have a direct impact on 
optimal family size. For this reason, I instrument the number of children in the family 
with an event that is arguably exogenous: the incidence of a multiple birth on the 
second or later birth.  
 
An important contribution of this chapter is to investigate possible reasons why family 
size doesn’t necessarily have the same impact on child outputs as it does on child 
inputs. This is the first study to do so. 
 
$"#$ 
 
Chapter 3 is a follow up to Chapter 2. Larger families are expected to contribute 
towards reducing investments in children for the simple reason that more children are 
drawing on fixed resources. However, larger families may also increase parental time 
spent at home (as opposed to the paid workplace). This may counter-balance the 
effect of spreading investments on children more thinly (assuming more parental 
contact benefits the child).  Hence, this chapter looks at the impact of family size on 
the allocation of both paid and unpaid labour of the mother and the father.   
 
Once again, identification is an issue since families with certain preferences for 
labour-leisure allocation may, as a result, have certain preferences for fertility. Using 
Census data, I instrument the number of children using the same approach as in 
Chapter 2 (i.e. the incidence of a multiple birth on the second or later birth). I also 
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adopt an alternative instrumental variable approach used in this literature: the sex 
composition of the first two children. Families often prefer to have a boy and a girl; if 
they fail in achieving their goal after two children, they may be compelled to have a 
third child. Note that this approach is not typically used in the child quality literature 
since the sex of one’s siblings may directly influence child quality. 
 
This chapter represents the first study to look at the impact of family size on unpaid 
work patterns of the parents. This is important for two reasons. First, as mentioned 
above, increased parental contact with the child may counter-balance the effect of a 
decline in parental investments on child quality (following an increase in family size). 
Second, the theoretical literature regarding household labour supply decisions and 
fertility invariably incorporates decisions pertaining to unpaid work. The empirical 
evidence in this chapter will inform this aspect of the literature. 
 
%"#%
 
In this chapter, I estimate the impact of schooling on academic performance. In other 
words, to what extent do students learn in school? The answer to this question is not 
obvious. School marks are based on different standards that depend on the school 
grade. Governments often assess students in different grades with standardized tests, 
but again, the content of the tests depends on the school grade. Even if one could 
administer the same test to a student in successive years, and assume that the student 
forgets the specific questions in the meantime, it would still not be possible to 
measure the impact that schooling has on the learning process. The reason is simple: 
in the intervening year between the tests, the student may have learned relevant 
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material from multiple sources (e.g. parents, siblings, friends, media, books, museums, 
etc.)  
 
The approach used in this chapter is to exploit a setting whereby students of very 
close age wrote the same tests (in reading, mathematics, and science), but were in 
different school grades because of the existence of school age of entry laws. To 
estimate the impact of schooling on academic performance, I apply a regression 
discontinuity estimator nested in an IV framework, based on the exact date of birth 
and the school entry laws.  
 
An important advance in this chapter is the analysis of heterogeneity in the results (i.e. 
across the conditional distribution of academic performance, as well as by sex and 
parental income). To date, no study has placed such a heavy emphasis on the variation 
in school effects. Without a doubt, understanding for whom the school system works 
is of critical importance for education policy.  
 
&"#&
 
Most of the work in the area of student financial aid and postsecondary access has 
focused on the impact of liquidity constraints (i.e. the total aid provided). However, 
the nature of the aid itself (grant or loan) may also influence decisions of youth since 
a higher debt load may prevent them from participating in certain activities following 
graduation (e.g. buying a home, starting a family, etc.), as well as the decision to 
attend in the first place (based on net returns). This chapter focuses on the latter of the 
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two by estimating the impact of prospective student debt load on the probability of 
pursuing a postsecondary education.   
 
To estimate this relationship, the ideal situation would be an exogenous increase in 
expected debt, but with no change in total student financial aid provided. Beginning in 
2005, such programs were implemented in Canada.  
 
Specifically, the government introduced large grants to students whose parental 
income fell below a certain threshold. If parental income was above the threshold, no 
grant was offered. A critical feature of the grant was that it did not provide additional 
aid; it was simply clawed back from loans. As a result, student debt decreased for 
eligible students, but liquidity constraints remained constant. To estimate the impact 
of this decline in student loans, I use longitudinal income tax data that matches youth 
to their parents, and allows one to ascertain whether the youth has pursued 
postsecondary education.  
 
Two estimation approaches are used. The first is a differences-in-differences 
estimator (which examines changes in the gap in postsecondary enrolment between 
eligible and non-eligible youth over time in different jurisdictions—the programs 
were not introduced at the same time in each jurisdiction). The second approach is a 
regression discontinuity estimator, given the sharp discontinuity in grant eligibility 
based on parental income.  
 
A small handful of studies around the world evaluate the impact of prospective debt 
on attendance, but given the nature of the policy changes examined, these are mainly 
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limited to a differences-in-differences approach. This chapter represents the first study 
on the topic using a regression discontinuity approach.  
 
Another important innovation is to consider specific circumstances where youth may 
be more sensitive to debt. I present a simple theoretical model to argue that although 
the net benefit to attending PSE should rise as loan repayment is lowered, the demand 
for PSE will only increase if students initially considered PSE to be a bad investment 
(relative to no PSE). I then argue that supply side constraints may result in no change 
in overall enrolment, but rather a re-allocation of students offered positions in PSE 
institutions. I test this hypothesis by estimating attendance effects for groups of 
students who may face lower net returns to PSE; specifically, males (who face lower 
labour market returns to PSE) and students who were raised far from a university 
(who face higher costs of attending). 
 
'

	
 
This thesis seeks to add to the current knowledge in the literature on human capital 
acquisition. The actions of three agents are examined in particular: parents, schools, 
and government. Government may intervene directly in the human capital 
development of youth or it may attempt to influence outcomes through mediating 
players such as parents or schools. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, I examine the impact of family 
size on child quality. A related topic appears in Chapter 3, where I investigate the 
relationship between family size and parental labour supply (including paid and 
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unpaid work). In Chapter 4, I estimate the impact of schooling on academic 
performance. In Chapter 5, I examine the impact of prospective debt load on 
postsecondary attendance. Finally, the thesis is tied together and put into perspective 
in Chapter 6. To this end, I summarize the thesis, highlight the key contributions to 
our knowledge of human capital acquisition among youth, discuss their policy 
implications, and finally, list several possibilities for future research. 
 
 
 

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
 10
!#"(

)#
 
!


 
In this chapter, I estimate the impact of family size (i.e. number of children) on 
various measures of child quality. As with any production function, the child quality 
production function consists of some measure of child output (e.g. academic 
performance, educational attainment, labour market success, etc.), which is 
determined by child inputs. Child inputs may be initiated by the behaviour of parents, 
friends, teachers, governments, etc.  
 
For the purposes of this chapter, I focus on academic performance as a measure of 
output. This is measured by results from a standardized test in reading.1 On the input 
side, I consider parental behaviour since it is the parents who may be influenced by 
family size. Parental investments in children may be financial or non-financial in 
nature. In this chapter, I consider financial inputs. Measures of financial investments 
include private school enrolment, the number of computers in the home per child, and 
saving for the child’s postsecondary education.  
 
                                                 
1  The literature often uses the term ‘cognitive ability’ when studying test scores. When I refer to my 
own work, I opt to use the more neutral ‘academic performance’, which may encompass cognitive 
ability, but also non-cognitive abilities (e.g. motivation to perform well on tests). However, I often 
use the term ‘cognitive ability’ when referring to previous work to be consistent with their 
terminology. In all cases, however, I am referring to test scores.  
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Using a survey of 15 year old Canadian youth, I instrument fertility with the incidence 
of a multiple birth on the second or later birth. Parents who have twins on their first 
try may have always planned to have two children. In contrast, it is likely that a 
multiple birth on the second or later birth would generate more children than 
originally planned given the small size of the typical modern family. The findings 
suggest that increased family size is linked to lower parental investments in children, 
but is not negatively linked to child test scores. In fact, test scores improve by 16% of 
a standard deviation, which is significant at 10%.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, I will review the literature 
on fertility and child quality. This review will describe both the theoretical and 
empirical works in the area. Next, I will undertake the empirical analyses of fertility 
and child quality in Section 2.3 (Methodology), Section 2.4 (Descriptive results), and 
Section 2.5 (Econometric results). In Section 2.6, I discuss and explore potential 
explanations behind the finding that increased family size is linked to lower parental 
investments in children, but is not negatively linked to child test scores. The chapter 
concludes in Section 2.7.  
 
!! 
 
Overview 
 
The literature regarding fertility is multifaceted. Indeed, countless theoretical and 
empirical studies have examined several factors related to the determination of 
fertility, as well as the impact of fertility on various other outcomes. Moreover, this 
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literature is multidisciplinary. Although demographers were the first to become 
interested in fertility (for obvious reasons), economists entered the field when it 
became clear that the existing demographic models of fertility were not designed to 
account for changing patterns of fertility in the postwar era (i.e. the baby boom). 
According to Becker (1960), socio-economic factors were largely absent from 
demographic models of fertility. These models were simple extrapolations of past 
trends, and at best would occasionally adjust for changes in the composition of age, 
sex, and marital status of the population. Consequently, economists such as Gary 
Becker and many others have undertaken to apply more stringent economic principles 
to the study of fertility. Incidentally, the works of Becker have been espoused by 
many sociologists, who have also become keen stakeholders in the broad field of 
fertility. 
 
Providing an overview of all the dimensions of the fertility literature is beyond the 
scope of this review. The objective here is far more modest, albeit more focused: I 
will attempt to summarize and synthesize the major theoretical and empirical works in 
the literature related to this chapter. 
 
The structure of this section is as follows. First, I will review the theoretical articles in 
the literature. The major aim here is to highlight the assumptions of the models and 
(perhaps more importantly) the testable hypotheses implied by the models. Second, I 
will move into the empirical branch of the literature. As we shall see, studies abound 
in this area. However, all studies face a major hurdle from the first: finding an 
exogenous source of variation in fertility. This point was actually implied much 
earlier by some of the theoretical work, although many of the early empirical works 
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paid little attention to the identification of the causal effects of fertility. Finally, I will 
position the current chapter within the context of the literature reviewed in this section. 
Specifically, I will elaborate on how the chapter contributes to the literature.  
 
Theoretical literature 
 
The economic predictions underpinning the relationship between fertility and 
investment in children are based on Becker’s “Quantity-Quality” theory. This model 
was first presented in Becker (1960), and was further elaborated upon by Becker and 
Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1976).  
 
Prior to Gary Becker and subsequent work by other economists, fertility theory was 
largely the domain of demographers. However, these models failed to predict the 
rapid increase in fertility rates following the Second World War in many 
industrialized countries. As Becker (1960) notes, this may relate to the fact that the 
demographic models were quite crude. They were either simple extrapolations of past 
trends for the population as a whole, or for specific subgroups defined by sex, age, 
and marital status. The models were, in fact, largely devoid of economic content.  
 
Becker began to remedy the situation by examining the relationship between 
household income and family size. Previously, the 18th and 19th Century political 
economist/demographer Thomas Robert Malthus had assumed that family size should 
increase with household income. In other words, Malthus assumed that children were 
normal goods. Moreover, he assumed that the elasticity between the two should be 
quite large for two reasons. First, child mortality rates typically decline as income 
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rises. Second, a rise in income increases the prospects for marriage, and thus, the 
opportunity to produce children.  
 
However, empirical data often suggested a negative relationship between the number 
of children and household income. Rather than simply assume that children were 
inferior goods or that higher income couples faced a higher price of producing a child, 
Becker began investigating other possibilities in a more structured economic 
framework. 
 
Becker assumed that children are consumer goods rather than producer goods. This is 
because the net costs of children are likely to be positive (i.e. the total cost of having a 
child is likely greater than the total revenue). The total cost includes direct costs (i.e. 
food, clothing, and shelter) and parental time necessary to raise the child, which has 
implied opportunity costs related to market time. Total revenue includes revenue 
arising from child labour. The assumption that children are consumer goods allowed 
Becker to use the theory of demand for consumer goods, which proved to be quite 
useful. 
 
The fundamental distinction between Becker’s theory of children as consumer 
durables and a more standard approach is that Becker assumed that parents would 
purchase two aspects of “children”: the number of children and the quality per child. 
The implications are that the household seeks to maximize utility as a function of the 
number of children (N), the quality per child (Q), and some composite good (X), 
subject to a nonlinear budget constraint, as shown below: 
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Subject to: 
  
MXpNQp XC =+ )2.2( , 
 
where U denotes the utility function, p refers to price, C refers to “children” (in a 
broad sense, including both the number and the average quality), and M denotes 
income. Note the interaction between the number of children and the quality per child.  
 
Specifying the budget constraint in such a way addresses an important 
mischaracterization about the cost of children faced by higher income households. 
While it is true that these households spend more per child, this is simply because 
they aim for higher quality children. The cost per unit of total child goods (pc) is not 
necessarily higher for them.  
 
As noted by Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1997) in their overview of the economics of 
fertility in developed countries, one implication of the consumer choice problem 
described above is: 
 
1)1()( )3.2( =−++ XQN εαεεα , 
 
where α is the share of household income spent on children and ε denotes income 
elasticity. If “children” (i.e. quantity multiplied by quality) are normal goods, then 
 16
0)( >+ QN εε ; however, this does not preclude the possibility that 0<Nε if Qε  is 
positive enough. In other words, the oft-cited negative relationship between income 
and the number of children does not necessarily imply that children (as defined by 
quantity multiplied by quality) are inferior goods. The number of children may be an 
inferior good (i.e. 0<Nε ), but total child services is not necessarily an inferior good. 
Becker further argued that Nε  is likely positive, albeit somewhat small. The reasons 
he gives include the possibility that tastes vis-à-vis quality and quantity vary 
systematically by income (likely because of social pressures), as well as the positive 
relationship between income and knowledge of contraceptives. The latter point is a 
supply side argument, while the former lies on the demand side. To support the supply 
side argument, Becker cites several data sources suggesting that when knowledge of 
contraceptives is equal across the income distribution, fertility tends to rise with 
income.  
 
The very real possibility that 0N ≠ε  implies that fertility is endogenous to household 
income. Moreover, fertility may be endogenous to the well known correlates of 
income, such as education, work hours, labour market experience, etc. As a result, 
empirical studies examining the impact of fertility on other outcomes (such as work 
hours, as is envisioned in the next chapter) will necessarily have to deal with the 
underlying endogeneity of fertility. For the moment, however, this discussion is left 
for Chapter 3. 
 
Returning to the consumer problem described above, the first order conditions were 
derived more formally in Becker and Lewis (1973). They are: 
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and 
 
QCQ MCNMCMU λλ == )5.2( , 
 
where MU  is the marginal utility, MC  is the marginal cost, and λ  is the marginal 
utility of income. Rearranging these equations, we obtain the following marginal rate 
of substitution between the number of children and the quality per child: 
 
NQMCMCMUMU QNQN /// )6.2( == . 
 
So, the relative cost of the number of children rises as the ratio of quality to quantity 
rises. This has strong implications for the relationship between quantity and quality 
(i.e. fertility and child investments). First, as the relative costs change, there is a 
substitution between quantity and quality. For example, if the relative cost of quantity 
rises, consumers substitute quality for quantity. Second, as income rises, there is also 
a substitution of quality for quantity as long as NQ εε > .
2 Becker and Lewis (1973) and 
Willis (1973) believed this to be empirically plausible. This is due to an income effect 
(related to the elasticities), as well as a substitution effect (related to the implied 
change in the marginal costs resulting from the changing ratio of quality over 
quantity). 
                                                 
2  Note that Hotz et al. (1997) mistakenly report on two occasions that the necessary condition 
is QN εε > . 
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The upshot of this discussion is that the Quantity-Quality Model implies a trade-off 
between these two characteristics of “children”. In other words, the theoretical 
expectation derived from this model is that increased fertility will lead to a reduction 
in child quality.  
 
Empirical literature 
 
This section considers the main empirical studies related to the impact of fertility on 
child quality. The main challenge faced by researchers has been the potential 
endogeneity of fertility to child quality. Consequently, an important feature of this 
part of the literature review consists of highlighting the development of identification 
strategies over the years. Another challenge faced by some studies relates to small 
samples resulting from the chosen identification strategy. For example, some authors 
use the event of a twin birth to identify the causal impact of fertility. Since twins are 
relatively rare, standard datasets often do not produce sufficient twin cases to yield 
reliable estimates. 
 
The objective of the empirical studies on fertility and child quality is to test Becker’s 
Quantity–Quality theory. In other words, the studies aim to test the implied negative 
relationship between the number of children and the quality per child. Child quality is 
often based on some measured outcome of child success, such as academic 
performance, educational attainment, or even labour market success later in life.  
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As noted by Cáceras-Delpiano (2006), these can be viewed as the outputs in a child 
production function. Most of the literature has actually adopted this approach. 
However, the spirit of Becker’s Quantity–Quality theory is that parents faced with 
more children will reduce their investments in child quality. That is, family size will 
affect parental behaviour vis-à-vis child inputs, but the overall child output is 
somewhat beyond complete control of the parents. Other factors may enter the child 
production function, and some of these factors may be completely unrelated to 
parental investments in child quality. As a result, a desirable objective in this 
literature is to use data sources containing direct measures of parental investments, 
such as enrolling their children in private schools, purchasing learning equipment in 
the home (e.g. a computer or educational books), saving for postsecondary studies, etc. 
 
Another empirical issue is the fact that family size and birth order are necessarily 
related. For purely mechanical reasons, children from larger families are, on average, 
later-born compared to children from smaller families. The end result is that the 
omission of a birth order control variable may lead to omitted variable bias in the 
estimate of the effect of family size on child quality. I will return to this point below 
when we encounter studies that fail to include a birth order variable. 
 
Given the discussion above regarding the need for relatively large datasets in order to 
properly exploit the twin birth identification strategy, the total requirements from the 
data are quite limiting. The ideal study would utilize a large dataset with information 
on twin births, sibling birth order, and parental investments in child outcomes. Large 
datasets usually come in two forms: administrative data and census survey data. 
Fortunately, census survey and administrative data usually contain birth order 
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information. However, administrative data contain little or no information on parental 
investments in child success, while census survey data may contain some limited 
information on parental investments. An alternative approach is to exploit surveys of 
children or youth, which usually contain all of the required information (i.e. 
information on twin births, birth order, and parental investments). The challenge is to 
find such a survey with a sufficient sample size to properly implement the twin birth 
identification strategy. 
 
As noted earlier, most of the literature on fertility and child quality has focused on 
child outcomes. This is probably due to a lack of data, or perhaps to a more policy-
oriented objective. Indeed, it may be argued that policymakers may only be interested 
in the final outcome related to child success. Whatever the motives behind the studies, 
I begin this section by reviewing them before transitioning into the more recent work 
looking directly at parental investments. 
 
A significant portion of the early works can be found in the psychology literature. 
One example is Olneck and Bills (1979), who cite several earlier studies. In their 
paper, the authors study a sample of males who attended public schools in Kalamazoo, 
Michigan between 1928 and 1950. Students were initially administered sixth grade 
aptitude tests. They were then followed several decades later and asked questions 
regarding their educational attainment, occupation, and earnings. Using regression 
analysis, their findings suggest that family size is negatively related to aptitude test 
scores, educational attainment, occupational status, and earnings. These findings are 
consistent with the vast majority of earlier descriptive (i.e. non-causal) studies. 
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This is not to say that non-causal studies in this literature were completely ignorant of 
the identification issues. To illustrate, I turn to Blake (1981). Using a variety of small 
scale youth surveys primarily from the United States, she consistently finds a negative 
relationship between family size and child outcomes such as college plans and 
educational attainment. Although she adopts no identification strategy, she discusses 
the usefulness of controlling for detailed socio-economic background characteristics. 
Moreover, Blake notes that these controls may not be enough since couples may 
choose family size based on unobserved characteristics. As an example, she notes the 
possibility that couples may stop after their first birth if the child is of poor quality. In 
other words, there may be positive selection into larger families. Blake then proceeds 
to argue that if a negative relationship between family size and child outcomes is 
found, which is almost always the case in the literature, the positive selection into 
larger families implies an understatement (upward bias) of the negative effect of 
family size on child quality.  
 
What Blake did not acknowledge was the possibility that the selection process could 
work in the opposite direction. For example, imagine a highly educated, highly 
motivated dual earner (high income) couple. It is quite possible that this couple may 
prefer to have fewer children if the marginal costs of doing so are high. Going back to 
Becker’s early work on fertility (Becker, 1960), he noted that the income elasticity of 
fertility could very well be positive, but there is nothing in his model that suggested 
that this must be the case. If one assumes that there is a positive relationship between 
parental income and child quality (perhaps through genetic transmission), then a 
negative income elasticity of fertility would imply negative selection into larger 
 22
families. If this were the case, then the common result that family size and child 
quality are negatively related would be overstated (biased downwards). 
 
The consistency of the negative relationship between family size and child quality not 
only manifests itself from one study to the next, but also among different populations. 
For example, Wolfe (1982) examines the relationship among a largely black sample 
of the four and seven year olds who were born in two Philadelphia hospitals between 
1959 in 1966. The sample was largely black since the maternity clinics in question 
provided inexpensive care. Wolfe finds that family size is negatively related to two 
measures of IQ (Intelligence Quotient) for black males and black females; however, 
the relationship is stronger for black females. 
 
Although the studies by Olneck and Bills (1979), Blake (1981), and Wolfe (1982) 
paid little or no attention to the causal impact of family size on child quality, they 
cannot be faulted for omitting a key variable in their analysis, namely birth order. As 
noted above, birth order is an important control variable since larger families 
necessarily have higher birth orders. A more recent paper by Hill and O’Neill (1994) 
examines the relationship between family size and cognitive achievement from a 
nationally representative sample of young children in the United States. The authors 
find a large negative relationship, but they do not control for birth order. Why is this 
important? Studies of birth order effects typically find that first-borns have outcomes 
that are at least as good as later-borns. However, as noted by Kantarevic and 
Mechoulan (2006), most studies understate the effect of being a first born on 
outcomes. Why? Because these children had access to fewer parental resources in 
their infancy since their mothers were necessarily younger than later-borns. Once they 
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control for maternal age at birth, Kantarevic and Mechoulan find that the average 
educational attainment of first-borns is significantly higher than that of later-borns. If 
it is indeed the case that birth order and child quality are negatively related, and birth 
order is positively related to family size, then omitting birth order in a child quality 
equation will bias the estimated relationship between family size and child quality 
downwards. In other words, one of the reasons why child quality is lower among 
larger families may simply be related to the fact that children in larger families have 
higher average birth orders. 
 
Despite differences in model specification, a consensus was reached in the literature 
concerning the negative relationship between family size and child quality. Given the 
selection into marriage and the availability of contraceptives, family size is largely a 
choice. This raises the possibility that family size may depend on child quality, or that 
the two are co-determined by some extraneous factor. In any event, it became clear in 
the literature that more rigorous methods had to be applied than simple cross-sectional 
regressions. More specifically, the identification of the causal impact of fertility on 
child quality had to be addressed. 
 
One attempt at doing so comes from Hanushek (1992). He uses data from the Gary 
Income Maintenance Experiment. This social experiment applied to low-income black 
families in Gary, Indiana. The experiment consisted of a negative income tax for the 
treatment group; however, this feature of the data was not (and probably could not be) 
used by Hanushek. Instead, the author exploited the longitudinal nature of the data. 
School-age students of the families in the experiment were tested in reading and 
vocabulary achievement on two occasions, with a four year interval. Hanushek 
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examined changes in the test scores in relation to changes in family size, which he 
called a value added approach. This approach yields two benefits over a standard 
cross sectional regression. First, it “differences out” time invariant individual traits 
that may affect child quality. This may resolve the selection into larger families; 
however, the decision to change one’s family size may also be a selective process. As 
a result, the value added approach may still suffer from endogeneity. Second, cross-
sectional studies do not consider the timing of the inputs into the child quality 
production function. They simply aggregate the inputs over past history, and associate 
them with current output. The value added approach considers the introduction of the 
inputs and its contemporaneous impact on the output. 
 
Once again, the findings from the Hanushek study confirm previous studies. An 
increase in family size is associated with a decrease in reading and vocabulary 
achievement. For the reasons cited above, Hanushek’s value added approach is 
superior to the descriptive regression approach adopted by most previous studies. 
However, the value added approach still does not convincingly solve the identification 
puzzle. To find a method that comes closer to doing so, we need to consider studies 
that have used the event of twin births as an exogenous increase in family size. 
 
The rationale behind the exogeneity of twin births is relatively straightforward: 
having twins is largely an unplanned event. Couples may expect a higher probability 
of having twins if they seek fertility treatment, or if there is a family history of twins. 
In the majority of cases, however, a twin birth is unexpected. As a result, it may 
generate a larger family than originally planned. If that is the case, the number of 
children would be exogenously determined. Furthermore, the effect of family size on 
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various outcomes (including child quality) could then be examined in a more causal 
framework. 
 
The first study to use twin births as an exogenous shift in the number of children was 
by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a). They examine the impact of twinning on years 
of schooling among children by using a dataset consisting of Indian households. The 
actual specification of the twin variable is noteworthy. They use the twin ratio, which 
is the number of twin births divided by the total number of births. They argue that the 
incidence of twins causes a selection bias for two reasons. First the probability of 
having a twin rises with the total number of births even if the probability of having a 
twin is the same for each birth. Put in different terms, P(A or B) > P(A) even if P(A) 
= P(B), where P is the probability and A and B denote the incidence of twins on given 
births, and B is a later birth than A. In the event that P(A) = P(B), the twin ratio will 
not be endogenous to family size. Second, there is evidence in the United States that 
the probability of having a twin increases with each successive birth. However, in this 
case, both the incidence of twins and the twin ratio are endogenous to family size.  
 
Another criticism of Rosenzweig and Wolpin’s twin variable specification is that 
twins on the first birth may not necessarily generate more children than originally 
planned. A simple example can help clarify this point. Suppose a couple marries and 
plans to have two children. On their first birth, the wife delivers twins. Since the 
couple met their original goal of having two children, they decide to stop after the first 
birth. Now suppose that the very same couple did not have twins on the first birth, but 
rather, they had a singleton birth. Since they haven’t met their original goal of having 
two children, they decide to try once more. This time around, the wife delivers twins, 
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and the couple is left with three children (one more than originally planned). In this 
example, where the desired number of children equals two, only a twin birth on the 
second birth will generate more children than originally planned. Since most couples 
who choose to have children have at least two, a twin birth on the second or later birth 
is more likely to generate an exogenous increase in family size compared to having 
twins on the first birth. It is for this very reason that subsequent studies that have 
adopted a twins identification strategy have focused on twin births occurring on the 
second or later birth.  
  
Rosenzweig and Wolpin find that twinning is negatively related to years of schooling. 
Introducing the twin variable directly into the child quality equation marks a departure 
from other studies in the literature. The authors do not attempt to estimate the role of 
family size on the child outcome. The advantage of including the twins variable 
directly is that there is no need to be concerned about whether or not twinning has a 
direct effect on the dependent variable (years of schooling in this case).  
 
An alternative approach would have been to use the twin variable as an instrument for 
fertility. This would, in effect, be a rescaling of the twins effect into the metric of 
family size. From both the policy and theoretical point of view, this rescaling would 
have been preferred. The authors do note that the twin variable is positively related to 
family size. However, they do not present standard errors. As a result, it is not clear if 
their twin variable would be a strong instrument (i.e. strongly correlated with the 
problem variable – fertility). In the end, all we can conclude is that years of schooling 
declines as twinning rises. Little can be assumed about the role of fertility on years of 
schooling.  
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Another criticism of the study relates to the low sample size. Once all the sample 
selection criteria are applied, the authors are left with 25 twins, which the authors 
claim are sufficient. Although they find large and significant results, there is no 
guarantee that their findings are not driven by sampling error (i.e. the possibility that 
the 25 twins in the sample are not necessarily representative of all twins in the 
population).  
 
The next study to adopt the twins approach in the fertility and child quality literature 
was Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005). They look at the educational attainment in 
adulthood of all Norwegian children from administrative data. This study offers 
several advantages over previous ones. First, it considers the entire population as 
opposed to a sample. This can be particularly important when looking at variables 
such as twin births or even birth order. Second, the authors instrument family size 
with the multiple birth variable. In other words, the study expresses the impact of 
multiple births on child outcomes in the metric of family size. Finally, the 
specification of the twin birth variable is somewhat different than the one adopted by 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a). Black et al. only consider twin births on the second 
or later births. They also only consider twin births if it is the last birth (otherwise, the 
twin birth could not possibly yield the desired number of children unless the 
subsequent singleton birth was not planned). Another important distinction in the 
study by Black et al. is that they do not consider child outcomes for children involved 
in the last birth. This is important since the last birth includes some twins, who may 
be different than singletons for biological or environmental reasons. 
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In part because of their superior data, but also because of their methodological 
improvements, the Black et al. study is likely the most convincing empirical work in 
the area to date. This is important given their findings. They initially find a negative 
relationship between family size and educational attainment in their basic regressions. 
However, the magnitude of this relationship becomes much smaller (albeit still 
statistically significant) once birth order is added to the model. Furthermore, the 
relationship disappears once the multiple birth instrumental variable approach is 
adopted. 
 
In a very recently published study, the same authors use similar, but more recent 
Norwegian data to investigate the link between fertility and cognitive ability (Black, 
Devereux, and Salvanes, 2010). In contrast to their earlier work, they find a negative 
relationship. They attribute this finding to the fact that they examine more recent birth 
cohorts. This highlights the importance of taking into account not only the country, 
but also the period of the data when considering the evidence in this or any other 
literature.  
 
Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2005) use the same multiple birth IV strategy as Black 
et al. (2005 and 2010) to investigate a broader range of outcomes, including 
educational attainment, labour market outcomes (hours of work and earnings), and 
marriage and fertility from Israeli census data.3 They come to the conclusion that 
there is no trade-off between child quantity and quality.  
 
                                                 
3  They also use the sex composition of the first two children as an IV. I return to this point in the 
methodology section.  
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A more direct approach to testing the Quantity-Quality theory is to assess the impact 
of additional children on parental investments per child. This is the approach adopted 
by Cáceras-Delpiano (2006), who uses US census data to study the impact of family 
size on child outcomes (grade retention), parental investments (private school 
enrolment), and parental labour supply (maternal labour force participation). The 
study also uses the incidence of a multiple birth on the second or later birth as an 
instrument for fertility. Cáceras-Delpiano demonstrates that increased family size has 
little impact on grade retention. This might be the result of potentially 
counterbalancing effects that are also noted in the study, namely that family size is 
negatively related to private school enrolment and maternal labour force participation. 
 
Contributions of the present chapter to the literature 
 
The chapter contributes to the literature in many ways. First, it is only the second 
study to consider academic performance and fertility using quasi-causal methods. 
This is important given that performance on tests and fertility decisions may be co-
determined. 
 
Second, I also look at direct parental investments in child quality (enrolment in 
private school, computers per child, and parental savings for postsecondary education). 
To the best of my knowledge, the only other study to date that has looked at child 
investments is Cáceras-Delpiano (2006), who does not consider parental savings for 
postsecondary education or computers per child. Clearly, more research is needed on 
child investments since it provides the framework for a more direct test of Becker’s 
Quantity-Quality theory. 
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Third, I will begin exploring various potential explanations behind the findings in the 
literature, suggesting that increased family size is negatively related to parental 
investments in children, but is not always negatively related to overall child quality. 
Three possible explanations are noted. First, parental investments in child quality are 
not necessarily associated with improved child quality. In fact, the empirical literature 
suggests that there is no relationship for the measures of parental investments that 
have been investigated. Second, there may be economies of scale associated with 
rearing more children and/or in selecting effective sibling interactions. A third 
possibility, which was noted by Cáceras-Delpiano (2006), suggests that larger 
families may entice parents to stay home, which may help foster child development. 
To investigate this possibility, a different framework based on parental labour supply 
is required. This is left for Chapter 3. 
 
Finally, I will add Canadian evidence to the body of knowledge. Most of the studies 
to date have been based on US data. Adding evidence from additional countries is 
important because it speaks to the robustness of the US findings in a global context. 
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The data are drawn from the Canadian Youth in Transition Survey (YITS), Cohort A. 
This survey was developed by Statistics Canada in conjunction with the Programme 
for International Student Assessment (PISA), a project of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. PISA consisted of standardized tests in 
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reading, mathematics and science. Although several countries participated in PISA, 
the YITS component was unique to Canada. 
 
The target population consisted of students enrolled in an educational institution on 
December 31, 1999 who were 15 years old on that day—that is, they were born in 
1984. The assessment took place in April or May 2000, depending on the sampled 
school. Furthermore, background questionnaires were administered to students 
through PISA and YITS. Parents and schools were also administered questionnaires 
through YITS and PISA, respectively. The parent most knowledgeable about the child 
answered the parent questionnaire, while the principal of the school answered the 
school questionnaire. Students were followed up every two years afterwards, although 
that information is not needed in this chapter. 
 
Students living in the territories or on Indian reserves, students who were deemed 
mentally or physically unable to perform in the PISA assessment, as well as non-
native speakers with less than one year of instruction in the language of assessment 
were excluded. These exclusions account for less than 4% of the overall population of 
15 year old students. 
 
The survey design consisted of a two-stage approach. In the first stage, a stratified 
sample of schools was selected to ensure adequate coverage in all of the 10 Canadian 
provinces (including adequate coverage of minority school systems in certain 
provinces). The stratification was based on the enrolment of 15 year olds in the school 
in the previous academic year. In the second stage, a simple random sample of 15-
year-old students within the school was selected. Given this complex survey design, 
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the standard errors are calculated using 100 bootstrap weights designed by Statistics 
Canada specifically for this purpose. Note that bootstrapping provides a consistent 
estimate of the standard errors, and as such, will also correct for heteroscedasticity if 
it is present. See Appendix A2.1 for more details on bootstrapping standard errors. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to estimate the impact of family size on child quality 
measures. The identification strategy is based on instrumenting family size with a 
variable indicating the presence of a multiple birth on the second or later birth, as 
described in Appendix A2.2 (Wald estimate) and Appendix A2.3 (Instrumental 
variable, or two-stage least squares, regression). Note that an important limitation of 
instrumental variables is described in Appendix A2.4. 
 
The data offer several useful pieces of information for the purposes of this section. 
For example, the survey contains various measures of child quality (including parental 
investments in child quality), the age of every member of the household, the 
relationship between the sampled youth and every member of the household, and 
various other background characteristics.  
 
The first measure of child quality I consider is a measure of child output, namely the 
PISA reading score. In 2000, the PISA assessment focused primarily on reading, but 
there were also assessments in mathematics and science.4  All students wrote the 
reading exam, while about one half wrote the mathematics exam and the other half 
wrote the science exam. Since only half of the students wrote the mathematics or 
science tests, I focus exclusively on the reading scores in this chapter, as it allows me 
                                                 
4  A description of the three tests and sample questions are shown in Appendix A2.5.  
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to maintain the largest possible sample. The sample size is crucial here because I use a 
multiple birth IV. In any event, the reading portion accounted for about two thirds of 
the total testing time, and was clearly the main objective of PISA for the year 2000. 
 
The assessment was administered in the language of instruction of the school, which 
was either English or French. The reading test consisted of having students perform a 
range of tasks with different kinds of text that included retrieving specific 
information, interpreting text, and reflecting on the content and features of the text. 
The texts included standard prose passages and various types of documents such as 
lists, forms, graphs and diagrams. The test score was standardized to have a mean of 0 
and a standard deviation of 1, as described in Appendix 2.6. 

In the survey, there are several measures of parental investments in child quality (i.e. 
child inputs). The first measure of parental investment that I consider is a binary 
indicator of enrolment in a private school. The principal of the child’s school is asked: 
 
· “Is your school a public or a private school?” 
 
The two options were: 
 
· “A public school. (This is a school managed directly or indirectly by a public 
education authority, government agency, or governing board appointed by 
government or elected by public franchise.)” 
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· “A private school. (This is a school managed directly or indirectly by a non-
government organization; e.g., a church, trade union, businesses, other private 
institutions.)” 
  
As we shall see, the majority of Canadian private schools are sectarian. If it is the case 
that enrolment in private schools largely depends on the parents’ religious affiliation, 
as opposed to a desire to enhance the child’s academic experience, then this variable 
may not serve as a useful input into the child educational production function. For 
robustness, I also look at private, non-sectarian schools. To do so, I also consider 
answers to the question (asked of the principal): 
 
· “What type of school is your institution?” 
 
Again, two options were possible: 
 
· “Non-sectarian (no religious affiliation)” 
· “Sectarian/separate (with religious affiliation, for example Anglican, Catholic, 
Mennonite, etc.)” 
 
The next measure of parental investment is the number of computers in the home per 
child. Students were asked: 
 
· “How many of these do you have at you home?”  
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d) “Computer”5 
 
The choices were: 
 
· “None” 
· “One” 
· “Two” 
· “Three or more” 
 
The number of computers is thus right-censored at three in the survey. About 10% of 
responses fall in the top category. However, according to Statistics Canada’s 2001 
General Social Survey, Cycle 14, which asks households how many computers they 
have in the home, 70% of households with children who report having three or more 
computers in the home in fact only have three computers. As a result, there is only 
very little actual censoring in the YITS data.
 
The third measure of parental investment is a binary indicator of the presence of 
parental savings earmarked for the child’s postsecondary studies. The parent was first 
asked: 
 
· “Have you (or your partner) done anything specific to ensure that {child} will 
have money for further education after high school?” 
 
                                                 
5  The list included other items which did not necessarily signal an intention to invest in children (e.g. 
television, bathroom, etc.)  
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If the answer is yes, they are then asked: 
 
· “What have you (or your partner) done? (MARK ALL THAT APPLY.)” 
 
The list of choices included: 
 
· started a savings account 
· started a Registered Education Savings Plan (RESP) 
· set up a trust fund for this child 
· made investments, such as mutual funds or Canada Savings Bonds 
· started working or took an additional job 
· encouraged child to earn money/get a job 
· encouraged child to work toward a scholarship 
· other, specify 
 
The measure I created for this chapter includes the first four options, which involve 
actual savings. The remaining categories do not necessarily involve any savings 
earmarked for the child’s education. 
 
I also create variables indicating the number of children in the household, the birth 
order of the sampled youth, and an indicator of a multiple birth in the household (used 
as an IV).  
 
It is worth noting that some studies in the child quality literature have used the sex 
composition of children of the first two children as an instrument for fertility (e.g. 
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Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser, 2005; Conley, 2004; Goux and Maurin, 2005). The idea 
is that families may prefer having at least one child of each sex, so having two same 
sex children will incite them to try for another. However, several studies suggest that 
sex composition may have a direct impact on child outcomes, including Butcher and 
Case (1994), Deschênes (2007), Dahl and Moretti (2004), and, ironically, Conley 
(2000). As noted by Black et al. (2005), this suggests that sex composition may not be 
a valid instrument for fertility. For this reason, I do not use the sex composition of the 
first two children as an IV. It will, however, be used as an instrument in the next 
chapter, when the outcome is parental labour supply.   
 
Since the number of siblings, birth order, and the multiple birth indicator are all 
intricately related, I will discuss them in unison below. Before doing so, however, it is 
worthwhile stating the precise definition of a multiple birth used in this study. The 
multiple birth variable is set to 1 if the following three conditions hold: 
 
· There are multiple birth siblings in the household. 
· The multiple birth siblings must have occurred on the second or later birth 
(multiple birth siblings on the first birth are unlikely to yield additional 
children). 
· The multiple birth siblings must have occurred on the last birth (otherwise, 
they could not possibly generate additional children since the couple chose to 
have more children following the multiple birth). 
 
The YITS parent questionnaire contains information on the age of each member of the 
household. From this, it is relatively straightforward to calculate the number of 
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siblings in the household. It is also straightforward to calculate birth order; however, 
age is measured in discrete years. This means that two children who were the same 
age in years cannot be distinguished in terms of birth order. The reporting of age in 
discrete years may also pose a challenge for the identification of multiple birth 
siblings. 
 
The incidence of siblings of the same age in years is likely to be more common in 
blended families where the husband and wife each have children from a previous 
marriage. To address this, I restrict the sample to youth in families where all siblings 
in the household are living with their biological mother. Using an extraneous data 
source containing household member relationships and exact birth dates, I 
demonstrate in Appendix A2.7 that this measure succeeds in identifying true multiple 
birth siblings in about 98% of the cases. 
 
While this measure addresses the issue of birth order among singleton birth children, 
it does not guarantee a proper measure of birth order among multiple birth siblings. 
However, as I will discuss below, I exclude from the analysis any youth who is part of 
a multiple birth. In other words, the youth may have multiple birth siblings, but if the 
youth was part of a multiple birth, I drop him or her. 
 
In the preferred sample described below, I classify 119 youth as having multiple birth 
siblings. Although this is far less than the studies using the US Census (e.g. Cáceras-
Delpiano, 2006) or Norwegian administrative data (Black et al., 2005 and 2010), it is 
far greater than the 25 reported by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a).  
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The other variables used in the analysis include the child’s age (reported in this case 
in months by the student, but rescaled to years in the analysis), the child’s sex, an 
immigrant dummy for the child, the mother and the father’s age (reported in discrete 
years) and their highest level of education, a set of dummy variables indicating 
whether neither of the parents were immigrants, only one parent was an immigrant, or 
both were immigrants, and, finally, the household’s province of residence.6 Note that 
the parental age variables are in quadratic form since their range is potentially quite 
high. For the child, a linear specification is used since the age range is quite narrow, 
as all children in the sample were born in 1984.  
 
All of these variables are potential determinants of child quality, whether on the input 
or output side. Although the youth in the sample were all born in the same year, there 
is a literature suggesting that children who are relatively old for their grade tend to 
perform better. The child sex is important to take into account since we know that 
girls tend to outperform boys according to many studies. The immigrant indicators are 
important since immigrants may face difficulties in learning a new language, thus 
hindering their performance on a reading test in that language. Even if the child does 
speak the language, they may not receive as much help from their parents if they are 
                                                 
6  One variable that is absent from this list is parental income. The reason is that family size may 
influence child quality directly or indirectly through parental income. For example, maternal labour 
supply may decline as family size increases. If parental income were included as a covariate in the 
model, this indirect channel may be removed from the family size coefficient. I return to this point 
after the IV results are shown in Tables 2.9a and 2.9b. Note, however, that the regressions to follow 
will include the standard set of variables that comprise a Mincer wage equation (i.e. the age and 
education level of the mother and father). Unlike income, these variables are not likely to be 
influenced by the number of children. 
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immigrants and do not know the language very well. Finally, the province of 
residence is necessary since education falls under provincial jurisdiction in Canada.  
 
The initial sample consists of all youth with two opposite sex parents in the home, 
including the biological mother of the child.7 As shown on the left side of Table 2.1, 
this includes 18,913 youth. The mean and standard error of each variable used the 
analysis are shown. The process of selecting the final sample involved three more 
steps. In each of the steps, it is important to verify how the selection affected the 
composition of the sample. I do this by tracking the sample statistics for each of the 
variables in each step. 
 
                                                 
7  Since the YITS only contains information on the father if he is present in the household, it is not 
possible to account for paternal characteristics in lone mother families. It may be argued that 
increased fertility can result in divorce, and thus lone mother families; however, I find no such 
evidence in the YITS. Appendix A2.8 shows the results of an IV regression of lone motherhood on 
the number of children, using the multiple birth strategy described in this chapter as an instrument. 
The p-value on the coefficient representing the impact of the number of children on lone motherhood 
is 0.654, suggesting that focusing on households with couples should not bias the results. 
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Table 2.1: Means and standard errors of variables used in the analysis by sample selection criteria
Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e.
Reading score 537.814 1.322 537.946 1.346 539.255 1.344 539.295 1.344
Attends a private school 0.065 0.011 0.065 0.011 0.064 0.011 0.064 0.011
Attends a private, non-sectarian school 0.014 0.005 0.015 0.005 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.005
Computers per child 0.654 0.007 0.658 0.007 0.564 0.006 0.564 0.006
Parents have saved money for PS schooling 0.606 0.005 0.607 0.005 0.610 0.006 0.610 0.006
Number of children 2.351 0.012 2.337 0.012 2.576 0.011 2.573 0.011
Multiple birth 0.012 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.001
Child's birth order 1.585 0.009 1.586 0.009 1.691 0.010 1.687 0.010
Child's age (months/12) 15.789 0.003 15.788 0.003 15.788 0.003 15.788 0.003
Child is a female 0.497 0.006 0.496 0.006 0.493 0.006 0.494 0.006
Child is an immigrant 0.092 0.006 0.092 0.006 0.091 0.006 0.090 0.006
Mother's age (years in integers) 43.118 0.068 43.124 0.069 43.000 0.072 42.995 0.072
Father's age (years in integers) 45.632 0.072 45.640 0.073 45.486 0.078 45.484 0.078
Mother has less than a high school diploma 0.117 0.004 0.116 0.004 0.106 0.004 0.105 0.004
Mother has a high school diploma 0.393 0.006 0.394 0.006 0.396 0.006 0.397 0.006
Mother has a college certificate 0.301 0.005 0.301 0.005 0.304 0.005 0.304 0.005
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.144 0.005 0.143 0.005 0.148 0.005 0.147 0.005
Mother has a professional degree 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.001
Mother has a master's degree 0.030 0.002 0.030 0.002 0.031 0.003 0.031 0.003
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001
Father has less than a high school diploma 0.148 0.005 0.148 0.005 0.138 0.005 0.138 0.005
Father has a high school diploma 0.310 0.005 0.311 0.005 0.311 0.006 0.311 0.006
Father has a college certificate 0.302 0.005 0.302 0.005 0.305 0.006 0.305 0.006
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.151 0.005 0.150 0.005 0.155 0.005 0.155 0.005
Father has a professional degree 0.024 0.002 0.025 0.002 0.027 0.003 0.026 0.003
Father has a master's degree 0.047 0.003 0.047 0.003 0.048 0.003 0.048 0.003
Father has an earned doctorate 0.017 0.002 0.017 0.002 0.017 0.002 0.016 0.002
No immigrant parents 0.713 0.010 0.714 0.010 0.708 0.010 0.708 0.010
One parent is an immigrant 0.186 0.004 0.185 0.004 0.189 0.004 0.103 0.004
Both parents are immigrants 0.021 0.010 0.021 0.010 0.020 0.010 0.189 0.010
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.020 0.001
Prince-Edward-Island 0.033 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.006 0.000
Nova Scotia 0.029 0.001 0.029 0.001 0.028 0.001 0.032 0.001
New Brunswick 0.227 0.001 0.227 0.001 0.217 0.001 0.028 0.001
Québec 0.380 0.004 0.381 0.004 0.391 0.005 0.217 0.005
Ontario 0.037 0.007 0.037 0.007 0.039 0.008 0.391 0.008
Manitoba 0.041 0.001 0.041 0.001 0.041 0.001 0.039 0.001
Saskatchewan 0.109 0.001 0.109 0.001 0.109 0.002 0.041 0.002
Alberta 0.118 0.003 0.117 0.003 0.118 0.003 0.109 0.003
British Columbia 0.117 0.004 0.117 0.004 0.117 0.005 0.118 0.005
N 18,913 18,558 15,598 15,555
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Initial sample of youth 
with two opposite sex 
parents in the home 
Drop if part of a 
multiple birth
Drop if first birth is a 
multiple
Drop if only one birth in 
family
 
 
In the first step, I drop youth who were part of a multiple birth. This is important since 
multiple birth siblings may be different than singleton births for biological or 
environmental reasons. Since youth who have only singleton birth siblings in the 
household cannot possibly be multiple birth siblings themselves, this sample selection 
criterion is necessary to avoid an asymmetry between youth with or without multiple 
birth siblings in the household. The impact of applying this criterion is minimal. The 
sample declines moderately by 355. The average values of the outcome variables are 
virtually unchanged as a result. The average number of children is marginally lower, 
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but this is expected since some youth with a multiple birth sibling were deleted 
(specifically those cases where the sampled youth was part of a multiple birth). The 
proportion of youth with a multiple birth sibling is cut in half, from 0.012 to 0.006. 
Again, this is expected since we dropped sampled youth who were part of a multiple 
birth. All of the other variables in the analysis have similar average values after the 
criterion is applied. 
 
The second step consists of dropping youth in families with only one birth. This 
measure is adopted since multiple birth siblings are more likely to occur in larger 
families. Moreover, a multiple birth on a second or later birth is obviously not 
possible when there is only one birth. The impact on the sample size is a bit larger this 
time: from 18,558 to 15,598. The number of computers per child is somewhat lower, 
which is an early indication of the relationship between family size and this variable. 
Not surprisingly, the average family size and birth order increase. The proportion of 
youth with a multiple birth in the family also increases, but only slightly. All of the 
other variables are largely unaffected. 
 
The fact that the analysis is limited to families with at least two births means that the 
child effect is mainly the result of differences observed between the second and the 
third child (or between the third and fourth, etc.) From this, we cannot draw any 
conclusions about the effect of the first or second child, which may be more policy 
relevant. A priori, it is not clear how the effect varies by number of children. 
Economies of scale might apply, in which case the effect on parental investments 
might diminish with each additional child. On the other hand, additional costs may 
need to be borne by families when certain milestones are reached. For example, a 
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third child might require an additional row of car seats (thus requiring a larger and 
more expansive vehicle). Although the literature has not yet developed an appropriate 
strategy for identifying the effect of first or second children, I will show descriptive 
evidence on the relationship between number of children and the measures of child 
quality used in this chapter for smaller families (i.e. those with one child). 
 
The third step consists of dropping youth in families with a multiple birth on the first 
birth. This action is also necessary to implement the multiple birth strategy since 
many families may want to stop at two children (and thus, a multiple birth on the 
second may have an optimal impact on family size if it follows a singleton). However, 
this resulted in a small decline of 43 and virtually no change to the sample statistics.  
 
To summarize, the sample selection criteria I adopt has very little impact on the 
explanatory variables used in the analysis, other than for specific variables where an 
impact is expected for mechanical reasons. For that reason, the remainder of the 
analysis in this section will be based on the sample described in the rightmost column 
of Table 2.1: all youth with two opposite sex parents in the home, including the 
biological mother of the child, who are not part of a multiple birth, and the family has 
had at least two births (the first being a singleton). 
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I begin the section on descriptive results by simply showing the means of the outcome 
variables by the number of children in the family (Table 2.2). Although the main 
focus from here on will be on youth in families with more than one birth, I include 
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those with no siblings in this table since no identification strategy is applied yet. The 
patterns displayed in the table are quite interesting. First, there is no clear direction for 
the reading score. In fact, the reading score follows an alternating pattern of rising and 
falling with additional children. In terms of private school attendance, the rates are 
fairly consistent across different family sizes (except when we go from 5 to 6 children, 
which is a rare event). This may simply reflect preferences for larger families among 
religious households. When I focus on private, non-sectarian school attendance, the 
rates fall as families become larger. The decline is small in absolute terms, but this is 
because the enrolment rates are quite low to begin with. In relative terms, the declines 
are large. Family size and the number of computers per child are also negatively 
related. One could argue that there are economies of scale associated with computers 
since children may share the same computer by negotiating computer time. However, 
Table 2.2 suggests that on average, families with one child have access to 1.19 
computers, while families with six children share 1.39 computers. It is difficult to 
imagine that children in larger families have the same access to a computer as 
children in smaller families. Finally, the decline in the proportion of parents saving 
for PSE (postsecondary education) is also quite large, going from 0.591 with one 
child to 0.276 with six children. 
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Table 2.2: Means of outcome variables by the number of children in the family
Number of children
1 2 3 4 5 6
Standardized reading score -0.079 0.017 0.010 0.031 -0.065 0.040
Attends a private school 0.068 0.064 0.066 0.064 0.065 0.044
Attends a private, non-sectarian school 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.005 0.000
Computers per child 1.188 0.659 0.469 0.361 0.278 0.232
Parents have saved money for PSE 0.591 0.639 0.607 0.511 0.396 0.276
N 2,960 8,866 4,868 1,392 292 137
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Note: The sample consists of youth with two opposite sex parents in the home (mother is biological), who are not
part of a multiple birth, and the first birth is a singleton.
 
 
The results in Table 2.2 suggest that as families become larger, academic performance 
of children is unchanged, despite the fact that parental investments in child quality 
decline, at least based on the various measures shown in the table. 
 
Of course, the evidence in Table 2.2 is very crude since the number of children is 
largely a choice given the widespread availability of contraceptives. In Table 2.3, I 
focus on the multiple birth IV to begin identifying the impact of fertility on the 
outcomes. From this point forward, I focus on families with more than one birth. 
Youth in a family with a multiple birth have higher reading scores, but a lower 
probability of attending a private school, fewer computers per child in the home, and a 
lower probability of having parents who saved money for postsecondary studies. It is 
interesting to note the large dichotomy in the relationship between (chosen) family 
size and private school enrolment on the one hand (Table 2.2), and the incidence of 
twins and private school enrolment on the other (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3: Means of outcome variables by presence of a multiple birth in the family
Multiple birth=0 Multiple birth=1 ∆
Standardized reading score -0.002 0.284 0.286
Attends a private school 0.065 0.013 -0.051
Attends a private, non-sectarian school 0.014 0.000 -0.014
Computers per child 0.565 0.393 -0.173
Parents have saved money for PSE 0.611 0.504 -0.107
N 15,436 119
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Note: The sample consists of youth with two opposite sex parents in the home (mother is
biological), who are not part of a multiple birth, and the family has had at least two births
(the first being a singleton).
 
 
The results in Table 2.3 strongly suggest that a multiple birth is associated with an 
increase in the child output (i.e. the reading score) and a decrease in child inputs. But 
what impact does a multiple birth have on the number of children and the family? To 
answer this, I generated the average number of children by the presence of a multiple 
birth in the family (Table 2.4). The result suggests that a multiple birth is associated 
with 1.211 additional children in the family. 
 
Table 2.4: Mean number of children by the presence of a multiple birth in the family
Multiple birth=0 Multiple birth=1 ∆
Number of children 2.565 3.776 1.211
N 15,436 119
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Note: The sample consists of youth with two opposite sex parents in the home
(mother is biological), who are not part of a multiple birth, and the family has had
at least two births (the first being a singleton).
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In Table 2.5, I rescale the impact of a multiple birth on the measures of child quality 
by calculating the Wald estimate. This effectively shows the impact of one additional 
child generated by a multiple birth on the child quality measures. Since a multiple 
birth is associated with roughly one additional child (Table 2.4), the Wald estimates 
are actually quite close to the results in Table 2.3. Standard errors are also shown in 
the table. Altogether, the results suggest that one additional child generated from a 
multiple birth is associated with about one quarter of a standard deviation increase in 
the reading score, but a 4.2 (1.2) percentage point decrease in the probability of 
attending a private (private, non-sectarian) school, a 0.142 decline in the number of 
computers per child, and an 8.9 percentage point decline in the probability of having 
parents who saved money for the child’s postsecondary studies. However, 
significance is either quite low (10%) or simply not achieved. 
 
Table 2.5: Wald estimates
Multiple birth=0 Multiple birth=1
Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Wald s.e.
Standardized reading score -0.002 0.008 0.284 0.091 0.236 0.117
Attends a private school 0.065 0.002 0.013 0.010 -0.042 * 0.011
Attends a private, non-sectarian school 0.014 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.012 * 0.004
Computers per child 0.565 0.003 0.393 0.022 -0.142 * 0.031
Parents have saved money for PSE 0.611 0.004 0.504 0.046 -0.089 0.056
Average number of children 2.565 3.776
N 15,436 119
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Note: Statistical significance for the Wald estimate is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%).
The sample consists of youth with two opposite sex parents in the home (mother is biological), who are
not part of a multiple birth, and the family has had at least two births (the first being a singleton). 
 
 
The analysis so far has not taken into account differences in other covariates. This is 
important for at least two reasons. First, although multiple births are likely exogenous, 
it is possible that they are not fully exogenous. Although multiple births have 
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occurred naturally throughout history, they have been associated with fertility drugs in 
recent years. Second, it is still possible that there exist differences in socioeconomic 
characteristics between youth with and without a multiple birth in the family. This is 
especially so in small samples, where sampling variability is likely. For both reasons, 
it is important to account for differences in observable characteristics. In Table 2.6, I 
show the mean values of the relevant covariates by multiple birth status. 
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Table 2.6: Means of explanatory variables by presence of a multiple birth in the family
Multiple birth=0Multiple birth=1 ∆ s.e.
Child's birth order 1.689 1.359 -0.330 *** 0.070
Child's age (months/12) 15.788 15.785 -0.003 0.033
Child is a female 0.494 0.506 0.013 0.069
Child is an immigrant 0.091 0.031 -0.059 *** 0.023
Mother's age (years in integers) 43.003 41.835 -1.169 *** 0.369
Father's age (years in integers) 45.498 43.454 -2.044 *** 0.600
Mother has less than a high school diploma 0.105 0.141 0.036 0.052
Mother has a high school diploma 0.397 0.367 -0.030 0.061
Mother has a college certificate 0.304 0.304 -0.001 0.056
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.148 0.118 -0.029 0.042
Mother has a professional degree 0.012 0.038 0.026 0.038
Mother has a master's degree 0.031 0.032 0.002 0.029
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.004 0.000 -0.004 *** 0.001
Father has less than a high school diploma 0.138 0.132 -0.006 0.047
Father has a high school diploma 0.311 0.276 -0.035 0.062
Father has a college certificate 0.305 0.321 0.016 0.056
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.156 0.070 -0.086 ** 0.040
Father has a professional degree 0.026 0.119 0.093 ** 0.046
Father has a master's degree 0.047 0.072 0.024 0.034
Father has an earned doctorate 0.017 0.009 -0.008 0.009
No immigrant parents 0.708 0.729 0.021 0.063
One parent is an immigrant 0.102 0.168 0.065 0.054
Both parents are immigrants 0.190 0.103 -0.087 * 0.050
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.020 0.019 0.000 0.009
Prince-Edward-Island 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.003
Nova Scotia 0.032 0.053 0.021 0.017
New Brunswick 0.028 0.012 -0.016 *** 0.006
Québec 0.217 0.199 -0.018 0.048
Ontario 0.392 0.338 -0.054 0.081
Manitoba 0.039 0.032 -0.007 0.012
Saskatchewan 0.041 0.043 0.002 0.013
Alberta 0.108 0.130 0.022 0.042
British Columbia 0.117 0.164 0.047 0.038
N 15,436 119
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample
consists of youth with two opposite sex parents in the home (mother is biological), who are not part
of a multiple birth, and the family has had at least two births (the first being a singleton).
 
 
Table 2.6 also shows the differences in mean values with the associated standard 
errors. In general, the differences are quite small, but some are worth noting. For 
instance, the average birth order is lower among youth with multiple birth siblings. 
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This is tautological: I code multiple births to 1 only if it is on the last birth (i.e. higher 
birth orders) and exclude youth who are themselves part of a multiple birth. Therefore, 
youth with a multiple birth in the family cannot be last born children by definition.

The average age of the parents is also lower among youth with a multiple birth sibling. 
Mothers are about one year younger on average, while fathers are about two years 
younger. Again, this is related to the definition of a multiple birth, which implies that 
youth with a multiple birth in the family cannot be last born children. Moreover, all 
youth in the sample were born in 1984. Combining these two facts, one can conclude 
that parents in the sample who had a multiple birth had fewer children prior to 1984 
than parents without a multiple birth (i.e. they are likely younger). 
 
The remaining covariates are all similar in mean values, with the exception of a few 
select variables. Although the means are generally similar, the differences that do 
exist are non-negligible. As a result of this, it is imperative to verify if the results 
reported so far hold when they are taken into account. This is precisely what I do in 
the next section, which considers econometric evidence. Once again, I will consider 
evidence from both OLS and IV regressions, with the preferred set of results 
stemming from the latter.  
 
!&,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
 
OLS approach 
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I begin this section by estimating ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the child 
quality variables on the number of children and other covariates (Tables 2.7a and 
2.7b). One additional child is associated with higher reading scores (significant at 1%), 
but is negatively associated with the number of computers per child and the presence 
of parental savings for PSE (both significant at 1%). In terms of private school 
attendance, there is a slight positive relationship (significant at 10%), and no 
significant relationship with private, non-sectarian school enrolment.8   
 
                                                 
8  Some of these dependent variables are binary, yet I use ordinary least squares rather than logit or 
probit models. The same holds true for later chapters. While logit and probit models mechanically 
bound predicted probabilities within the [0, 1] range, they are more prone to misspecification and are 
inconsistent in the presence in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Thus, OLS is preferred when one is 
interested in obtaining coefficient estimates (as is the case here), as opposed to predicted 
probabilities. See Moffitt (1999) for more details.  
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Table 2.7a: OLS regressions of standardized reading score on the number of children and other controls 
b s.e.
Number of children 0.071 *** 0.014
Child's birth order -0.184 *** 0.020
Child's age (months/12) 0.178 *** 0.034
Child is a female 0.341 *** 0.024
Child is an immigrant -0.301 *** 0.060
Mother's age (years in integers) 0.135 *** 0.044
Mother's age
2
 (years in integers) -0.001 *** 0.000
Father's age (years in integers) 0.020 0.027
Father's age
2
 (years in integers) 0.000 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 0.263 *** 0.038
Mother has a college certificate 0.353 *** 0.044
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.548 *** 0.057
Mother has a professional degree 0.445 *** 0.141
Mother has a master's degree 0.792 *** 0.083
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.805 *** 0.163
Father has a high school diploma 0.255 *** 0.039
Father has a college certificate 0.330 *** 0.037
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.494 *** 0.045
Father has a professional degree 0.694 *** 0.070
Father has a master's degree 0.541 *** 0.068
Father has an earned doctorate 0.815 *** 0.107
One parent is an immigrant 0.043 0.041
Both parents are immigrants -0.031 0.041
Prince-Edward-Island -0.104 ** 0.052
Nova Scotia -0.074 0.046
New Brunswick -0.237 *** 0.043
Québec 0.151 *** 0.048
Ontario 0.019 0.045
Manitoba 0.070 0.049
Saskatchewan 0.110 ** 0.050
Alberta 0.255 *** 0.050
British Columbia 0.111 ** 0.053
Intercept -7.419 *** 0.958
Adjusted R
2 
0.165
N 15,555
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample
consists of youth with two opposite sex parents in the home (mother is biological), who are not part of
a multiple birth, and the family has had at least two births (the first being a singleton).
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Table 2.7b: OLS regressions of parental investments on the number of children and other controls 
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Number of children 0.007 * 0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.148 *** 0.005 -0.049 *** 0.008
Child's birth order -0.010 ** 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.006 -0.060 *** 0.008
Child's age (months/12) -0.003 0.008 0.007 * 0.004 0.010 0.013 -0.035 0.024
Child is a female -0.012 ** 0.006 -0.005 0.003 -0.033 *** 0.007 0.014 0.010
Child is an immigrant -0.026 * 0.015 -0.003 0.007 -0.044 ** 0.021 -0.124 *** 0.026
Mother's age (years in integers) -0.002 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.008 0.013 0.047 ** 0.020
Mother's age
2
 (years in integers) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000
Father's age (years in integers) -0.007 0.009 -0.013 * 0.007 0.018 ** 0.007 0.000 0.014
Father's age
2
 (years in integers) 0.000 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 0.036 *** 0.009 0.011 * 0.006 0.052 *** 0.014 0.129 *** 0.023
Mother has a college certificate 0.044 *** 0.012 0.015 * 0.008 0.063 *** 0.014 0.182 *** 0.023
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.059 *** 0.015 0.016 ** 0.007 0.105 *** 0.016 0.193 *** 0.026
Mother has a professional degree 0.041 * 0.021 0.021 * 0.012 0.121 ** 0.047 0.289 *** 0.058
Mother has a master's degree 0.071 ** 0.028 0.018 0.012 0.130 *** 0.028 0.239 *** 0.036
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.213 *** 0.077 0.025 0.029 0.185 ** 0.075 0.238 *** 0.077
Father has a high school diploma 0.017 *** 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.074 *** 0.010 0.059 *** 0.019
Father has a college certificate 0.024 *** 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.117 *** 0.012 0.080 *** 0.021
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.051 *** 0.012 0.005 0.006 0.181 *** 0.013 0.122 *** 0.024
Father has a professional degree 0.091 *** 0.030 0.018 * 0.011 0.216 *** 0.029 0.182 *** 0.031
Father has a master's degree 0.094 *** 0.023 0.015 * 0.008 0.241 *** 0.024 0.145 *** 0.027
Father has an earned doctorate 0.125 *** 0.046 0.021 * 0.012 0.247 *** 0.039 0.129 ** 0.057
One parent is an immigrant 0.031 *** 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.060 *** 0.014 0.011 0.019
Both parents are immigrants 0.038 ** 0.017 0.027 * 0.015 0.057 *** 0.013 0.019 0.019
Prince-Edward-Island 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.042 *** 0.012 0.003 0.023
Nova Scotia -0.010 *** 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.077 *** 0.012 0.022 0.020
New Brunswick -0.007 *** 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.033 ** 0.013 0.011 0.021
Québec 0.167 *** 0.037 0.048 ** 0.020 0.057 *** 0.011 -0.122 *** 0.021
Ontario -0.005 0.013 -0.011 ** 0.005 0.167 *** 0.012 0.112 *** 0.021
Manitoba 0.062 *** 0.021 0.016 0.013 0.092 *** 0.013 0.103 *** 0.022
Saskatchewan 0.019 * 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.104 *** 0.012 0.101 *** 0.019
Alberta 0.001 0.013 -0.005 0.003 0.130 *** 0.012 0.100 *** 0.022
British Columbia 0.060 ** 0.028 0.005 0.013 0.144 *** 0.014 0.059 ** 0.023
Intercept 0.110 0.218 0.172 0.132 -0.229 0.337 -0.001 0.513
Adjusted R
2 
0.105 0.045 0.217 0.100
N 15,555 15,555 15,555 15,555
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth with
two opposite sex parents in the home (mother is biological), who are not part of a multiple birth, and the family has
had at least two births (the first being a singleton).
Attends a private 
school
Attends a private, 
non-sectarian 
school
Computers per 
child
Parents have saved 
money for PSE
 
 
The coefficients associated with the control variables are also worth mentioning. In 
terms of reading scores, factors with a positive influence include the child’s age, 
being a female, the mother’s age, the parents’ level of education, and living in certain 
provinces (Québec, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia) relative to 
Newfoundland and Labrador (the omitted category). Factors with a negative influence 
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include the child’s birth order, being an immigrant, and living in Prince-Edward-
Island and New Brunswick. 
 
With respect to attending a private school, the child’s birth order, being female, and 
being an immigrant, as well as living in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick exert a 
negative influence. Factors with a positive influence include parental education, 
having immigrant parents (one or both), and living in Québec, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, and British Columbia.  
 
For private, non-sectarian school enrolment, fewer coefficients are statistically 
significant. The child’s age has a moderate positive influence, as does the level of 
parental education, and having two immigrant parents. Living in Québec exerts a 
larger positive influence, although it still pales in comparison to its effect on 
enrolment in private schools more broadly defined. The only characteristics with a 
negative influence are the father’s age and living in Ontario.  
 
Not surprisingly, higher levels of parental education are positively linked to the 
number of computers per child. Also, living anywhere but in Newfoundland and 
Labrador (the omitted category) is positively associated with more computers per 
child, as is the father’s age. Being a female or an immigrant are the only the factors 
exerting a negative influence.   
 
Several factors are positively linked to having parents who save money for the child’s 
education, including the mother’s age, the parents’ education, and living in Ontario or 
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the western provinces (Manitoba to British Columbia). Factors with a negative 
influence include the child’s birth order, being an immigrant, and living in Québec.  
 
IV approach 
 
I now turn to the instrumental variable (IV) approach. In Table 2.8, I show the first-
stage regression results. Here, I regress the number of children on the multiple birth 
IV, and other covariates. The findings suggest that a multiple birth is associated with 
1.3 additional children, which is significant at 1%. The F-statistic (i.e. the square of 
the t-statistic on the multiple birth coefficient) is 183.689, which is well above the 
thresholds for strong IVs established by Stock and Yogo (2005)—in most instances, 
an F-statistic of 16 is sufficient. 
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b s.e.
Multiple birth 1.301 *** 0.096
Child's birth order 0.516 *** 0.014
Child's age (months/12) -0.008 0.034
Child is a female -0.018 0.015
Child is an immigrant 0.054 0.052
Mother's age (years in integers) -0.113 *** 0.031
Mother's age
2
 (years in integers) 0.001 ** 0.000
Father's age (years in integers) -0.010 0.018
Father's age
2
 (years in integers) 0.000 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma -0.033 0.032
Mother has a college certificate -0.019 0.035
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.074 * 0.041
Mother has a professional degree 0.174 0.132
Mother has a master's degree 0.056 0.054
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.184 * 0.104
Father has a high school diploma 0.052 ** 0.026
Father has a college certificate 0.076 *** 0.028
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.119 *** 0.032
Father has a professional degree 0.316 *** 0.070
Father has a master's degree 0.190 *** 0.051
Father has an earned doctorate 0.297 *** 0.092
One parent is an immigrant 0.063 ** 0.026
Both parents are immigrants 0.008 0.030
Prince-Edward-Island 0.304 *** 0.037
Nova Scotia 0.111 *** 0.029
New Brunswick 0.083 *** 0.030
Québec 0.117 *** 0.032
Ontario 0.180 *** 0.032
Manitoba 0.227 *** 0.035
Saskatchewan 0.262 *** 0.028
Alberta 0.209 *** 0.038
British Columbia 0.119 *** 0.032
Intercept 5.324 *** 0.647
F-statistic 183.689
Adjusted R
2 
0.222
N 15,555
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Table 2.8: First-stage regression of the number of children on the multiple birth instrumental
variable and other controls 
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The
sample consists of youth with two opposite sex parents in the home (mother is biological),
who are not part of a multiple birth, and the family has had at least two births (the first being
a singleton).
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In Tables 2.9a and 2.9b, I show the second stage results of the IV regressions. These 
estimates are considered the preferred ones since the number of children draws its 
variation from the presence of a multiple birth, and several covariates are taken into 
account in the model. 
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b s.e.
Number of children 0.158 * 0.092
Child's birth order -0.229 *** 0.045
Child's age (months/12) 0.178 *** 0.035
Child is a female 0.342 *** 0.024
Child is an immigrant -0.305 *** 0.060
Mother's age (years in integers) 0.144 *** 0.045
Mother's age
2
 (years in integers) -0.001 *** 0.000
Father's age (years in integers) 0.021 0.027
Father's age
2
 (years in integers) 0.000 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 0.266 *** 0.039
Mother has a college certificate 0.355 *** 0.044
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.542 *** 0.057
Mother has a professional degree 0.430 *** 0.137
Mother has a master's degree 0.788 *** 0.084
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.790 *** 0.165
Father has a high school diploma 0.251 *** 0.039
Father has a college certificate 0.323 *** 0.038
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.484 *** 0.046
Father has a professional degree 0.663 *** 0.080
Father has a master's degree 0.523 *** 0.073
Father has an earned doctorate 0.789 *** 0.115
One parent is an immigrant 0.037 0.042
Both parents are immigrants -0.032 0.041
Prince-Edward-Island -0.130 ** 0.063
Nova Scotia -0.084 * 0.048
New Brunswick -0.244 *** 0.045
Québec 0.141 *** 0.051
Ontario 0.003 0.051
Manitoba 0.051 0.054
Saskatchewan 0.087 0.061
Alberta 0.236 *** 0.056
British Columbia 0.100 * 0.055
Intercept -7.873 *** 1.106
Adjusted R
2 
0.161
N 15,555
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The
sample consists of youth with two opposite sex parents in the home (mother is biological),
who are not part of a multiple birth, and the family has had at least two births (the first being 
Table 2.9a: IV regressions of standardized reading score on the number of children and other 
controls 
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Table 2.9b: IV regressions of child quality measures on the number of children and other controls 
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Number of children -0.041 *** 0.012 -0.010 ** 0.004 -0.143 *** 0.029 -0.109 ** 0.050
Child's birth order 0.014 ** 0.007 0.005 * 0.003 -0.006 0.017 -0.029 0.027
Child's age (months/12) -0.003 0.008 0.007 * 0.004 0.010 0.013 -0.036 0.024
Child is a female -0.013 ** 0.006 -0.005 0.003 -0.033 *** 0.007 0.013 0.010
Child is an immigrant -0.024 0.015 -0.002 0.007 -0.044 ** 0.021 -0.121 *** 0.026
Mother's age (years in integers) -0.006 0.009 -0.001 0.005 0.009 0.013 0.040 ** 0.021
Mother's age
2
 (years in integers) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000
Father's age (years in integers) -0.007 0.009 -0.013 * 0.007 0.018 ** 0.007 -0.001 0.014
Father's age
2
 (years in integers) 0.000 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 0.034 *** 0.009 0.010 * 0.006 0.053 *** 0.014 0.127 *** 0.024
Mother has a college certificate 0.042 *** 0.012 0.015 * 0.008 0.063 *** 0.014 0.180 *** 0.024
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.062 *** 0.015 0.016 ** 0.007 0.105 *** 0.016 0.197 *** 0.027
Mother has a professional degree 0.050 ** 0.022 0.022 * 0.013 0.120 ** 0.047 0.300 *** 0.057
Mother has a master's degree 0.073 *** 0.028 0.018 0.012 0.129 *** 0.028 0.242 *** 0.036
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.221 *** 0.077 0.026 0.029 0.184 ** 0.076 0.248 *** 0.081
Father has a high school diploma 0.019 *** 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.073 *** 0.011 0.062 *** 0.020
Father has a college certificate 0.027 *** 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.117 *** 0.012 0.085 *** 0.022
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.057 *** 0.013 0.005 0.006 0.181 *** 0.013 0.129 *** 0.025
Father has a professional degree 0.108 *** 0.032 0.021 * 0.012 0.214 *** 0.031 0.203 *** 0.036
Father has a master's degree 0.104 *** 0.025 0.016 * 0.009 0.240 *** 0.025 0.157 *** 0.030
Father has an earned doctorate 0.140 *** 0.048 0.023 * 0.012 0.245 *** 0.040 0.147 ** 0.060
One parent is an immigrant 0.034 *** 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.060 *** 0.014 0.015 0.020
Both parents are immigrants 0.039 ** 0.017 0.027 * 0.015 0.057 *** 0.013 0.020 0.019
Prince-Edward-Island 0.019 *** 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.040 *** 0.015 0.022 0.029
Nova Scotia -0.004 0.003 0.003 * 0.001 0.076 *** 0.013 0.029 0.022
New Brunswick -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.032 ** 0.013 0.015 0.022
Québec 0.173 *** 0.037 0.049 ** 0.020 0.056 *** 0.012 -0.115 *** 0.023
Ontario 0.003 0.014 -0.009 * 0.005 0.167 *** 0.013 0.123 *** 0.023
Manitoba 0.072 *** 0.022 0.017 0.014 0.091 *** 0.014 0.117 *** 0.026
Saskatchewan 0.032 *** 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.103 *** 0.014 0.117 *** 0.025
Alberta 0.011 0.015 -0.003 0.003 0.129 *** 0.013 0.113 *** 0.025
British Columbia 0.066 ** 0.029 0.006 0.013 0.143 *** 0.015 0.067 *** 0.025
Intercept 0.361 0.224 0.214 0.133 -0.257 0.370 0.314 0.606
Adjusted R
2 
0.085 0.042 0.217 0.092
N 15,555 15,555 15,555 15,555
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Attends a private, 
non-sectarian 
school
Parents have saved 
money for PS 
schooling
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth with two
opposite sex parents in the home (mother is biological), who are not part of a multiple birth, and the family has had at least
two births (the first being a singleton).
Attends a private 
school
Computers per 
child
 
 
The results suggest that one additional child is associated with an improvement in the 
reading test score equivalent to 0.158 (16%) of a standard deviation, although the 
coefficient is only statistically significant at 10%. In contrast, an additional child is 
associated with lower parental investments in child quality. Specifically, the 
additional child reduces the probability of the youth attending a private (private, non-
sectarian) school by 4.1 (1) percentage points, which is significant at 1% (5%). The 
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number of computers per child declines by 0.143 (significant at 1%). We also see a 
large reduction in the probability that the parents save money for the youth’s 
postsecondary education (a decline of 10.9 percentage points, which is significant at 
5%). 
 
One notable variable that is absent from the child quality regressions is parental 
income. This is because we know from the literature that maternal labour supply 
declines as family size increases. Thus, parental income may also decline as family 
size increases. Furthermore, the regressions already include the age and educational 
levels of each parent, both of which are key variables in a Mincer wage equation. 
However, parental income may still exert an additional influence on child quality not 
captured by parental age and education. In Appendix 2.9, I add parental income and 
its squared value to the models. As shown in Tables A2.9.1a and A2.9.1b, this has no 
tangible impact on the relationship between family size and the measures of child 
quality in the IV regressions.  
 
The preferred set of results has strong implications for child quality and parental 
behaviour. Additional children are found to reduce parental investments per child 
according to all metrics of child inputs investigated here. As noted by Cáceras-
Delpiano (2006) this is a superior test of Becker’s Quantity-Quality model compared 
to simply looking at child outcomes. However, it is interesting to note the dichotomy: 
fertility induces parents to invest less in children, yet we see no decline in the reading 
scores. In fact, we see an increase, albeit one that is only statistically significant at 
10%. Why don’t we see a negative relationship? The next section examines potential 
candidates. 
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It is also important to compare the size of the IV estimates (in Tables 2.9a and 2.9b) 
to those obtained from OLS (in Tables 2.7a and 2.7b). The IV estimates are generally 
in the same direction as the OLS estimates, with the exception of private school 
attendance (which is not surprising given the potential for selection effects in 
enrolment in such schools regarding family size). Furthermore, even when the IV and 
OLS coefficients are in the same direction, they are not always of the same magnitude. 
For example, the impact of family size on academic performance and the incidence of 
parental savings for PSE is about twice as large according to IV compared to OLS. 
The impact of family size on private, non-sectarian school enrolment is also much 
larger according to IV compared to OLS.   
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What factors may explain why family size is negatively associated with inputs into 
child quality, yet is not negatively associated with child quality per se? In this section, 
I discuss three potential candidates. 
 
The first possibility is that, despite the best intentions of the parents, their investments 
in children may simply exert little or no influence on the measured child output. For 
example, Neal (2009) reviews the literature on the effects of private schools on 
academic achievement and attainment (including experimental evidence based on 
voucher programs), and concludes that there is no evidence suggesting that private 
schools are generally superior to public schools. The one exception is with private 
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schools that serve minority students in the United States, although this finding is 
likely the result of the poor funding for urban public schools.  
 
In terms of computer use, perhaps the most credible study comes from Angrist and 
Lavy (2002). The authors examine the randomized introduction of computers in 
Israeli elementary and middle schools in the 1990s. They conclude that although the 
introduction of computers raised the use of computer-aided instruction among 
teachers, it did not have any effect on pupil test scores. 
 
With regards to parental savings for the child’s postsecondary schooling, there are no 
studies devoted to credibly estimating its relationship with test scores. However, it is 
hardly a stretch of the imagination to assume that parents who save for their child’s 
education do so at least partly in response to their child’s abilities. 
 
Although it is quite possible that the measures of child inputs used in this study are 
not associated with test scores, their relationship with family size nevertheless signals 
parental behaviour or intentions. There may be other measures of child inputs that 
parents attempt to manipulate, and perhaps these are associated with test scores. 
Consequently, more research is needed in this area. Specifically, further studies 
highlighting the impact of family size on a broader spectrum of parental investments 
would be particularly useful. 
 
A second possibility is that there may be economies of scale in rearing children and/or 
selecting effective sibling interactions in larger families. With regards to rearing 
children, more children may reduce available resources per child, but the productivity 
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of these resources may improve. Siblings may share the same toys or clothes, leaving 
more resources available for other household goods, some of which may be related to 
learning activities. Also, there may be economies of scale regarding the time 
allocation of parents. For example, parents may read to two siblings close in age at the 
same time.  
 
In terms of selecting effective sibling interactions, the likelihood of finding a sibling 
who may be beneficial to interact with might rise with sibling size. A child may 
benefit from an older sibling by acquiring information or aspiring to be like them. 
Alternatively, a child may also benefit from a younger sibling by feeling the pressure 
to serve as a role model, or by reinforcing knowledge through teaching the younger 
sibling.   
 
It is plausible that economies of scale are more likely to occur when the siblings are 
close in age. One way to reduce the potential impact of economies of scale is by re-
estimating the child output IV model on a sample of youth who have no siblings who 
are close in age. Going back to the YITS data, I focus on youth with no siblings who 
are within two years in age. The results appear in Table 2.10.  
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b s.e.
Number of children 0.016 0.141
Child's birth order -0.123 0.141
Child's age (months/12) 0.272 *** 0.066
Child is a female 0.294 *** 0.049
Child is an immigrant -0.348 *** 0.105
Mother's age (years in integers) 0.140 0.098
Mother's age
2
 (years in integers) -0.001 0.001
Father's age (years in integers) 0.092 * 0.053
Father's age
2
 (years in integers) -0.001 * 0.001
Mother has a high school diploma 0.301 *** 0.073
Mother has a college certificate 0.453 *** 0.083
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.595 *** 0.123
Mother has a professional degree 0.811 *** 0.218
Mother has a master's degree 1.021 *** 0.136
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.920 *** 0.267
Father has a high school diploma 0.207 *** 0.066
Father has a college certificate 0.260 *** 0.067
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.408 *** 0.067
Father has a professional degree 0.481 *** 0.179
Father has a master's degree 0.511 *** 0.122
Father has an earned doctorate 0.732 *** 0.201
One parent is an immigrant 0.085 0.074
Both parents are immigrants 0.022 0.076
Prince-Edward-Island -0.172 ** 0.070
Nova Scotia -0.128 * 0.071
New Brunswick -0.322 *** 0.074
Québec 0.049 0.062
Ontario -0.073 0.070
Manitoba 0.061 0.076
Saskatchewan -0.022 0.086
Alberta 0.188 ** 0.077
British Columbia 0.014 0.072
Intercept -10.347 *** 2.078
Adjusted R
2 
0.169
N 4,313
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Table 2.10: IV regression of the standardized reading score on the number of children and other
controls - no siblings within two years of age
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample
consists of youth with two opposite sex parents in the home (mother is biological), who are not
part of a multiple birth, and the family has had at least two births (the first being a singleton).
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The weak positive association shown in Tables 2.9a and 2.9b is not present at all in 
Table 2.10. Nevertheless, the relationship is still not negative even after removing 
children with siblings who are close in age (i.e. who are most likely to be affected by 
economies of scale). Therefore, economies of scale may explain some of the puzzle, 
but not all of it.  
 
A third possibility is that, following a child, parents (especially the mother) reduce 
their paid labour supply in favour of unpaid work. The resulting increased maternal 
contact with the child may foster child quality. In fact, Waldfogel (2006) reviews the 
literature and concludes that children fare better if their mothers do not work full-time 
in the first year of life.9 Since this draws on the parental labour supply literature, a 
different framework is needed. This is left for Chapter 3.  
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In this chapter, I have explored the relationship between family size and various 
measures of child quality. The child quality measures include both a measure of 
output (i.e. test score data) and various measures of inputs (i.e. parental investments in 
children, including private school enrolment, the number of computers in the home 
per child, and parental savings earmarked for the child’s education).  
                                                 
9  As noted by Baker and Milligan (2008), however, this research does not employ causal or quasi-
causal methods. In their study, Baker and Milligan examine variation in maternal employment in the 
child’s first year of life that is drawn from policy changes regarding maternity leave expansion. They 
conclude that maternal employment has a negligible impact on motor-social development and a small 
negative impact on temperament. Unfortunately, they did not have access to cognitive assessments in 
their data. 
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Using a survey of 15 year old Canadian youth, I instrument family size with the 
incidence of a multiple birth on the second or later birth. The findings suggest that 
larger families lead to reduced parental investments in children. Despite these 
reductions in parental investments, test scores are not negatively affected by larger 
families. In fact, test scores improve by 16% of a standard deviation (significant at 
10%). 
 
The chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is only the second 
study to look at the relationship between family size and academic performance using 
quasi-causal methods. Second, there is only one other study that examines parental 
investments in children as a function of family size (Cáceras-Delpiano, 2006). Third, 
the chapter looks at various possible explanations behind the finding that larger 
families are negatively associated with parental investments in children, yet they are 
not negatively related to child test scores. Fourth, it is the first comprehensive study of 
family size and child quality using Canadian data. 
 
In terms of reconciling this apparent puzzle, three explanations were discussed and/or 
explored. First, parental investments in child quality are not necessarily associated 
with improved child quality. In fact, the best empirical studies (based on credible 
identification strategies) suggest that there is no link, at least for certain types of 
investments (computers and private schools).  
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Second, there may be economies of scale associated with rearing more children and/or 
selecting effective sibling interactions. Empirical investigation suggests that these 
factors alone are not likely to fully reconcile the findings.  
 
A third possible explanation, which was noted by (Cáceras-Delpiano, 2006), is that 
larger families may entice parents to stay home, which may help foster child 
development. Cáceras-Delpiano (2006) only had data on paid labour supply. However, 
this argument critically rests on the availability of the parent in the home. In the next 
Chapter, I will investigate this issue empirically using a data source that contains 
detailed information on both paid and unpaid work patterns of the parents. 
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In Chapter 2, I estimated the impact of family size on different components of the 
child quality production function (i.e. measures of child inputs and output). 
Paradoxically, I found that increased family size is associated with reduced parental 
investments in children, but does not lead to a reduction in child test scores. These 
findings are similar to those of Cáceras-Delpiano (2006), although he used grade 
retention as his measure of child output, and the measures of child inputs were also 
somewhat different.  
 
Two potential explanations were examined, including the possibility that the 
measured inputs are simply not associated with test scores, as well as the 
opportunities for larger families to reap economies of scale in childrearing and/or 
selecting efficient sibling interactions. 
 
In the current chapter, I examine another possible explanation. Faced with more 
children, parents may spend more time at home. Based on Becker’s theory of 
specialization in the sexual division of labour (Becker, 1985), complemented with 
Lundberg and Rose’s theory of home intensity (Lundberg and Rose, 1999), the 
mother is expected to spend more time at home following an increase in family size, 
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but the expectations are ambiguous for the father. If, in fact, overall parental contact 
increases as family size increases, there are important implications for the child 
quality literature. This is because Waldfogel (2006) concludes that children generally 
fare better if their mothers do not work full-time in the first year of life. 
 
For these reasons, the current chapter can be seen as complementary to Chapter 2. 
However, understanding the labour supply response of parents to additional children 
is also important in its own right. Fertility is one potential policy lever that could be 
used to alleviate labour shortages. The argument supporting this point of view 
actually begins with a population that is largely not involved with fertility decisions: 
the elderly.  
 
It is no secret that the population in the industrialized world is aging. One of the main 
concerns associated with an aging population is a possible rise in the dependency ratio, 
which is the ratio of the non-working age population to the working age population. 
Holding all else constant, the dependency ratio will increase as baby boomers enter 
their retirement years. One strategy for mitigating the impact of the aging population 
is to take in more working-age immigrants who are qualified to enter the labour force. 
This is in fact what has occurred in the case of Canada, as the proportion of skilled 
immigrants has increased dramatically in recent decades. However, research on 
immigrant labour market outcomes has been very conclusive regarding their level of 
success. Immigrants have generally not adapted well to the Canadian labour market, 
especially in light of their higher levels of education compared to the Canadian-born 
population (Baker and Benjamin, 1994; Bloom, Grenier, and Gunderson, 1995; Grant, 
1999; Frenette and Morissette, 2003; Aydemir and Skuterud, 2005).  
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An alternative approach to easing the impact of the aging population in the years to 
come is to create financial incentives for families to have more children. There is 
some evidence that financial incentives are positively linked to fertility. From an 
identification point of view, perhaps the best available evidence comes from Milligan 
(2005), who examines the Allowance for Newborn Children (ANC) introduced in the 
Canadian province of Québec in 1988. By implementing a quasi-experimental 
strategy, he finds strong evidence that the financial incentives associated with the 
ANC raised fertility rates in Québec. Zhang, Quan, and van Meerbergen (1994) use 
Canadian time-series data from 1921 to 1988 to estimate the impact of the personal 
tax exemption for children, the child tax credit, family allowances, and maternity 
leave benefits on fertility. The authors find that the exemption, the child tax credit, 
and family allowances all had significant and positive effects on fertility. Milligan 
(2005) notes several other studies around the world, most of which find a positive link 
between financial incentives and fertility. 
 
Although increased fertility may help alleviate the looming retirement crunch when 
the newborns enter the labour force, this effect may be partially offset in the short to 
medium term. First, in a purely mechanical fashion, the dependency ratio increases 
with the number of children. Second, additional children encourage women to stay at 
home, as per Becker (1985) and Lundberg and Rose (1999). 
 
Using the 2006 Canadian Census, I estimate the role of family size in determining the 
allocation of paid and unpaid labour among couples. To identify the impact of family 
size, I instrument fertility with the incidence of a multiple birth on the second or later 
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birth (as in Chapter 2), as well as with the sex composition of the first two children 
(following Angrist and Evans, 1998). Parents who have two children of the same sex 
may be more likely to try for a third if they prefer having at least one boy and one girl. 
 
I find that additional children lead to a reduction in paid hours and to an even larger 
increase in unpaid hours among mothers. In contrast, additional children are not 
related to paternal paid hours, although there is evidence of a small increase in unpaid 
hours spent on childcare.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, I will review the 
literature on fertility and parental labour supply. This review will describe both the 
theoretical and empirical works in the area. Next, I will undertake empirical analyses 
of fertility and parental labour supply in Section 3.3 (Methodology), Section 3.4 
(Descriptive results), and Section 3.5 (Econometric results). In Section 3.6, I attempt 
to assess the validity of the instruments used in this chapter by exploiting 
retrospective data available in the Census. The chapter concludes in Section 3.7.  
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Overview 
 
The structure of this section is the same as the literature review in Chapter 2. First, I 
will review the theoretical articles in the area. The goal here is to point out the 
assumptions of the model, as well as the testable hypotheses that are derived from 
these assumptions. Second, I will move into the empirical branch of the literature. 
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Once again, all studies must contend with finding an exogenous source of variation in 
fertility in order to establish their credibility. Finally, I will elaborate on how the 
current chapter contributes to the literature.  
 
Theoretical literature 
 
I consider the theoretical relationship between fertility and parental labour supply. To 
this end, Becker’s theory of specialization within households (Becker, 1985) and 
Lundberg and Rose’s theory of home intensity (Lundberg and Rose, 1999) will be 
discussed as complementary theories. The implications of the specialization theory 
are that increased fertility lead women (who are relatively more productive in 
household production) to spend more time taking care of children, and men (who are 
relatively more productive in market production) to spend more time in market work. 
However, this assumes that market versus home hours remains fixed for the couple. 
According to Lundberg and Rose, additional children should increase the demand for 
home production from the couple as a whole, yielding more childcare from both the 
father and the mother. Thus, the unified theories predict that fertility is 
unambiguously related to paid labour supply of the mother in a negative sense since 
the specialization and home intensity effects work in the same direction. For the father, 
the theories predict an ambiguous impact since the specialization and home intensity 
effects work in opposite directions.  
 
I now turn to describing the theories in somewhat more detail, including some earlier 
work on time allocation in general. The goal here is to highlight the main assumptions 
of the models, as well as the relevant testable hypotheses with respect to this chapter. 
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The first generation of economic models examining time allocation (including labour 
supply) and fertility considered fertility as the outcome of market wage rates of 
women. Following on the work of Mincer (1963) and Becker (1965), Willis (1973) 
provides a framework for deriving relevant testable hypotheses. In his model, utility is 
derived from “adult standard of living” and child services (the number and quality of 
children). As Becker (1965) notes, households use non-market time and purchased 
goods as inputs in the production of the two utility generating outputs. Decisions are 
made jointly by the couple, although the husband’s income is exogenous, while the 
wife must decide how much time to spend in market versus household work. A key 
assumption of the model is that the production technology for children is time 
intensive.  
 
For the purposes of this chapter, there is one notable prediction that can be derived 
from this model. Specifically, an increase in the wife’s market wage leads to increases 
in total household income, as well as the opportunity cost of having children. An 
increase in household income will raise child services consumed through an income 
effect, while the increased opportunity cost of having a child will tend to lower child 
services consumed through a substitution effect. Thus, fertility may be affected by the 
wife’s wage offer if the income effect does not equal the substitution effect. It follows 
that fertility may also be affected by factors that are likely to determine the wife’s 
wage offer, such as human capital (i.e. education and labour market experience), 
labour supply (i.e. hours willing to work at given wage rates), etc. This result is 
similar to the one derived from the Quantity-Quality Model in Chapter 2, except that 
the focus now is on the wife’s wage, as opposed to the household’s income. In any 
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event, it simply highlights the fact that fertility is very likely to be an endogenous 
variable (vis-à-vis many variables), and should be treated with caution in any 
empirical analysis.  
 
As important as this note of caution may be, this particular strand of the literature 
yields no insight into the anticipated impact of fertility on labour supply, which is the 
primary goal of this chapter. A more fruitful avenue begins with Becker’s theory of 
specialization in the sexual division of labour (Becker, 1985).10 
 
Becker began by postulating that for some exogenous reason (perhaps discrimination), 
there historically has been a sexual (or gender) division of labour within households. 
Women spend more time doing housework (including childcare), while men spend 
more time doing market work. In his pioneering book Human Capital, Becker states 
that it is this division of labour that creates an incentive for each member of the 
couple to invest in human capital specific to their main activity (Becker, 1964).  
 
In his book A Treatise on the Family, Becker postulates that investments in specific 
human capital produce increasing returns to scale (i.e. productivity rises in the main 
activity), and thus, additional time is spent in that activity in order to capitalize on the 
increased productivity (Becker, 1981). Furthermore, with more time spent performing 
childcare, productivity in market work declines since childcare requires more effort 
than other household activities, such as leisure.  
                                                 
 
10  Note that Becker does not actually name his theory. I provide a descriptive name simply for 
convenience. 
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As a result, the gender division of labour is further engrained in household behaviour. 
This is the case even if men and women are otherwise identical. It is the original 
exogenous reason for the gender division of labour that triggered this series of events.  
 
What does the theory of specialization in the sexual division of labour imply about the 
effect of childbirth on labour supply? Following a birth, the mother, who spends more 
time working in the home for historical/exogenous reasons, will simply substitute 
childcare for non-childcare housework. Since childcare requires more effort than 
other household activities, her productivity in market work declines. As a result, she 
spends even more time at home and less time in market work. The decrease in the 
wife’s market productivity implies that her comparative advantage in housework 
relative to the husband will increase. Put differently, the husband’s comparative 
advantage in market work will increase. As a result, he substitutes market work for 
household work.  
 
A key assumption in Becker’s theory of specialization in the sexual division of labour 
is that households maintain their total time spent doing both market and household 
work. The members of the couple simply act as economic agents who must decide 
how to allocate market and household activities between them.  
 
But what if childbearing requires that the couple spend more time at home with the 
child (or doing work related to the child, such as cleaning up after them)? This was 
proposed by Lundberg and Rose (1999), who postulated that children result in 
increased value of total parental time as inputs to childcare. As a result, the couple as 
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a whole will spend more time doing household activities rather than market work. 
There is no distinction here between the mother and the father: the value of both 
parents’ time at home increases following childbirth. In contrast, Becker’s theory of 
specialization only involved a re-allocation of resources vis-à-vis home and market 
work.  
 
Lundberg and Rose term this the home- (relative to market-) intensity effect. It is 
important to note that the authors do not propose this as an alternative to Becker’s 
theory of specialization in the sexual division of labour. Rather, they treat both 
theories as complementary. Both effects co-exist, but unfortunately, the predictions 
from the unified theory are less definitive than in Becker’s theory alone, at least in the 
case of men. For them, the specialization and home intensity effects work in opposite 
directions, rendering the anticipated total effect of fertility on labour supply 
ambiguous: market work and housework may go up or down following the birth of a 
child. For women, both effects work in the same direction, implying an unambiguous 
effect: fertility is negatively related to market work and positively related to 
housework.  
 
Empirical literature 
 
This section considers the main empirical studies related to the impact of fertility on 
parental labour supply. The main challenge faced by researchers has been the 
potential endogeneity of fertility to the outcomes in question. Consequently, an 
important feature of this part of the literature review consists of highlighting the 
development of identification strategies over the years. Another challenge faced by 
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some studies relates to small samples resulting from the chosen identification strategy. 
For example, some authors use the event of a twin birth to identify the causal impact 
of fertility. Since twins are relatively rare, standard datasets often do not produce 
sufficient twin cases to yield reliable estimates. 
 
This literature has been spearheaded mainly by labour economists, who are 
accustomed to dealing with identification issues. This, in addition to the fact that 
labour supply and childbearing are so intricately linked (and thus, highly prone to 
causality in both directions), has resulted in much earlier attempts at solving the 
identification problem than was the case in the child quality studies. Note, however, 
that there is a sizable literature involving many prominent economists that treat 
fertility as purely exogenous (e.g. Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980; Hausman and Ruud, 
1984). Adopting this philosophy has provided researchers with a simple solution to 
the sample selection bias associated with the study of female wages (i.e. the 
exogeneity of the presence of children is used as an exclusion restriction in a 
Heckman selection model). Since I treat fertility as potentially endogenous (as do 
most studies), I will not review this literature any further. 
 
In his review of the literature on the effects of fertility on labour supply, Browning 
(1992) discusses two schools of thought regarding empirical approaches. The standard 
approach is to estimate the impact of fertility on labour supply, while accounting for 
the endogeneity of fertility. Most studies have followed this route. Other studies have 
adopted what Browning calls the ‘purist’ approach. In this case, researchers estimate a 
reduced form labour supply equation, where the number of children does not appear 
on the right hand side. Rather, the cost of rearing those children appears in the 
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equation. This approach more closely follows demand theory. Specifically, the 
demand for leisure (the residual of market work) is a function of income, its price, and 
the price of other commodities, such as children. If one were to include the number of 
children in the labour supply equation, this would be akin to modeling demand for 
one good as a function of purchases of another. It is the price of obtaining those 
purchases that matter. However, as we shall see, the number of children is not always 
determined by its price. Researchers using the standard approach have tried to identify 
natural experiments whereby the choice of family size was, to some extent, taken 
away from the parents. 
 
The purists also argue that the cost of children is more amenable to policy 
intervention then the number of children per se. This is not necessarily the case. 
Declining fertility rates in industrialized countries has been an issue of policy concern 
for some time. This is especially so given the aging population in these countries, and 
the difficulties related to replacing older workers with immigrant labour. 
Consequently, the fertility rates may itself be the policy objective. If this is the case, 
then understanding the impact of achieving a particular fertility rate on other 
outcomes such as labour supply is of the utmost importance. 
 
In one example of the purist approach, Carliner, Robinson, and Tomes (1980) use data 
on Canadian wives between the ages of 35 and 60 years old and living with their 
husbands to study the relationship between variables linked to the cost of childcare 
and female labour supply, measured by labour force participation, hours per week, 
and weeks per year. They hypothesize that Catholics face lower costs to having 
children since their psychic cost of using effective birth control techniques are greater. 
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They also argue that the cost of childcare should decline as the possibility of child 
employment increases, such as is the case when we move from a city, to a town, to a 
rural area, to a farm (in that order). Childcare costs should be positively linked to 
female labour supply since lower costs induce all women to have children and spend 
less time doing market work.  
 
Carliner et al.’s results generally do not support their hypotheses. One reason might 
be because the childcare costs they hypothesize to exist are somewhat indirect, and 
likely quite small. They do make reference to a potentially more substantial cost 
associated with children: the opportunity cost from lost wages. Since they do not have 
a direct measure of the female wage, they lean on variables that are correlated with 
the wage, such as education and province of residence. In this instance, the results are 
more supportive of the notion that higher childcare costs encourage increased labour 
supply among women. 
 
Several other studies have adopted the purist approach (Mincer, 1963; Schultz, 1978 
and 1980; Moffitt, 1984; Ermisch, 1989). The main objective of this section, however, 
is to review studies based on the standard approach since that is the one adopted in 
this chapter. 
 
Early efforts in the standard approach attempted to model labour supply, fertility, and 
at times other outcomes such as wages in a system of simultaneous equations. In an 
early study, Cain and Dooley (1976) use US data on black and white wives to model 
the three outcomes listed above in a system of equations. With respect to the impact 
of fertility on labour force participation, the instrumental variables include religion, 
 80
urban/rural status of residence, and local industrial structure. Although the authors 
find no impact of fertility on labour force participation for black and white wives, this 
might be because the instruments they use are not valid. In other words, they might be 
direct determinants of labour supply. This is almost certainly the case with the 
urban/rural status and industrial structure, and it is plausibly the case for religion as 
well. They also note that endogenizing various aspects of household behaviour adds 
considerable complexity to the models and substantially increases the data 
requirements to estimate them. 
 
Despite the difficulties in estimating all-encompassing, flexible systems of equations 
noted by Cain and Dooley, other economists followed suit. Fleisher and Rhodes (1979) 
also endogenize fertility, labour supply, and wage rates in a system of equations for 
black and white US wives. Their identification strategy was slightly different, 
however, in that the husband’s education was used to instrument fertility. Regardless, 
they also find that fertility has no impact on labour supply. However, they do note that 
this result may be due to the absence of an appropriate instrumental variable. 
 
Miller and Volker (1983) adopt a similar strategy with Australian Data. In their case, 
religion and available part time work in the area were used as instrumental variables 
for fertility. Once again, these variables may not be valid instruments. The value 
added of their study was to look at the differential impact of fertility on labour supply 
by the age of the mother. Labour supply is defined as labour force participation. They 
find that fertility has a negative impact on labour supply among women below the age 
of 35, but it has no impact on older women. 
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Economists were not the only ones interested in the impact of fertility on labour 
supply. Several sociologists also endeavoured to study the issue. Although the 
methods were generally similar in the early days, in that both groups tended to favour 
simultaneous equation models, the approach was slightly different. For example, 
Waite and Stolzenberg (1976) examine the impact of planned fertility on planned 
labour force participation among a sample of young women from the US. Given the 
prospective nature of the data, the instrumental variables used were quite different 
from the ones mentioned above in the economics literature. Specifically, the authors 
used the ideal family size and the number of current siblings as instruments for 
planned fertility. The ideal family size is likely not a valid instrument, as it may be 
correlated with preferences for labour supply. The number of current siblings, on the 
other hand, is less at the discretion of the young women in the study; however, it is 
clearly at the discretion of the parents of those young women, and to the extent that 
parents and children share the same preferences, the validity of the instrument is once 
again put into question. They find that planned fertility has a small negative impact on 
planned labour force participation. Unfortunately, it is impossible to make any 
inferences on real (actualized) outcomes from intentions of young women. 
 
Another interesting study from the sociology literature is Smith-Lovin and Tickamyer 
(1978). They also estimate a simultaneous equation model where the labour supply 
outcome is the number of years in the labour force since marriage. The innovation in 
their study lies in one of the instruments used: fecundity (religion was the other 
instrument). To measure fecundity, the authors use a unique dataset of 30 year old 
women from the United States. Respondents were asked if they or their husband were 
unable to have a child (or another child). The authors only coded couples who were 
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involuntarily sterile as being not fecund. The reason was that couples who chose to be 
sterilized likely have different preferences for the number of children, and this might 
be correlated with some unobserved preference for labour supply. In this case, the 
authors find that fertility has a substantial negative effect on labour supply. 
 
Of all the studies reviewed so far that use simultaneous equation models, Smith-Lovin 
and Tickamyer stand alone in finding a substantial negative effect on labour supply. 
The other factor that distinguishes this study from the previous ones is the quality of 
the fecundity instrumental variable. The studies by Cain and Dooley (1976), Fleisher 
and Rhodes (1979), Miller and Volker (1983), and Waite and Stolzenberg (1976) can 
all be quite reasonably criticized for lacking valid instruments. As noted earlier, 
Fleisher and Rhodes actually question their own instrument. The lesson to be learned 
from these early attempts at estimating the role of fertility in determining labour 
supply is that solving the endogeneity issue is of critical importance.  
 
It is for this very reason that more recent studies have narrowed their lens to focus on 
the impact of fertility on labour supply in a two-stage model. In other words, the more 
recent studies are less concerned with modeling a vast array of household behaviour. 
This is a reasonable approach since there is a trade-off between the quality of the 
identification strategy and the need to include (potentially endogenous) variables in 
one’s model. If an instrumental variable is adequate, the Wald estimate (the 
unconditional analogue to the two-stage least squares estimator) has a causal 
interpretation (Angrist, 1990). Thus, the relatively successful quest for instruments 
has reduced the need for complex simultaneous equation models. 
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The genesis of this most recent strand of the literature actually dates back to 1980. 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b) use a sample of US mothers to study the role of 
having twins on the first birth on the probability of working. Having twins on the first 
birth presumably leads to a larger family. Their results show that the incidence of 
twins on a first birth reduces the probability of work for women under the age of 25 
only. There is no significant effect on older women. 
 
This study can be criticized from two angles. First, there are only 87 cases of first 
birth twins in the data. I also criticized Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a) in the child 
quality literature (Chapter 2) for using a dataset containing very few twins (25). 
Second, the incidence of a twin on the first birth may not be associated with an 
unanticipated increase in family size since many couples may prefer to have two 
children. This same comment was made in critiquing Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a) 
who considered the proportion of all births who were twins, including first births. In a 
sense, the strategy of focusing exclusively on first births may very well be inferior to 
their other approach. The authors defend the use of first birth twins by stating that the 
probability of having a twin birth increases with the number of births. However, 
conditioning on a minimum number of births (e.g. Black et al., 2005) would address 
this issue when the sample is large enough. 
 
To date, I have criticized the use of first birth twins as an instrument for fertility based 
on intuition. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b) actually provide some evidence 
supporting this critique. They show that having twins on the first birth is only weakly 
correlated with completed family size. Furthermore, the correlation is not statistically 
significant. In other words, the incidence of twins on a first birth would make for a 
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weak instrument for completed fertility. Nevertheless, they do show that their twin 
variable is positively linked to incomplete fertility (i.e. family size by age 25), which 
is one of the outcomes used in their study.  
 
Despite the methodological issues in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b), the concept of 
looking at twin births has spawned several follow-up works based on slight 
modifications of this instrumental variable. One example is Bronars and Grogger 
(1994), who were the first to apply the twins strategy with the US Census data. The 
advantage of using the Census data lies in the large sample size, which is required to 
study twins. Although Bronars and Grogger also primarily focus on twins at first birth 
(they do briefly mention results from twins on the second birth), their study is 
somewhat different from Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b) in that they focus on the 
effects of fertility per se. Their results suggest that there are large short term effects on 
labour force participation for black and white unwed mothers. However, the effects 
dissipate over time (except for unwed black mothers). 
 
Another twins study is Gangadharam and Rosenbloom (1996). They also use the US 
Census and apply the same strategy as Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b), which is to 
estimate the reduced form effect of twins on the first birth on labour supply. They find 
that having a twin on the first birth has a negative effect on labour force participation 
and the number of weeks worked per year. 
 
I have already discussed Cáceras-Delpiano (2006) in the section on child quality. This 
study also looked at the impact of fertility on female labour force participation. The 
main difference in the methodology between this study and previous twin studies 
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relates to the definition of the twins variable. Cáceras-Delpiano only looks at the 
incidence of a twin birth on the second or later birth. This is a substantial 
improvement from looking at first birth twins since having a twin on a later birth is 
more likely to lead to an unanticipated increase in family size. Following Black et al. 
(2005), Cáceras-Delpiano also conditions on a minimum number of births (two, in his 
case). This addresses the possibility noted above that a twin birth is more likely with 
subsequent births. He finds a strong negative relationship between fertility and female 
labour force participation. 
 
While most of the studies in the literature focused on some version of the twin birth 
strategy, Angrist and Evans (1998) were busy developing a different instrumental 
variable. They use the sex composition of the first two children as an instrumental 
variable for the total number of children. The idea is that the sex of the children is 
almost certainly random, and that couples may prefer to have at least one child of 
each sex. They may thus plan on having more children if they have not achieved their 
‘opposite sex’ goal after the first two. The authors find that mothers in the US tend to 
reduce their labour supply in response to an increase in the number of children 
generated by the sex composition of the first two. Angrist and Evans also demonstrate 
that the labour supply effect is larger when using the same sex instrumental variable 
then when they use the incidence of a twin birth on a second or later birth. They 
hypothesize that this is likely because a third child born as a twin from the second 
birth is older (and thus requires less maternal attention) than a third child generated 
from the sex composition of the first two children, conditional on the second child 
having the same age in both cases. This may very well be part of the reason, but 
another possible explanation relates to economies of scale in rearing twins as opposed 
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to singletons. Siblings of the exact same age may be more likely to participate in 
similar extracurricular activities, which may reduce demands on the mother’s time, 
allowing her to spend more time performing market work. Yet another reason is the 
differences in the quality of the instruments themselves. As noted by Angrist and 
Evans, the sex composition of children is almost certainly random. In contrast, twin 
births may have genetic foundations, or can even result from fertility treatments. 
Conditioning on socioeconomic background characteristics may address the first issue, 
while restricting the sample to families with a minimum number of distinct births may 
help alleviate the second. Despite such efforts, it is difficult to automatically dismiss 
the possibility that twin births may be related to labour supply since twinning is not 
completely random (unlike the sex composition). On the other hand, twin births 
necessarily come in pairs: parents do not have one of the two twins, and then decide if 
they will have the other. The same cannot be said for additional children generated 
from the sex composition instrument. When the second child is born, if it is of the 
same sex as the first, parents have to decide if they will pursue having another child. It 
is this level of discretion that opens the door for selection bias. Two sets of parents 
who have the same preferences for achieving opposite sex children may make 
different choices regarding the pursuit of a third child if they have different 
preferences vis-à-vis desired family size in general, which may be correlated with 
labour supply preferences. 
 
To date, I have only reviewed studies that have looked at the impact of fertility on 
female labour supply. This is representative of the state of the literature: most studies 
consider female labour supply since it is women who are still largely responsible for 
the care of children. Nevertheless, there are a couple of recent studies that have 
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considered the impact of childbearing on paternal labour supply. Lundberg and Rose 
(1999) propose the theory of home intensity, which suggests that the impact of 
childbearing on men’s labour supply is ambiguous (when combined with Becker’s 
theory of specialization). Using US longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), the authors find that fatherhood has a significant positive impact 
on annual hours of work for men (Lundberg and Rose, 2002). Interestingly, they find 
that men’s labour supply increases more in response to sons than to daughters. The 
only identification strategy used in this study is to relate changes in fertility to 
changes in labour supply (i.e. to exploit the longitudinal nature of the data). This 
approach is similar to the one used by Hanushek (1992) in his study of child quality. 
As I noted at the time, Hanushek’s study can be criticized on the grounds that changes 
in fertility may be endogenous to changes in labour supply. The same criticism 
applies to Lundberg and Rose (2002). 
 
Another study looking at the impact of fertility on men’s labour supply is Kim and 
Aassve (2006). Using data from Indonesia, they instrument fertility with a variety of 
variables, including religion, presence of other adults in the home, and schooling of 
both spouses. They find that higher fertility is linked to an increase in men’s work 
hours in rural areas only. It is argued that this affect is specific to rural areas because 
of the lower cost of child care in those areas; specifically, households in rural 
Indonesian areas contain more adult women who may participate in the task of 
childcare. The extent to which this holds in industrialized countries is less clear. As a 
result, some caution should be exercised in generalizing the findings of this study to 
other countries. 
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Contributions of the present chapter to the literature 
 
The chapter contributes to the literature in many substantive ways. First, it is the only 
work in the area that considers the supply of both paid and unpaid work. The impact 
of fertility on housework in most studies is, at best, implied in a residual fashion (i.e. a 
decline in paid labour supply implies an increase in unpaid labour supply). This is an 
important omission in the literature since theories of labour supply are based on the 
substitution between market work and housework. Despite this, no studies to my 
knowledge look at both effects. Related to Chapter 2, unpaid work patterns may help 
explain why larger families are negatively associated with child inputs, but are not 
always negatively associated with child outputs. Cáceras-Delpiano (2006) alluded to 
this possibility, but he could only examine paid labour supply.  
 
Second, this chapter considers the labour supply effects for both the wife and the 
husband. To the best of my knowledge, only the studies by Lundberg and Rose (2002) 
and Kim and Aassve (2006) look at the labour supply response of husbands. Clearly, 
more evidence is needed in this area 
 
Third, the study contributes to the evaluation of the two primary instruments used in 
the literature: the sex composition and the incidence of a twin birth on the second of 
later birth. Specifically, I will evaluate not only the strength of the instruments (i.e. 
the correlation between the instruments and fertility in the first stage of a two stage 
least squares regression), but I will also propose a methodology to evaluate their 
validity (i.e. the extent to which they do not belong in the labour supply equation). To 
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the best of my knowledge, no studies have evaluated the validity of the instruments 
proposed in the literature. Validity is usually established on conceptual grounds.  
 
Fourth, I will add some Canadian evidence to the existing body of knowledge. Most 
of the studies to date have been based on US data. Adding evidence from additional 
countries is important since it provides an opportunity for testing the robustness of the 
results.  
 
$$*#
 
For the analysis in this chapter, I rely on the long-form of the 2006 Canadian Census 
of Population, which is a 20% sample of households developed by Statistics Canada. 
The Census is intended to be a simple random sample based on pre-census 
enumeration of households. However, sample weights are adjusted moderately 
following the Census as the number of households may change disproportionately in 
certain regions of the country between enumeration and Census day. Nevertheless, it 
is virtually a simple random sample, and authors categorically treat it as such in their 
research. The same approach is used here.  
 
Although the survey design should not pose any challenges in estimating standard 
errors, heteroscedasticity is still a potential issue. To correct for heteroscedasticity in 
this chapter, I calculate robust standard errors using the standard Huber-White 
sandwich estimator.   
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The objective of this chapter is to estimate the impact of family size on parental 
labour supply. For identification purposes, two instrumental variables are used: the 
incidence of same sex siblings among the first two children and the incidence of a 
multiple birth on the second or later birth, as described in Section 1.2.11 The multiple 
birth IV is constructed in a similar fashion as in the empirical analysis of fertility and 
child quality. Specifically, three conditions have to be met for a multiple birth to have 
occurred in this IV framework: 
 
· There are multiple birth siblings in the family. 
· The multiple birth siblings must have occurred on the second or later birth 
(multiple birth siblings on the first birth are unlikely to yield additional 
children). 
· The multiple birth siblings must have occurred on the last birth (otherwise, 
they could not possibly generate additional children since the couple chose to 
have more children following the multiple birth). 
 
The Census contains information on the sex of the child, which is used to construct 
the sex composition of the first two children (a dummy variable indicating whether 
they are of the same sex or not). The Census also contains information on the exact 
date of birth, which is used to identify multiple births on the second or later birth 
within families. A dummy variable is created to indicate this status.  
                                                 
11 Recall that the same sex IV was not used in the child quality analysis in Chapter 2. This was because 
previous studies suggested that the sex composition of siblings has a direct influence on childhood 
outcomes. Of course, this is plausible with respect to parental labour supply as well. In Appendix 
A3.1, I investigate this hypothesis, and conclude that it is likely not the case. 
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Two or more children living in the same census (or nuclear) family and sharing the 
same date of birth are deemed to be multiple birth siblings. Although it is impossible 
to identify birth siblings with the Census (since we don’t know the exact relationship 
between the mother and her children, whether it be biological, adoptive, or step), they 
comprise 96.5% of all children of married mothers who gave birth to or raised two or 
more children in their lives according to the 2006 version of Statistics Canada’s 
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID). This suggests that in the vast 
majority of instances, children reporting the same mother (by birth or otherwise) and 
who were born on the same day are indeed birth siblings, and thus, multiple birth 
siblings.  
 
The Census contains information on the hours spent at work (in either paid or self-
employment) during the reference week (the week prior to Census Day: May 7th to 
13th, 2006). Respondents were asked the following question: 
 
· “	, how many hours did this person spend working for pay  in self-
employment?” 
 
Respondents are next prompted to report the number of hours to the nearest hour.  
 
The Census also contains information on paid or self-employment patterns in the year 
prior to the Census (2005) based on the following question: 
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· “In how many 	 did this person work 
 !11&? Please enter the total 
number of weeks worked for pay or in self-employment at all jobs held in 
2005. Include  	 in which this person: was 
  
 or 	
  #; worked   or  ; worked for , #, 
 or 
; was 2#; worked directly towards the 
operation of a #
 without formal pay arrangements” 
 
We also know if the person worked mainly full time or part time in the previous year 
based on the question: 
 
· “During most of those weeks, did this person work  or ” 
 
The two possible responses are:  
 
· “Full time (30 hours or more per week)” 
· “Part time (less than 30 hours per week)” 
 
Note that for simplicity, and to distinguish them from unpaid work, I will collectively 
refer to all measures of paid or self-employment outcomes as ‘paid’ work. 
 
There is also information on the hours spent taking care of children or doing 
housework.12,13 Specifically, respondents were asked:  
                                                 
12The Census also includes information on time spent taking care of an elderly individual without 
remuneration, but it is not included in this analysis since it is not directly related to children. 
 93
 
· “ 	, how many hours did this person spend doing the following 
activities:  
 
a) doing 
 housework, yard work or home maintenance for members of 
this household, or others?  
b) looking after one or more of this person’s own children, or the children of 
others, #?” 
 
The number of hours spent on childcare and housework is categorical: none, less than 
5 hours, 5 to 14 hours, 15 to 29 hours, 30 to 59 hours, and 60 hours or more. In order 
to facilitate comparisons with the paid work results, I imputed continuous values for 
the measures of unpaid work. In Appendix A3.1, I describe the imputation approach 
and demonstrate that it has very high predictive power.  
  
The models also contain several other covariates, including the mother’s and the 
father’s age, their highest level of completed education, their ethnicity, and the local 
unemployment rate they face (calculated at the census sub-division level, separately 
for men and women aged 25 to 54). 
 
The initial sample is restricted to married or common-law opposite sex couples with 
at least one child. I then drop couples who only had one birth since multiple births are 
more common in larger families, and a multiple birth on a second or later birth is 
                                                                                                                                            
13 Respondents are told that they can report the hours associated with two or more activities taking 
place at the same time. 
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impossible with only one birth. This action is also necessary to construct the same sex 
IV strategy. Finally, I delete couples who had a multiple birth the first time, which is 
necessary to construct the multiple birth IV (since many families may want to stop at 
two children, and thus, a multiple birth on the second may have an optimal impact on 
family size if it follows a singleton). Although not necessary to construct the same sex 
IV, it is applied nonetheless in order to achieve identical samples (facilitating 
comparisons). In any event, the restriction is not very binding since almost all births 
(including first ones) are singletons. No restrictions are imposed in terms of work 
patterns (paid or unpaid). In other words, non-participants are included throughout the 
study. This avoids endogenous selection of any sub-group based on work patterns. For 
example, an increase in the number of children may encourage some mothers to stop 
working in a paid job in order to stay home.  
 
As in Chapter 2, focusing on families with at least two births means that the child 
effect is mainly the result of differences observed between the second and the third 
child (or between the third and fourth, etc.) We cannot draw any conclusions about 
the effect of the first or second child, which may be more policy relevant. It is 
possible that the first child has the largest impact on parental labour supply since a 
parent may already be home when additional children are born (and thus, not further 
reducing paid labour supply). On the other hand, if parents have little flexibility in 
choosing their hours of paid work, and must decide between paid work or staying 
home to take care of their children, then it is conceivable that their exists for each 
family a specific number of children that represents the breaking point between 
working outside of the home (and paying for childcare) or staying at home (and 
saving on childcare costs). In other words, it is not clear a priori how the effect varies 
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by the number of children (including smaller family sizes). Although the literature has 
not yet developed an appropriate strategy for identifying the effect of first or second 
children, I will show descriptive evidence on the relationship between number of 
children and parental labour supply for smaller families (i.e. those with zero or one 
child). 
 
To examine the impact of the sample selection criteria, I show the mean and standard 
error of each of the variables used in the analysis by sample selection criterion (Table 
3.1). By dropping couples with only one birth, which is necessary for the multiple 
birth IV strategy, the sample declines from 514,371 to 332,011. Although most 
variables maintain their mean values, there are some expected changes. For example, 
work patterns are somewhat different: couples with at least two births generally work 
more, both at home and in market work. This is true for the mother and the father. 
Obviously, the average number of children increases, from 1.894 to 2.375. As 
suggested by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a), multiple births are more likely among 
couples with more than one birth. Finally, couples with at least two births are slightly 
older than those with only one birth, again for obvious reasons. The other sample 
statistics do not change in any meaningful way as a result of this selection criterion.  
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Table 3.1: Means and standard deviations of variables used in the analysis by sample selection criteria
Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e.
Mother's hours per week of paid work 23.081 0.027 22.999 0.034 23.008 0.034
Mother's hours per week of childcare 36.168 0.031 37.195 0.037 37.183 0.037
Mother's hours per week of housework 25.721 0.026 27.580 0.033 27.559 0.033
Father's hours per week of paid work 40.234 0.027 41.171 0.034 41.172 0.034
Father's hours per week of childcare 21.696 0.028 22.221 0.034 22.216 0.034
Father's hours per week of housework 13.461 0.018 13.963 0.023 13.958 0.023
Number of children 1.894 0.001 2.375 0.001 2.371 0.001
Same sex 0.496 0.001 0.494 0.001 0.493 0.001
Multiple birth 0.010 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.000
Mother's age 37.154 0.010 37.447 0.011 37.444 0.011
Father's age 39.834 0.011 40.086 0.012 40.083 0.012
Mother has less than a high school diploma 0.102 0.000 0.101 0.001 0.101 0.001
Mother has a high school diploma 0.232 0.001 0.235 0.001 0.235 0.001
Mother has a college certificate 0.392 0.001 0.396 0.001 0.396 0.001
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.215 0.001 0.214 0.001 0.214 0.001
Mother has a professional degree 0.046 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.041 0.000
Mother has a master's degree 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.000
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000
Father has less than a high school diploma 0.130 0.000 0.126 0.001 0.126 0.001
Father has a high school diploma 0.214 0.001 0.213 0.001 0.213 0.001
Father has a college certificate 0.394 0.001 0.400 0.001 0.400 0.001
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.183 0.001 0.183 0.001 0.183 0.001
Father has a professional degree 0.057 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.055 0.000
Father has a master's degree 0.009 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.000
Father has an earned doctorate 0.013 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.000
Mother is white 0.773 0.001 0.779 0.001 0.779 0.001
Mother is black 0.018 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.019 0.000
Mother is Asian 0.144 0.000 0.136 0.001 0.136 0.001
Mother is Arab 0.012 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000
Mother is Latino 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.000
Mother is Aboriginal 0.034 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.035 0.000
Mother is other non-white 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000
Father is white 0.779 0.001 0.783 0.001 0.782 0.001
Father is black 0.021 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.022 0.000
Father is Asian 0.137 0.000 0.131 0.001 0.131 0.001
Father is Arab 0.013 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.000
Father is Latino 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.000
Father is Aboriginal 0.032 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.033 0.000
Father is other non-white 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000
Local unemployment rate (women, 25 to 54) 0.056 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.055 0.000
Local unemployment rate (men, 25 to 54) 0.052 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.051 0.000
N 514,371 332,011 330,269
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Initial sample of married or 
common-law couples with 
at least one child
Drop if only one birth
Drop if first birth is a 
multiple 
Notes: In the sample of married or common-law couples with at least one child, only 336,434 have two or more children.
Forcibly, the same sex dummy variable is only based on these cases.
 
 
The second measure taken is to drop couples where the first birth is a multiple. In this 
case, the sample loss is minimal, going from 332,011 to 330,269. Moreover, the 
sample statistics are stable for each variable.  
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The empirical analysis begins with descriptive evidence. In Table 3.2, I show parental 
work measures by the number of children. Although the main sample from now on 
will be couples with at least two children, I include couples with one child in this 
table since no identification strategy is applied yet. In general, the mother’s paid work 
declines by about three or four hours per week on average with each additional child. 
Interestingly, this is only true after the second child. There is very little difference in 
paid hours between the first and second child. However, her unpaid childcare and 
housework rises by a larger total amount. In contrast, the father’s paid work hours 
remains stable between two and four children, but declines afterwards. The father’s 
unpaid hours of childcare and housework rise with each additional child. In other 
words, the paid work hours of the father appears more resilient, only declining in very 
large families (five or more children). This is despite the fact that unpaid paternal 
work hours rise between families with two and four children. However, it is always 
the case that additional children result in more total work hours for the mother than 
the father.  
  
Table 3.2: Means of outcome variables by the number of children
Number of children
1 2 3 4 5 6 or more
Mother's hours per week of paid work 23.229 24.272 20.974 17.063 12.834 10.344
Mother's hours per week of childcare 34.229 35.808 39.584 43.630 45.522 47.785
Mother's hours per week of housework 22.271 25.850 30.532 35.326 38.630 42.400
Father's hours per week of paid work 38.498 41.026 41.868 41.228 37.993 36.331
Father's hours per week of childcare 20.675 21.913 22.675 23.625 24.904 26.412
Father's hours per week of housework 12.517 13.599 14.471 15.651 17.273 19.945
N 177,937 231,306 74,793 17,554 4,287 2,329
Note: The sample consists of married or common-law couples with at least one birth, and the first is a singleton.
Source: Census of Population, 2006.  
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Although the results in Table 3.2 are interesting and generally in agreement with the 
predictions of the unified theories of Becker (1985) and Lundberg and Rose (1999), 
the magnitude of the differences may be difficult to interpret. The reason is that 
family size is largely a choice, and may thus be endogenous to the couples’ work 
preferences.  
 
To begin addressing this identification issue, I recalculate the mean parental work 
patterns along two dimensions of exogenous variation in family size below in Table 
3.3 for couples with at least two births. Among couples who had two same sex 
singleton children on the first two births, the mother spends 0.413 fewer hours per 
week in paid work, 0.476 additional hours per week doing unpaid childcare, and 
0.335 additional hours per week doing unpaid housework. For the father, the response 
is far smaller: we see virtually no change in paid work hours, a moderate increase in 
unpaid childcare, and a slight increase in unpaid housework.  
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Table 3.3: Means of outcome variables by instrumental variable value
Same sex
0 1 ∆
Mother's hours per week of paid work 23.212 22.799 -0.413
Mother's hours per week of childcare 36.949 37.425 0.476
Mother's hours per week of housework 27.394 27.729 0.335
Father's hours per week of paid work 41.215 41.129 -0.086
Father's hours per week of childcare 22.111 22.325 0.215
Father's hours per week of housework 13.923 13.995 0.072
N 164,636 165,633
Multiple birth
0 1 ∆
Mother's hours per week of paid work 23.057 19.820 -3.237
Mother's hours per week of childcare 37.122 41.149 4.026
Mother's hours per week of housework 27.497 31.599 4.103
Father's hours per week of paid work 41.165 41.653 0.488
Father's hours per week of childcare 22.189 23.993 1.804
Father's hours per week of housework 13.941 15.058 1.117
N 325,090 5,179
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Note: The sample consists of married or common-law couples with at least two births,
and the first is a singleton.
 
 
Breaking the numbers down by the incidence of a multiple birth on the second or later 
(and last) birth in Table 3.3, we see similar patterns in a qualitative sense, but the 
magnitude of the differences are much larger. Why might this be the case? The reason 
is demonstrated below in Table 3.4, where the child generating properties of each IV 
is shown. In short, a multiple birth is associated with substantially more additional 
children than having same sex children on the first two births (1.113 versus 0.073).  
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Table 3.4: Mean number of children by instrumental variable value
0 1 ∆
Same sex 2.335 2.408 0.073
Multiple birth 2.354 3.486 1.133
N - same sex 164,636 165,633
N - multiple birth 325,090 5,179
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Note: The sample consists of married or common-law couples with at
least two births, and the first is a singleton.
 
 
The fact that there is a such a large difference in the child generating properties 
between the IVs suggest that the numbers in Table 3.3 should be adjusted to account 
for this if one wants to gauge the impact of additional children on work patterns. This 
is precisely what the Wald estimate does.  
 
The Wald estimates appear below in Table 3.5. In this case, the impact of an 
additional child on parental work patterns is actually greater when using the same sex 
IV. Angrist and Evans (1998) hypothesize that this is likely because a third child born 
as a twin in a second birth is older (and thus requires less maternal attention) than a 
third child generated from the sex composition of the first two children, conditional 
on the second child having the same age in both cases. Earlier, I noted two other 
possibilities. First, there may be economies of scale in rearing twins as opposed to 
singletons. Siblings of the exact same age may be more likely to participate in similar 
extracurricular activities, which may reduce demands on the mother’s time, allowing 
her to spend more time performing market work. Second, there is a difference in the 
quality of the instruments themselves that may yield different estimates. Nevertheless, 
both sets of results tell the same story. Specifically, additional children are negatively 
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related to the mother’s paid work hours, but positively related to her unpaid hours of 
childcare and housework. In contrast, there is no clear effect on the father’s paid work 
patterns, and only a slight to moderate positive impact on housework and childcare, 
the latter not being statistically significant in the case of the multiple birth IV. 
 
Table 3.5: Wald estimates
Same sex
0 1
Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Wald s.e.
Mother's hours per week of paid work 23.212 0.048 22.799 0.048 -5.680 *** 0.060
Mother's hours per week of childcare 36.949 0.053 37.425 0.053 6.548 *** 0.066
Mother's hours per week of housework 27.394 0.046 27.729 0.046 4.604 *** 0.058
Father's hours per week of paid work 41.215 0.048 41.129 0.048 -1.180 *** 0.060
Father's hours per week of childcare 22.111 0.049 22.325 0.049 2.952 *** 0.061
Father's hours per week of housework 13.923 0.033 13.995 0.033 0.993 *** 0.041
Average number of children 2.335 2.408
N 164,636 165,633
Multiple birth
0 1
Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Wald s.e.
Mother's hours per week of paid work 23.057 0.034 19.820 0.266 -2.858 *** 0.236
Mother's hours per week of childcare 37.122 0.038 41.149 0.288 3.555 *** 0.257
Mother's hours per week of housework 27.497 0.033 31.599 0.270 3.622 *** 0.240
Father's hours per week of paid work 41.165 0.034 41.653 0.278 0.431 0.247
Father's hours per week of childcare 22.189 0.035 23.993 0.280 1.593 ** 0.249
Father's hours per week of housework 13.941 0.024 15.058 0.199 0.986 ** 0.177
Average number of children 2.354 3.486
N 325,090 5,179
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Notes: Statistical significance for the Wald estimate is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*"
(10%). The sample consists of married or common-law couples with at least two births, and the first is
a singleton.
 
 
Although the estimates in Table 3.5 are based on exogenous sources of variation, no 
IV is perfect. There may be residual differences in characteristics that should be taken 
into account. To demonstrate this, I show differences in observable characteristics by 
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the IV values in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 below. Beginning with Table 3.6, which is broken 
down by value of the same sex IV, it is evident that there are some small, but 
statistically significant differences in maternal and paternal education. Since 
education is an important determinant of labour supply, it is important to account for 
these differences in the econometric models that follow.  
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Table 3.6: Means of explanatory variables by sex composition of first two children
Same sex = 0 Same sex = 1
Mean Mean ∆ s.e.
Mother's age 37.445 37.443 -0.002 0.021
Father's age 40.085 40.081 -0.004 0.024
Mother has less than a high school diploma 0.101 0.102 0.001 0.001
Mother has a high school diploma 0.234 0.237 0.003 ** 0.001
Mother has a college certificate 0.396 0.396 0.000 0.002
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.216 0.211 -0.004 *** 0.001
Mother has a professional degree 0.041 0.042 0.001 0.001
Mother has a master's degree 0.008 0.007 -0.001 *** 0.000
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000
Father has less than a high school diploma 0.126 0.125 -0.001 0.001
Father has a high school diploma 0.212 0.215 0.003 * 0.001
Father has a college certificate 0.400 0.401 0.001 0.002
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.185 0.182 -0.003 ** 0.001
Father has a professional degree 0.055 0.054 -0.001 0.001
Father has a master's degree 0.010 0.011 0.001 * 0.000
Father has an earned doctorate 0.012 0.013 0.000 0.000
Mother is white 0.779 0.779 0.000 0.001
Mother is black 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.000
Mother is Asian 0.137 0.136 -0.001 0.001
Mother is Arab 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.000
Mother is Latino 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.000
Mother is Aboriginal 0.035 0.035 0.001 0.001
Mother is other non-white 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000
Father is white 0.782 0.782 0.000 0.001
Father is black 0.022 0.022 0.000 0.001
Father is Asian 0.132 0.131 -0.001 0.001
Father is Arab 0.014 0.014 0.001 0.000
Father is Latino 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.000
Father is Aboriginal 0.033 0.033 0.000 0.001
Father is other non-white 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000
Local unemployment rate (women, 25 to 54) 0.055 0.055 0.000 0.000
Local unemployment rate (men, 25 to 54) 0.051 0.051 0.000 0.000
N 164,636 165,633
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample
consists of married or common-law couples with at least two births, and the first is a singleton.
 
 
The exercise is repeated in Table 3.7, except along the multiple birth IV dimension 
this time. In this case, there are some significant differences in parental education, but 
also some differences in parental ethnicity. As noted by Cáceras-Delpiano (2006), the 
incidence of monozygotic twins (identical twins, who share the same, but divided 
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embryo) is equal in all races, age groups, and countries. However, the incidence of 
dizygotic twins (two separate fertilized embryos) depends on various factors, 
including ethnicity. In Table 3.7, the incidence of a multiple birth is more likely 
among blacks and whites, and less likely among Asians. Again, if these factors are 
independent determinants of labour supply preferences, it is important to account for 
the differences in the models to follow. 
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Table 3.7: Means of explanatory variables by presence of a multiple birth on the second or later birth
Mutiple birth = 0Multiple birth = 1
Mean Mean ∆ s.e.
Mother's age 37.443 37.528 0.085 0.081
Father's age 40.084 40.048 -0.035 0.093
Mother has less than a high school diploma 0.101 0.099 -0.002 0.004
Mother has a high school diploma 0.235 0.237 0.001 0.006
Mother has a college certificate 0.396 0.385 -0.011 0.007
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.213 0.223 0.010 * 0.006
Mother has a professional degree 0.041 0.041 0.000 0.003
Mother has a master's degree 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.001
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.001
Father has less than a high school diploma 0.126 0.131 0.006 0.005
Father has a high school diploma 0.213 0.211 -0.002 0.006
Father has a college certificate 0.400 0.398 -0.002 0.007
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.183 0.180 -0.003 0.005
Father has a professional degree 0.055 0.058 0.003 0.003
Father has a master's degree 0.010 0.012 0.002 0.002
Father has an earned doctorate 0.012 0.009 -0.003 *** 0.001
Mother is white 0.779 0.809 0.031 *** 0.006
Mother is black 0.019 0.023 0.004 * 0.002
Mother is Asian 0.137 0.097 -0.040 *** 0.004
Mother is Arab 0.013 0.015 0.003 0.002
Mother is Latino 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.002
Mother is Aboriginal 0.035 0.038 0.003 0.003
Mother is other non-white 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.001
Father is white 0.782 0.806 0.024 *** 0.006
Father is black 0.022 0.023 0.001 0.002
Father is Asian 0.132 0.095 -0.036 *** 0.004
Father is Arab 0.014 0.016 0.002 0.002
Father is Latino 0.011 0.014 0.003 0.002
Father is Aboriginal 0.033 0.039 0.006 ** 0.003
Father is other non-white 0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.001
Local unemployment rate (women, 25 to 54) 0.055 0.054 -0.001 0.001
Local unemployment rate (men, 25 to 54) 0.051 0.051 0.000 0.001
N 325,090 5,179
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists
of married or common-law couples with at least two births, and the first is a singleton.
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OLS approach 
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I begin the econometric section as I did the descriptive section, by presenting non-
causal evidence. In Tables 3.8 and 3.9, I show OLS regression results, where the 
dependent variables are the hours per week spent in various activities. The key 
independent variable is the number of children (not drawn from an exogenous source 
of variation). The other covariates are the ones described above: parental age, highest 
level of education, ethnicity, and local unemployment rates.  
 
In Table 3.8, the results for the mother are shown. The number of children has the 
expected impact on work patterns: negative with respect to paid work (-3.118 hours 
per week), positive with respect to childcare (3.332 hours per week) and housework 
(4.241 hours per week).  
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Table 3.8: OLS regressions of maternal work hours on the number of children and other controls 
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Number of children -3.118 *** 0.056 3.332 *** 0.059 4.241 *** 0.057
Mother's age 2.345 *** 0.063 -0.500 *** 0.071 -0.825 *** 0.063
Mother's age
2 
-0.025 *** 0.001 -0.004 *** 0.001 0.009 *** 0.001
Father's age 0.633 *** 0.042 -1.099 *** 0.048 -0.333 *** 0.042
Father's age
2 
-0.006 *** 0.000 0.009 *** 0.001 0.003 *** 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 3.313 *** 0.156 0.897 *** 0.166 -0.656 *** 0.155
Mother has a college certificate 5.865 *** 0.150 0.970 *** 0.159 -2.171 *** 0.149
Mother has a bachelor's degree 6.940 *** 0.169 2.182 *** 0.179 -3.707 *** 0.166
Mother has a professional degree 8.586 *** 0.244 1.520 *** 0.255 -5.256 *** 0.230
Mother has a master's degree 14.140 *** 0.491 -1.292 *** 0.484 -8.148 *** 0.435
Mother has an earned doctorate 13.174 *** 0.588 -0.037 0.576 -8.676 *** 0.471
Father has a high school diploma 0.070 0.145 0.611 *** 0.154 -0.631 *** 0.142
Father has a college certificate -1.314 *** 0.134 1.157 *** 0.142 0.175 0.132
Father has a bachelor's degree -4.644 *** 0.159 1.280 *** 0.169 0.207 0.156
Father has a professional degree -6.761 *** 0.213 1.078 *** 0.226 1.211 *** 0.207
Father has a master's degree -8.332 *** 0.365 4.019 *** 0.422 3.708 *** 0.391
Father has an earned doctorate -7.823 *** 0.375 2.020 *** 0.396 2.458 *** 0.363
Mother is black -1.287 *** 0.448 -4.504 *** 0.473 -1.379 *** 0.438
Mother is Asian -1.255 *** 0.272 -3.314 *** 0.276 -0.213 0.255
Mother is Arab -3.843 *** 0.728 -5.198 *** 0.749 -0.709 0.690
Mother is Latino -4.120 *** 0.505 -3.488 *** 0.533 0.303 0.499
Mother is Aboriginal 0.240 0.251 1.014 *** 0.263 0.686 *** 0.251
Mother is other non-white 0.211 0.653 -3.019 *** 0.670 0.273 0.632
Father is black 1.424 *** 0.417 -1.161 *** 0.429 -0.998 ** 0.406
Father is Asian -1.107 *** 0.275 -3.558 *** 0.281 -0.346 0.260
Father is Arab -3.949 *** 0.693 0.740 0.710 0.791 0.656
Father is Latino 0.410 0.522 -2.966 *** 0.545 -2.086 *** 0.510
Father is Aboriginal 0.436 * 0.251 0.762 *** 0.267 0.461 * 0.250
Father is other non-white -0.055 0.636 -2.229 *** 0.679 0.103 0.641
Local unemployment rate (women, 25 to 54) -26.135 *** 1.542 16.069 *** 1.629 16.505 *** 1.542
Local unemployment rate (men, 25 to 54) 4.382 *** 1.160 -11.631 *** 1.237 -8.244 *** 1.167
Intercept -37.669 *** 1.026 81.449 *** 1.175 45.089 *** 1.072
Adjusted R
2 
0.079 0.129 0.041
N 330,269 330,269 330,269
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Hours per week of 
paid work
Hours per week of 
childcare
Hours per week of 
housework
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of married or
common-law couples with at least two births, and the first is a singleton.
 
 
In terms of the other covariates, older mothers are more likely to work outside of the 
home. Also, the mothers’ education is positively linked with her paid work hours and 
negatively linked to her unpaid housework; however, the link with childcare is less 
clear, although slightly positive if anything. So, for a given number of children, 
mothers with more education choose more paid work at the expense of housework, 
not childcare. The relationship is much less clear between the mother’s work patterns 
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and her husband’s education. The link between the mother’s paid work and the 
father’s education is negative for most of the education spectrum, but not unilaterally 
so. Most groups of non-whites spend less time doing paid work (e.g. blacks, Asians, 
Arabs, and Latinos), but this might relate to the difficulties they face in finding 
employment in the labour market. Finally, the effect of the local unemployment rate 
faced by mothers on paud hours is negative, as expected.  
 
In Table 3.9, the exercise is repeated for the father’s work patterns. In this case, work 
hours in all three activities increase in response to additional children. However, the 
magnitude of the effect is quite small: always less than one additional hour per week 
for every additional child. The effect was much larger for the mother in Table 3.8. In 
terms of the other covariate effects, the relationship between the father’s education 
and his paid work hours is positive, albeit smaller than the one for mothers. In terms 
of ethnicity, all non-white groups work fewer paid hours than whites. Finally, the 
unemployment rate faced by fathers has a negative effect on paid work hours, as it did 
in the case of mothers, except that the effect is now about twice as large.  
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Table 3.9: OLS regressions of paternal work hours on the number of children and other controls 
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Number of children 0.439 *** 0.063 0.655 *** 0.059 0.953 *** 0.045
Mother's age 0.953 *** 0.070 0.061 0.067 -0.052 0.047
Mother's age
2 
-0.012 *** 0.001 -0.006 *** 0.001 0.001 0.001
Father's age 0.385 *** 0.055 -0.463 *** 0.045 0.036 0.031
Father's age
2 
-0.007 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001 0.000 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 2.024 *** 0.172 0.565 *** 0.160 -0.032 0.114
Mother has a college certificate 1.989 *** 0.166 1.878 *** 0.154 0.455 *** 0.110
Mother has a bachelor's degree 1.657 *** 0.181 3.599 *** 0.172 0.678 *** 0.121
Mother has a professional degree 1.020 *** 0.242 4.257 *** 0.238 1.333 *** 0.165
Mother has a master's degree -1.344 *** 0.486 6.255 *** 0.454 2.964 *** 0.331
Mother has an earned doctorate -0.851 0.529 6.636 *** 0.529 2.149 *** 0.359
Father has a high school diploma 2.462 *** 0.163 0.987 *** 0.152 -0.029 0.108
Father has a college certificate 2.437 *** 0.153 0.614 *** 0.141 0.006 0.100
Father has a bachelor's degree 2.263 *** 0.170 -0.198 0.162 -1.371 *** 0.113
Father has a professional degree 2.637 *** 0.214 -1.925 *** 0.204 -2.139 *** 0.142
Father has a master's degree 8.757 *** 0.418 -3.761 *** 0.355 -4.215 *** 0.233
Father has an earned doctorate 3.902 *** 0.362 -2.354 *** 0.331 -2.717 *** 0.224
Mother is black -2.482 *** 0.448 -2.346 *** 0.465 -0.251 0.320
Mother is Asian -2.738 *** 0.266 -1.386 *** 0.263 0.815 *** 0.188
Mother is Arab -5.340 *** 0.765 -3.049 *** 0.712 -0.287 0.440
Mother is Latino -1.925 *** 0.491 -3.328 *** 0.486 -0.978 *** 0.346
Mother is Aboriginal -1.636 *** 0.285 3.249 *** 0.279 2.989 *** 0.203
Mother is other non-white -0.913 0.595 -2.137 *** 0.635 0.446 0.471
Father is black -3.924 *** 0.420 -0.013 0.435 -0.250 0.296
Father is Asian -1.731 *** 0.268 -4.075 *** 0.267 -0.915 *** 0.191
Father is Arab -3.123 *** 0.728 -2.899 *** 0.686 -2.706 *** 0.407
Father is Latino -4.344 *** 0.530 -1.467 *** 0.508 -0.498 0.364
Father is Aboriginal -3.819 *** 0.293 4.256 *** 0.285 2.072 *** 0.199
Father is other non-white -2.814 *** 0.586 -0.974 0.649 -0.159 0.470
Local unemployment rate (women, 25 to 54) -4.470 ** 1.984 3.597 ** 1.661 2.517 ** 1.206
Local unemployment rate (men, 25 to 54) -55.782 *** 1.445 12.161 *** 1.260 13.809 *** 0.952
Intercept 16.840 *** 1.170 37.026 *** 1.166 10.386 *** 0.798
Adjusted R
2 
0.049 0.051 0.016
N 330,269 330,269 330,269
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Hours per week of 
paid work
Hours per week of 
childcare
Hours per week of 
housework
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of married or
common-law couples with at least two births, and the first is a singleton.
 
 
IV approach 
 
We now turn to the causal portion of the econometric results, namely the IV 
regression results. In Table 3.10, I show results from the first-stage regressions of the 
number of children on the instruments, plus the other covariates. The coefficients on 
the IVs confirm the descriptive findings from Table 3.4. Specifically, the same sex IV 
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is associated with 0.072 additional children, while the multiple birth IV is associated 
with 1.124 additional children. Both coefficients are significant at 1% and pass all 
thresholds for a strong IV, suggested by the F-statistic (squared value of the t-statistic), 
as noted in Stock and Yogo (2005). In most instances, an F-statistic of 16 is sufficient. 
The F-statistics reported in Table 3.10 are much larger: 717 and 7,323. 
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Table 3.10: First-stage regression of the number of children on the instrumental variables and other controls 
Same sex instrument Multiple birth instrument
b s.e. b s.e.
Same sex/Multiple birth 0.072 *** 0.003 1.124 *** 0.013
Mother's age 0.069 *** 0.002 0.067 *** 0.002
Mother's age
2 
-0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000
Father's age 0.015 *** 0.002 0.015 *** 0.002
Father's age
2 
0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma -0.151 *** 0.006 -0.151 *** 0.006
Mother has a college certificate -0.209 *** 0.006 -0.208 *** 0.006
Mother has a bachelor's degree -0.237 *** 0.007 -0.238 *** 0.007
Mother has a professional degree -0.274 *** 0.009 -0.274 *** 0.008
Mother has a master's degree -0.212 *** 0.017 -0.216 *** 0.017
Mother has an earned doctorate -0.310 *** 0.018 -0.315 *** 0.016
Father has a high school diploma -0.047 *** 0.005 -0.045 *** 0.005
Father has a college certificate -0.052 *** 0.005 -0.051 *** 0.005
Father has a bachelor's degree -0.021 *** 0.006 -0.019 *** 0.006
Father has a professional degree 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.008
Father has a master's degree 0.110 *** 0.016 0.111 *** 0.015
Father has an earned doctorate 0.000 0.013 0.007 0.013
Mother is black 0.177 *** 0.018 0.171 *** 0.018
Mother is Asian -0.045 *** 0.008 -0.040 *** 0.008
Mother is Arab 0.135 *** 0.026 0.129 *** 0.026
Mother is Latino -0.027 0.017 -0.021 0.017
Mother is Aboriginal 0.220 *** 0.010 0.221 *** 0.010
Mother is other non-white -0.006 0.023 -0.005 0.022
Father is black 0.144 *** 0.016 0.147 *** 0.015
Father is Asian 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.008
Father is Arab 0.141 *** 0.024 0.144 *** 0.024
Father is Latino 0.091 *** 0.019 0.083 *** 0.018
Father is Aboriginal 0.236 *** 0.010 0.233 *** 0.010
Father is other non-white 0.058 ** 0.024 0.060 ** 0.023
Local unemployment rate (women, 25 to 54) -0.168 *** 0.056 -0.159 *** 0.055
Local unemployment rate (men, 25 to 54) 0.093 ** 0.042 0.093 ** 0.041
Intercept 0.975 *** 0.037 1.028 *** 0.036
F-statistic 717.404 7,322.557
Adjusted R
2
0.040 0.077
N 330,269 330,269
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of
married or common-law couples with at least two births, and the first is a singleton.
 
 
In Tables 3.11 to 3.14, I show the coefficients from the second stage of the IV 
regressions. These are considered the preferred results since they are based on 
somewhat exogenous sources of variation and they take into account differences in 
observable characteristics that remain. Given the large volume of coefficients from 
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various tables, I summarize the key results in Table 3.15, which shows only the 
coefficients related to the number of children variable.  
 
Table 3.11: IV regressions of maternal work hours on the number of children and other controls - same sex IV
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Number of children -5.397 *** 1.044 6.456 *** 1.119 4.317 *** 1.015
Mother's age 2.503 *** 0.096 -0.717 *** 0.105 -0.831 *** 0.094
Mother's age
2 
-0.028 *** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.009 *** 0.001
Father's age 0.668 *** 0.045 -1.146 *** 0.052 -0.334 *** 0.044
Father's age
2 
-0.006 *** 0.000 0.009 *** 0.001 0.003 *** 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 2.969 *** 0.221 1.369 *** 0.237 -0.645 *** 0.217
Mother has a college certificate 5.389 *** 0.264 1.623 *** 0.282 -2.155 *** 0.258
Mother has a bachelor's degree 6.399 *** 0.300 2.924 *** 0.319 -3.689 *** 0.291
Mother has a professional degree 7.963 *** 0.377 2.375 *** 0.398 -5.236 *** 0.360
Mother has a master's degree 13.650 *** 0.542 -0.619 0.542 -8.131 *** 0.486
Mother has an earned doctorate 12.469 *** 0.672 0.930 0.672 -8.652 *** 0.566
Father has a high school diploma -0.035 0.154 0.755 *** 0.164 -0.628 *** 0.150
Father has a college certificate -1.433 *** 0.145 1.320 *** 0.155 0.179 0.143
Father has a bachelor's degree -4.691 *** 0.161 1.343 *** 0.172 0.208 0.157
Father has a professional degree -6.750 *** 0.214 1.063 *** 0.228 1.210 *** 0.207
Father has a master's degree -8.076 *** 0.387 3.668 *** 0.444 3.700 *** 0.407
Father has an earned doctorate -7.821 *** 0.377 2.016 *** 0.398 2.458 *** 0.363
Mother is black -0.884 * 0.485 -5.056 *** 0.517 -1.392 *** 0.474
Mother is Asian -1.358 *** 0.277 -3.173 *** 0.283 -0.210 0.259
Mother is Arab -3.537 *** 0.736 -5.618 *** 0.767 -0.719 0.704
Mother is Latino -4.182 *** 0.507 -3.403 *** 0.536 0.305 0.500
Mother is Aboriginal 0.742 ** 0.343 0.325 0.362 0.669 ** 0.336
Mother is other non-white 0.199 0.659 -3.002 *** 0.674 0.273 0.632
Father is black 1.753 *** 0.444 -1.612 *** 0.463 -1.009 ** 0.431
Father is Asian -1.091 *** 0.277 -3.579 *** 0.284 -0.347 0.260
Father is Arab -3.624 *** 0.702 0.295 0.728 0.780 0.671
Father is Latino 0.618 0.532 -3.251 *** 0.557 -2.093 *** 0.518
Father is Aboriginal 0.974 *** 0.353 0.024 0.378 0.443 0.346
Father is other non-white 0.077 0.643 -2.410 *** 0.688 0.099 0.644
Local unemployment rate (women, 25 to 54) -26.520 *** 1.557 16.596 *** 1.654 16.517 *** 1.552
Local unemployment rate (men, 25 to 54) 4.595 *** 1.168 -11.923 *** 1.256 -8.251 *** 1.171
Intercept -35.362 *** 1.476 78.286 *** 1.619 45.012 *** 1.486
F-statistic 26.711 33.280 18.077
Adjusted R
2
0.073 0.119 0.041
N 330,269 330,269 330,269
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of married or common-law
couples with at least two births, and the first is a singleton.
Hours per week of paid 
work
Hours per week of 
childcare
Hours per week of 
housework
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Table 3.12: IV regressions of paternal work hours on the number of children and other controls - same sex IV
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Number of children -1.154 1.053 3.008 *** 1.066 0.984 0.734
Mother's age 1.063 *** 0.101 -0.102 0.099 -0.054 0.069
Mother's age
2 
-0.013 *** 0.001 -0.003 ** 0.001 0.001 0.001
Father's age 0.409 *** 0.058 -0.498 *** 0.048 0.035 0.033
Father's age
2 
-0.007 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001 0.000 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 1.784 *** 0.232 0.920 *** 0.227 -0.027 0.160
Mother has a college certificate 1.657 *** 0.274 2.370 *** 0.271 0.461 ** 0.189
Mother has a bachelor's degree 1.279 *** 0.307 4.157 *** 0.306 0.685 *** 0.212
Mother has a professional degree 0.584 0.375 4.900 *** 0.376 1.341 *** 0.261
Mother has a master's degree -1.687 *** 0.536 6.761 *** 0.509 2.971 *** 0.366
Mother has an earned doctorate -1.343 ** 0.621 7.364 *** 0.625 2.159 *** 0.426
Father has a high school diploma 2.388 *** 0.171 1.096 *** 0.160 -0.028 0.113
Father has a college certificate 2.355 *** 0.163 0.736 *** 0.152 0.007 0.107
Father has a bachelor's degree 2.230 *** 0.172 -0.150 0.164 -1.370 *** 0.114
Father has a professional degree 2.645 *** 0.214 -1.936 *** 0.205 -2.140 *** 0.142
Father has a master's degree 8.936 *** 0.434 -4.025 *** 0.377 -4.219 *** 0.246
Father has an earned doctorate 3.904 *** 0.363 -2.356 *** 0.331 -2.717 *** 0.224
Mother is black -2.201 *** 0.484 -2.762 *** 0.504 -0.257 0.345
Mother is Asian -2.810 *** 0.270 -1.280 *** 0.268 0.816 *** 0.191
Mother is Arab -5.126 *** 0.774 -3.365 *** 0.727 -0.291 0.451
Mother is Latino -1.968 *** 0.492 -3.263 *** 0.488 -0.977 *** 0.346
Mother is Aboriginal -1.285 *** 0.369 2.730 *** 0.365 2.982 *** 0.261
Mother is other non-white -0.921 0.593 -2.124 *** 0.635 0.446 0.471
Father is black -3.694 *** 0.447 -0.353 0.465 -0.255 0.314
Father is Asian -1.719 *** 0.269 -4.091 *** 0.268 -0.916 *** 0.191
Father is Arab -2.896 *** 0.740 -3.234 *** 0.701 -2.710 *** 0.420
Father is Latino -4.199 *** 0.537 -1.682 *** 0.517 -0.501 0.370
Father is Aboriginal -3.443 *** 0.385 3.700 *** 0.382 2.064 *** 0.263
Father is other non-white -2.722 *** 0.585 -1.111 * 0.651 -0.161 0.471
Local unemployment rate (women, 25 to 54) -4.739 ** 1.996 3.994 ** 1.674 2.522 ** 1.212
Local unemployment rate (men, 25 to 54) -55.633 *** 1.450 11.941 *** 1.267 13.806 *** 0.954
Intercept 18.452 *** 1.574 34.646 *** 1.584 10.355 *** 1.090
F-statistic 1.200 7.957 1.799
Adjusted R
2
0.046 0.045 0.016
N 330,269 330,269 330,269
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Hours per week of paid 
work
Hours per week of 
childcare
Hours per week of 
housework
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of married or common-law
couples with at least two births, and the first is a singleton.
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Table 3.13: IV regressions of maternal work hours on the number of children and other controls - multiple birth IV
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Number of children -3.099 *** 0.266 3.402 *** 0.291 3.682 *** 0.278
Mother's age 2.344 *** 0.065 -0.505 *** 0.073 -0.786 *** 0.065
Mother's age
2 
-0.025 *** 0.001 -0.004 *** 0.001 0.009 *** 0.001
Father's age 0.633 *** 0.043 -1.100 *** 0.048 -0.324 *** 0.042
Father's age
2 
-0.006 *** 0.000 0.009 *** 0.001 0.003 *** 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 3.316 *** 0.161 0.908 *** 0.171 -0.741 *** 0.161
Mother has a college certificate 5.869 *** 0.159 0.985 *** 0.170 -2.288 *** 0.159
Mother has a bachelor's degree 6.945 *** 0.181 2.199 *** 0.192 -3.840 *** 0.179
Mother has a professional degree 8.591 *** 0.255 1.539 *** 0.267 -5.409 *** 0.242
Mother has a master's degree 14.144 *** 0.494 -1.277 *** 0.488 -8.268 *** 0.439
Mother has an earned doctorate 13.180 *** 0.594 -0.015 0.583 -8.849 *** 0.479
Father has a high school diploma 0.071 0.145 0.614 *** 0.155 -0.657 *** 0.143
Father has a college certificate -1.313 *** 0.135 1.161 *** 0.143 0.146 0.133
Father has a bachelor's degree -4.644 *** 0.159 1.281 *** 0.169 0.195 0.156
Father has a professional degree -6.761 *** 0.213 1.078 *** 0.226 1.213 *** 0.207
Father has a master's degree -8.335 *** 0.366 4.011 *** 0.423 3.771 *** 0.392
Father has an earned doctorate -7.823 *** 0.375 2.019 *** 0.396 2.458 *** 0.363
Mother is black -1.290 *** 0.450 -4.516 *** 0.476 -1.280 *** 0.441
Mother is Asian -1.254 *** 0.272 -3.311 *** 0.276 -0.238 0.256
Mother is Arab -3.846 *** 0.728 -5.208 *** 0.750 -0.634 0.692
Mother is Latino -4.120 *** 0.505 -3.486 *** 0.533 0.288 0.499
Mother is Aboriginal 0.236 0.257 0.998 *** 0.270 0.809 *** 0.258
Mother is other non-white 0.212 0.653 -3.018 *** 0.670 0.270 0.631
Father is black 1.422 *** 0.419 -1.171 *** 0.431 -0.917 ** 0.408
Father is Asian -1.107 *** 0.275 -3.558 *** 0.281 -0.342 0.260
Father is Arab -3.951 *** 0.694 0.730 0.711 0.871 0.658
Father is Latino 0.409 0.522 -2.973 *** 0.546 -2.035 *** 0.510
Father is Aboriginal 0.431 * 0.258 0.745 *** 0.275 0.593 ** 0.259
Father is other non-white -0.056 0.636 -2.233 *** 0.679 0.136 0.641
Local unemployment rate (women, 25 to 54) -26.132 *** 1.543 16.080 *** 1.630 16.410 *** 1.542
Local unemployment rate (men, 25 to 54) 4.380 *** 1.160 -11.637 *** 1.238 -8.192 *** 1.166
Intercept -37.688 *** 1.060 81.377 *** 1.213 45.655 *** 1.106
F-statistic 135.512 137.159 175.644
Adjusted R
2
0.079 0.129 0.041
N 330,269 330,269 330,269
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Hours per week of paid 
work
Hours per week of 
childcare
Hours per week of 
housework
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of married or common-law
couples with at least two births, and the first is a singleton.
 
 
 115
Table 3.14: IV regressions of paternal work hours on the number of children and other controls - multiple birth IV
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Number of children 0.292 0.288 1.403 *** 0.292 0.975 *** 0.207
Mother's age 0.963 *** 0.073 0.009 0.070 -0.054 0.049
Mother's age
2 
-0.012 *** 0.001 -0.005 *** 0.001 0.001 0.001
Father's age 0.387 *** 0.055 -0.474 *** 0.045 0.035 0.031
Father's age
2 
-0.007 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001 0.000 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 2.002 *** 0.177 0.678 *** 0.166 -0.029 0.118
Mother has a college certificate 1.959 *** 0.175 2.034 *** 0.166 0.459 *** 0.118
Mother has a bachelor's degree 1.622 *** 0.192 3.777 *** 0.185 0.683 *** 0.130
Mother has a professional degree 0.980 *** 0.254 4.461 *** 0.250 1.339 *** 0.174
Mother has a master's degree -1.376 *** 0.489 6.416 *** 0.458 2.969 *** 0.334
Mother has an earned doctorate -0.896 * 0.536 6.868 *** 0.536 2.156 *** 0.365
Father has a high school diploma 2.455 *** 0.164 1.022 *** 0.153 -0.028 0.108
Father has a college certificate 2.430 *** 0.154 0.653 *** 0.142 0.007 0.101
Father has a bachelor's degree 2.260 *** 0.170 -0.183 0.162 -1.371 *** 0.113
Father has a professional degree 2.638 *** 0.214 -1.928 *** 0.204 -2.140 *** 0.142
Father has a master's degree 8.774 *** 0.419 -3.845 *** 0.356 -4.218 *** 0.234
Father has an earned doctorate 3.902 *** 0.362 -2.355 *** 0.331 -2.717 *** 0.224
Mother is black -2.456 *** 0.450 -2.478 *** 0.468 -0.255 0.323
Mother is Asian -2.745 *** 0.266 -1.352 *** 0.264 0.815 *** 0.188
Mother is Arab -5.320 *** 0.765 -3.149 *** 0.713 -0.290 0.441
Mother is Latino -1.929 *** 0.491 -3.307 *** 0.486 -0.977 *** 0.346
Mother is Aboriginal -1.604 *** 0.292 3.084 *** 0.286 2.984 *** 0.208
Mother is other non-white -0.914 0.595 -2.133 *** 0.635 0.446 0.471
Father is black -3.903 *** 0.422 -0.121 0.438 -0.253 0.297
Father is Asian -1.730 *** 0.268 -4.080 *** 0.267 -0.916 *** 0.191
Father is Arab -3.102 *** 0.730 -3.005 *** 0.686 -2.709 *** 0.408
Father is Latino -4.331 *** 0.531 -1.535 *** 0.508 -0.500 0.365
Father is Aboriginal -3.785 *** 0.301 4.080 *** 0.294 2.067 *** 0.205
Father is other non-white -2.806 *** 0.586 -1.017 0.648 -0.160 0.470
Local unemployment rate (women, 25 to 54) -4.495 ** 1.985 3.723 ** 1.662 2.521 ** 1.207
Local unemployment rate (men, 25 to 54) -55.768 *** 1.445 12.091 *** 1.261 13.807 *** 0.952
Intercept 16.989 *** 1.203 36.270 *** 1.198 10.365 *** 0.822
F-statistic 1.029 23.137 22.246
Adjusted R
2
0.049 0.050 0.016
N 330,269 330,269 330,269
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Hours per week of paid 
work
Hours per week of 
childcare
Hours per week of 
housework
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of married or common-law
couples with at least two births, and the first is a singleton.
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Table 3.15: Summary of IV regression results of the effect of the number of children on parental work hours
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Same sex IV
   Mother -5.397 *** 1.044 6.456 *** 1.119 4.317 *** 1.015 5.376
   Father -1.154 1.053 3.008 *** 1.066 0.984 0.734 2.838
   Total -6.551 9.464 5.301
Multiple birth IV
   Mother -3.099 *** 0.266 3.402 *** 0.291 3.682 *** 0.278 3.985
   Father 0.292 0.288 1.403 *** 0.292 0.975 *** 0.207 2.669
   Total -2.807 4.805 4.656
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of
married or common-law couples with at least two births, and the first is a singleton. Included in the
regressions are controls for each parent's age, education, ethnicity, and the gender specific local
unemployment rate they face.
Hours per week of 
paid work
Hours per week of 
childcare
Hours per week of 
housework
Total hours per week 
of paid work, 
childcare, and 
 
 
The results are entirely in line with Becker’s theory of specialization, combined with 
Lundberg and Rose’s theory of home intensity. In response to an additional child, 
mothers spend less time in paid work (-5.397 for the same sex IV; -3.099 for the 
multiple birth IV), but more time doing unpaid childcare (6.456; 3.402) and 
housework (4.317; 3.682). All of these results are statistically significant at 1%. 
 
For the father, the responses are far more moderate. In response to an additional child, 
fathers spend about the same amount of time in paid work. In fact, the coefficients for 
either IV strategy are not significant. However, fathers spend more time doing unpaid 
childcare (3.008 for the same sex IV; 1.403 for the multiple birth IV), which are both 
significant at 1%. Regarding housework, there is no consistent significant effect. 
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On balance, mothers respond to an additional child by increasing their total workload 
by an additional 5.376 (same sex IV) or 3.985 (multiple birth IV) hours per week. The 
corresponding numbers are smaller for fathers: 2.838 and 2.669.  
 
It is important to compare the size of the IV estimates to those obtained from OLS. 
The multiple birth IV estimates are very close in magnitude to OLS, while the same 
sex IV estimates are larger in absolute value. Whether the OLS estimates were biased 
to begin with is unclear, depending on which set of IV estimates are more credible. 
Thus, at best, the IV estimates simply confirm the direction of the OLS effects. 
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Validity implies that the instrument is not correlated with the error term in a 
regression of work on fertility. The sex composition of the first two children is almost 
certainly random, and thus not correlated with anything (including the error term in a 
regression of work on fertility). However, there are reasons why this condition may 
not hold in the case of multiple births. For example, multiple births are more common 
among older parents and blacks (Cáceras-Delpiano, 2006). Both of these groups may 
have particular time use preferences. Nevertheless, both groups can be identified in 
the Census. More problematic is the fact that multiple births are far more common 
among women taking fertility drugs or among couples undergoing fertility procedures, 
such as in-vitro fertilization (IVF). Although it is not clear why fertility problems and 
preferences for paid and unpaid work are related, it is still possible that the decision to 
undergo fertility treatments is related to work patterns, especially in light of the high 
cost of certain treatments.  
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The same sex IV is also not immune to validity concerns. As I noted earlier, twins 
necessarily come in pairs. The same cannot be said for additional children generated 
from the sex composition instrument. When the second child is born, even if it is of 
the same sex as the first, parents still have to decide if they will pursue having another 
child. It is at this point where the process may become selective. 
 
To address these concerns for both IVs, I use the quasi-longitudinal nature of the 
Census to try to predict the IV values with work patterns in the previous year. If paid 
work patterns predict future IV values (i.e. if the sign on the previous work patterns 
coefficient is significantly different from zero), then the validity of the IV is put into 
question.14 It is important to note that, at best, this exercise may suggest validity, but 
cannot prove it. Also, a similar exercise is not possible for unpaid work since this is 
not available for the previous year. 
 
In Tables 3.16 and 3.17, I show the relevant OLS regression results. Beginning with 
Table 3.16, the sample consists of married or common-law couples, where the mother 
is less than 40 years old (i.e. of usual child-bearing age), and the couple has two births, 
the second of which occurred in 2006 (the outcome variable) and the first prior to 
2004. Also, the first birth is a singleton. I restrict the first birth to have occurred prior 
to 2004 since births in 2004 or 2005 are likely to affect labour supply in 2005 (the 
                                                 
14 Levitt (1996) applies a similar approach. His study is focused on estimating the causal impact of 
incarceration rates on crime rates using state-level data. As an instrument for incarceration rates, he 
uses prison overcrowding lawsuits, which are negatively correlated with incarceration rates (i.e. it is 
a strong instrument). To support the validity assumption, Levitt demonstrates that lawsuits cannot be 
predicted from prior information on crime rates. 
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independent variable of interest). I only select mother’s below the age of 40 since 
fertility declines substantially afterwards. 
 
The first point of interest in the table is that fact that the adjusted R2 value is very low, 
indicating that it is very difficult to predict either IV. The more detailed results 
suggest no significant relationship between the multiple birth IV and previous patterns 
of paid work. Although most lagged work pattern variables also fail to predict the 
same sex IV, the coefficient corresponding to the mother having previously worked 
on a full-time basis is significant at 5%. This finding is important, given that Angrist 
and Evans argue that the same sex IV is valid based on its randomness.  
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b s.e. b s.e.
Mother's weeks worked last year 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Mother mainly worked full-time last year -0.045 ** 0.020 0.000 0.005
Father's weeks worked last year 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Father mainly worked full-time last year 0.028 0.037 0.003 0.007
Mother's age -0.043 0.022 0.001 0.004
Mother's age
2 
0.001 * 0.000 0.000 0.000
Father's age -0.009 0.006 -0.001 0.001
Father's age
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 0.005 0.034 0.002 0.005
Mother has a college certificate -0.016 0.033 0.003 0.006
Mother has a bachelor's degree -0.023 0.037 0.011 0.008
Mother has a professional degree 0.070 0.048 0.009 0.011
Mother has a master's degree 0.041 0.096 -0.006 0.006
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.154 0.123 0.016 0.019
Father has a high school diploma 0.016 0.030 -0.003 0.005
Father has a college certificate 0.044 0.028 -0.001 0.005
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.041 0.033 0.000 0.008
Father has a professional degree 0.070 0.045 -0.007 0.009
Father has a master's degree -0.104 0.089 -0.016 ** 0.006
Father has an earned doctorate -0.057 0.079 -0.016 ** 0.008
Mother is black -0.005 0.075 0.013 0.027
Mother is Asian 0.083 * 0.044 -0.001 0.008
Mother is Arab 0.060 0.114 0.011 0.013
Mother is Latino 0.206 ** 0.101 -0.005 0.004
Mother is Aboriginal -0.041 0.048 -0.001 0.007
Mother is other non-white 0.059 0.117 -0.005 0.006
Father is black 0.003 0.071 -0.019 0.020
Father is Asian -0.061 0.046 -0.007 0.008
Father is Arab -0.023 0.107 -0.008 0.006
Father is Latino -0.043 0.092 -0.011 *** 0.004
Father is Aboriginal 0.062 0.051 0.013 0.010
Father is other non-white -0.099 0.106 -0.017 *** 0.005
Intercept 1.259 *** 0.332 -0.008 0.063
Adjusted R
2 
0.006 -0.001
N 5,320 5,320
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Same sex Multiple birth
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of
married or common-law couples, where the mother is less than 40 years old, and the couple has two births,
the second of which occurred in 2006 and the first prior to 2004. Also, the first birth is a singleton.
Table 3.16: OLS regressions of instrumental variables on previous patterns of paid work and other controls
 
 
As I alluded to earlier, the real window of opportunity for selectivity with regards to 
the same sex IV lies in the decision to have a third child or not, conditional on having 
same sex children on the first two. In Table 3.17, I focus on a sample of married or 
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common-law couples, where the mother is less than 40 years old, and the couple has 
two or three births, the first two of which occurred prior to 2004, and the third (if 
present) occurred in 2006. Also, the first two births were singletons of the same sex. 
The dependent variable in this case is the occurrence of a third child. Note that the 
sample is much larger in this case since it is far less likely to exclude couples who had 
two or more children, which is common among couples who choose not to remain 
childless. The coefficient of -0.0002 in this linear probability model suggests that an 
additional week of maternal work in the previous year is associated with a 0.02 
percentage point reduction in the probability of having a third child, conditional on 
having two (significant at 1%). Thus, although the coefficient is statistically 
significant, it is not large by any means, suggesting once again that selection effects 
are likely to be quite small.  
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b s.e.
Mother's weeks worked last year -0.0002 *** 0.0000
Mother mainly worked full-time last year -0.0023 0.0019
Father's weeks worked last year 0.0001 0.0001
Father mainly worked full-time last year -0.0030 0.0042
Mother's age -0.0105 *** 0.0038
Mother's age
2 
0.0001 * 0.0001
Father's age -0.0032 *** 0.0009
Father's age
2 
0.0000 *** 0.0000
Mother has a high school diploma -0.0040 0.0032
Mother has a college certificate -0.0008 0.0031
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.0028 0.0036
Mother has a professional degree 0.0007 0.0054
Mother has a master's degree -0.0120 * 0.0071
Mother has an earned doctorate -0.0188 *** 0.0045
Father has a high school diploma 0.0007 0.0027
Father has a college certificate 0.0020 0.0024
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.0058 * 0.0032
Father has a professional degree 0.0156 *** 0.0056
Father has a master's degree 0.0126 0.0117
Father has an earned doctorate 0.0129 0.0102
Mother is black 0.0255 ** 0.0128
Mother is Asian 0.0015 0.0061
Mother is Arab 0.0137 0.0239
Mother is Latino -0.0092 0.0107
Mother is Aboriginal 0.0051 0.0045
Mother is other non-white -0.0125 0.0110
Father is black 0.0059 0.0103
Father is Asian -0.0002 0.0061
Father is Arab 0.0259 0.0241
Father is Latino 0.0187 0.0125
Father is Aboriginal 0.0056 0.0047
Father is other non-white 0.0186 0.0156
Intercept 0.3404 *** 0.0663
Adjusted R
2 
0.018
N 45,621
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Table 3.17: OLS regressions of the incidence of a third child on previous patterns of paid work 
and other controls
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample
consists of married or common-law couples, where the mother is less than 40 years old, and the
couple has two or three births, the first two of which occurred prior to 2004, and the third (if
present) occurred in 2006. Also, the first two births were singletons of the same sex.
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What can we conclude from this? First, the multiple birth IV fares quite well in terms 
of validity. In contrast, some doubt is cast on the validity of the same sex IV. This is 
not only true for the decision to have a third child conditional on having two of the 
same sex, but also with regards to having two of the same sex in the first place. This 
second point seems odd, given that the gender of the child is largely random. To 
verify if the model specification might be the cause of this result, I ran a similar 
regression on the same sample, but only included the dummy variable indicating full-
time status (last year) for the mother. The coefficient was largely unchanged at -0.039 
(and again significant at 5%). Although it is not impossible that this result is caused 
by sampling variability, the sample size is not small by any means (5,320). In any 
event, what this exercise highlights is the importance of exploiting as many IVs for 
fertility as possible to ensure robust results.  
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In this Chapter, I use Canadian Census data to assess the impact of fertility on the 
allocation of paid and unpaid work among couples. To account for the possible 
endogeneity of family size and preferences for time use, I instrument fertility with the 
sex composition of the first two children and the presence of a multiple birth on the 
second or later birth. 
 
The results suggest that larger families are associated with substantial changes in the 
allocation of parental time. The results are consistent with Becker’s theory of 
specialization in the sexual division of labour (Becker, 1985) and Lundberg and 
Rose’s theory of home intensity (Lundberg and Rose, 1999). Specifically, additional 
 124
children lead to a reduction in paid work and to an even larger increase in unpaid 
work among mothers. In contrast, additional children are not related to paternal paid 
work, although there is evidence of a small increase in unpaid childcare. In the end, 
total work hours increase, especially for the mother, but also for the father.  
 
In terms of specific contributions of this chapter to the literature, several points are 
worth mentioning. First, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study anywhere 
to provide quasi-causal evidence of the impact of fertility on unpaid parental work 
patterns. This is important since the theories that consider fertility and labour supply 
are based on the reallocation of home and market work, yet to date home work 
patterns have been garnered residually from market work patterns. Moreover, unpaid 
work patterns may help reconcile the fact that larger families are associated with 
declines in parental investments in children, but not always with a decline in the 
academic performance of children (as suggested in Chapter 2). Becker’s Quantity-
Quality theory implies that any increase in family size will generate less parental 
investment per child. However, Becker’s theory of specialization, combined with 
Lundberg and Rose’s theory of home intensity suggest that mothers will spend more 
time at home in response to additional children while fathers may or may not spend 
more time at home. If parents do spend more time at home in the aggregate, then this 
can be seen as a form of unintended parental investments (i.e. time) resulting from 
additional children. It is unintended because it results in part from the relative 
productivity of wives and husbands in performing market and housework, as opposed 
to a conscientious effort to invest in child quality. In any event, the increased parental 
contact with the child may counterbalance the reduced investment per child, yielding 
no decline in measured child quality. 
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Second, the study is also one of the first to look at the relationship between family 
size and paternal labour supply. This is important to monitor as today’s households 
may choose to allocate labour differently than households in the past. However, the 
results suggest that paternal labour supply is largely impervious to fertility.  
 
Third, the chapter also contributes to the assessment of the IVs used in the literature 
by proposing a test of validity based on the predictive power of previous patterns of 
paid work.    
 
Fourth, this is the first comprehensive study of the labour supply consequences of 
fertility using Canadian data. Most of the literature focuses on the US, which is 
largely a function of the nationality of the researchers who have studied the topic. 
 
The findings have several important implications aside from informing the literature. 
First, increased fertility is one potential way of alleviating the looming retirement 
crunch. This chapter finds that a strategy of replacing older workers through increased 
fertility may have the opposite effect in the short to medium run. In terms of paid 
work hours in the economy, the cost of adding one potential labour market participant 
(i.e. the child) is simply the reduction in maternal paid work (about 3 to 5 fewer hours 
per week on average over the first 18 years of the child’s life). The benefit in paid 
work hours is simply the expected work hours of the child over their lifetime. 
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Although the benefit may be larger than the cost in raw numbers, the benefit only 
materializes later.15  
 
Of course, there are other potential costs and benefits associated with increased 
fertility. For example, substantial costs are needed to incite fertility, as shown by 
Milligan (2002). Focusing on a financial incentive program introduced in Québec in 
1988 (and subsequently cancelled in 1997), this study estimates the cost per additional 
child born as a result of the program. To estimate the number of additional children 
that resulted from the program, Milligan assumed that the gap in the fertility rate 
between Québec and the rest of Canada that existed prior to the introduction of the 
program would have remained constant throughout the program period had the 
program not been introduced. The study concludes that although the program was 
successful in achieving its goal of raising the fertility rate, it did so at a high cost: 
more than $15,000 (Canadian) per additional child.  
 
Another potential implication of the findings relates to the allocation of labour within 
the household. Faced with additional children, the mother typically takes on an 
additional four to six hours of total work per week. In contrast, the father takes on an 
additional three hours per week. Moreover, the mother accumulates less human 
capital over her offspring’s childhood given that she spends less time in the paid 
                                                 
15 Note that intertemporal substitution of labour supply is ignored here. For example, the mother may 
increase her paid work hours before having children or after she is done caring for her children to 
compensate for the reduction in paid hours during her child caring years. Testing this hypothesis is 
not possible with the available data.  
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labour market. This may have implications for her future wage growth, which can be 
important in the event of marital separation. 
 
The physical and mental health of the mother may also be affected by children given 
that the mother’s overall workload increases substantially with additional children. 
This is especially true if childcare is relatively more labour intensive, as suggested by 
Becker (1960). Other potential costs and benefits may also be present.  
 
Of course, fertility rates have actually been declining in industrialized nations over the 
last several decades. Given the findings in this chapter, the declining fertility rates 
may in part explain some well-documented long-term macro-trends in the developed 
world.16 On the parental labour supply front, it is well documented that female paid 
labour supply has increased. This may reflect, at least in part, the declining fertility 
rate. In actual fact, it may very well be the case that women made their labour supply 
and fertility decisions simultaneously, but the reduction in fertility may have further 
freed up some of their time available to spend in the labour market. Given that women 
now spend more time on the paid labour market, the discounted lifetime returns to 
higher education may now be higher for them. This may explain why women in 
particular have increased their investments in postsecondary schooling in recent 
decades. 
 
 
                                                 
16  The OECD produces several statistics related to the trends listed below in their publications 
‘Education at a Glance’ and ‘Employment Outlook’. These publications are available at 
www.oecd.org.   
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Although it is well-established that more education is causally linked to higher 
earnings (Card, 2001; Lemieux and Card, 2001), the precise mechanism is not so well 
understood. Education may act as a signal in the labour market, allowing potential 
employers to screen in ‘good’ candidates based on how well they have performed in a 
formal school setting. Whether they have learned anything that is useful for the job 
refers to the human capital aspect of education. In general, empirical findings can be 
better explained by signalling models than by human capital theory, although the 
literature finds evidence that both factors play important roles in wage determination 
(Weiss, 1995). 
 
This chapter contributes to our knowledge in this area by assessing the impact of 
schooling on one particular dimension of human capital: academic performance. I do 
so with a survey of Canadian youth that is linked to academic test score data. 
Identifying the impact of schooling can be problematic since individuals who choose 
more schooling may do so because they have higher abilities. Thus, an exogenous 
source of variation in schooling is required for identification. The approach used in 
this chapter takes advantage of a setting whereby large samples of students of roughly 
similar age wrote the same standardized tests, but were in different school grades 
because of school entry laws. In some cases, students who were one day apart in age 
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were in adjacent school grades, but wrote the same tests. In other words, one 
additional year of schooling is associated with as little as one additional day of life in 
general in this setting.  
  
More specifically, students in the survey were all born in the same calendar year. In 
most provinces, this means that they were assigned the same school grade (grade 10 
by the time they wrote the tests). This is not the case in Québec and Nova Scotia. In 
these two provinces, students born prior to October are assigned grade 10, while those 
born later in the year are assigned grade 9. Since they wrote the same standardized 
tests, it is possible to estimate the impact of an additional school year on academic 
performance. I do by instrumenting the actual school grade with the initially assigned 
school grade, all the while controlling for differences in age (which are small in any 
case).   
 
The specific objectives of the chapter are twofold. First, I will quantify the extent to 
which reading, mathematics, and science performance improves with an additional 
year of schooling. Second, I will assess the degree of heterogeneity in the results. 
Specifically, how do the results vary across the conditional distribution of academic 
performance? Do girls and boys benefit equally from more schooling? What about 
youth from higher and lower income families?  
 
The benefit that schooling confers onto different groups of students is a contentious 
issue. In Canada, virtually all schools are public, and as such, they may be seen as a 
conduit for equalizing opportunities. If the gap between the highly able and the less 
highly able widens as students progress in the school system, then opportunities have 
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clearly not been equalized. Of course, abilities tend to be concentrated among 
particular groups. This is the case according to the Canadian portion of the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), which was administered to 
15 year old students in 2000. Based on mean scores, girls outperform boys in reading 
by a large margin, while boys outperform girls in mathematics by a smaller margin 
(Figure 4.1). In science there is a smaller advantage held by females. When the data 
are broken down by parental income, the story is clearer: youth in the top quartile of 
the distribution outperform those in the bottom quartile by a sizeable margin in all test 
areas (Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.1: Mean PISA scores by sex
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Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A. 
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Figure 4.2: Mean PISA scores by parental income
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Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A. 
 
These patterns have important implications for human capital development since 
recent work has established that gaps in academic performance go a long way in 
helping us understand why boys are less likely to go on to university than girls 
(Frenette and Zeman, 2009) and why lower income youth are less likely to go on to 
university than higher income youth (Frenette, 2009). 
 
The findings in this chapter suggest that one additional year of schooling (grade 10 in 
most cases) is associated with significant improvements in reading, mathematics, and 
science performance. More importantly, schooling confers the same benefits in each 
academic area to students across three important dimensions: the conditional 
distribution of academic performance, sex, and parental income. These findings 
suggest that factors outside of the secondary school system may be the driving force 
behind heterogeneous academic performance. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section (Section 4.2), I provide an 
overview of the Canadian educational system, with special focus on the elementary 
and secondary systems. In Section 4.3, I review the previous literature related to the 
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impact of schooling on academic performance and describe how the current chapter 
fits into this literature. The empirical portion of the chapter is presented in Section 4.4 
(Methodology), Section 4.5 (Descriptive results), and Section 4.6 (Econometric 
results). I examine the robustness of the results in Section 4.7. In Section 4.8, I 
investigate heterogeneity in the results across three dimensions: the conditional 
distribution of academic performance, sex, and parental income. Finally, the chapter 
concludes in Section 4.9. 
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In most of Canada’s ten provinces, formal school entry (i.e. into kindergarten) begins 
in the year that the student becomes five years old. In Québec and Nova Scotia, 
school entry begins if the student was five years old on September 30 and October 1, 
respectively. To simplify the discussion and analysis, I will use September 30 as the 
cut-off date for both provinces. This had no discernable effect on the results since 
there are far more students from Québec than in Nova Scotia in the population. In the 
end, only a very small handful of Nova Scotia students were affected by collapsing 
the two cut-off points. In Prince-Edward-Island, the cut-off date is January 31, while 
in Alberta the cut-off date varies by school board. Compulsory kindergarten normally 
lasts for one year, which is followed by elementary schooling. 
 
When students begin school, they enter a system that falls under provincial 
jurisdiction. Moreover, the vast majority of schools in Canada are public (93.86%, 
according to the YITS data, which are used in this chapter). Schooling is generally 
compulsory until the age of 16 in most provinces. Ontario and New Brunswick are 
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exceptions in this regard. Since 1999 (in New Brunswick) and 2006 (in Ontario), 
compulsory schooling laws remain in effect until the age of 18. All along, however, 
parents may opt to educate their children at home rather than through the formal 
school system. 
 
Once in high school, which begins in grade 9 in most provinces, students may choose 
their courses from a wide range of levels (e.g. remedial, standard, gifted, etc.) 
However, there is no hard streaming per se as in the German system, except for a few 
rare exceptions (e.g. technical high schools geared towards the trades). In other words, 
students may tailor their course selection to suit their future intentions regarding 
higher education or the job market, without being fully committed to following a 
specific pathway. 
 
In most provinces, students obtain a high school diploma after 12 completed years of 
elementary and secondary schooling. The province of Québec stands out in this regard. 
Students in that province normally graduate with a high school diploma after 11 
completed years of schooling. In the past, the system was also different in Ontario. 
For students who began high school prior to 1999, university attendance required a 
regular high school diploma (12 years) plus several courses at the OAC (Ontario 
Academic Credit) level. Although it was possible to complete the OAC requirements 
by the end of grade 12, very few students achieved this. In the vast majority of cases, 
one additional year of high school was required. The Ontario system has since been 
reformed. For students beginning high school in 1999 or later, the university bound 
curriculum has been compressed from five years to four, meaning that students 
normally become eligible for university entry after grade 12, although many students 
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still need an additional year to obtain the advanced credits that are necessary for 
university admission (King, 2004).  
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Overview 
 
Is intelligence inherited or can it be influenced by environmental factors, such as 
parents, friends, or school? This question has been debated by social scientists 
countless times over the last several decades. In the review that follows, I will 
highlight the main studies in the theoretical and empirical portions of the literature. As 
we shall see, the theoretical side of the literature clearly suggests that cognitive ability 
can be shaped by environmental factors, including schooling. The main focus of the 
debate has thus centered around confirming the causal flow going from schooling to 
cognitive ability, as well as measuring the strength of the relationship. 
 
Theoretical literature 
 
The theory concerning intelligence has been the domain of psychologists from the 
first. Child psychologists have been particularly involved in this literature since it is 
believed that intelligence is a developmental concept, generally improving from 
infancy to maturity. There is a consensus in the literature on this point (e.g. Binet and 
Simon, 1916; Jensen, 1980; Wohlwill, 1980; Reynolds, 1982; Sternberg and Powell, 
1983). Glaser (1984) goes a step further and suggests that current learning activities in 
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American scholastic curricula are geared towards the formation of cognitive strategies 
that are necessary to perform well on aptitude tests.  

The main question of interest in the literature has thus been on the size of the effect of 
schooling on cognitive ability (or aptitude), as opposed to whether or not schooling 
affects scholastic learning (e.g. learning curricula). This is the point I now turn to in 
the next section. Note that my review will reflect the fact that considerable attention 
has been paid in the literature on identifying the causal relationship between schooling 
and academic performance. 
 
Empirical literature 
 
The early empirical studies were, once again, largely the domain of psychologists. 
Ceci (1991) reviews this literature and concludes that additional schooling has a 
sizeable effect on academic performance. These studies are grouped into eight classes, 
depending on the methodological approach. I re-organize these eight classes into three 
meta-classes, based on their general approach: correlational, indirect, and causal. I 
also limit my critique of these studies to points that were not mentioned by Ceci 
(1991), unless otherwise stated.  
 
In the correlational meta-class, three approaches have been used. The first considers 
the statistical correlation between Intelligence Quotient (IQ) and years in school. For 
example, Bouchard (1984) examines this correlation among twins reared apart. 
However, such twins may have been exposed to very different family environments, 
which may have a direct effect on IQ. Nevertheless, other studies find that the 
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schooling-IQ correlation persists even after controlling for socio-economic status and 
other social variables (Kemp, 1955; Wiseman, 1966). Of course, unobservable factors 
may lie beneath the differences in observed schooling choices. 
 
The second approach examines early termination of school and subsequent IQ scores. 
Harnqvist (1968) examines Swedish males who were administered IQ tests at age 13 
and 18. Among boys who had similar IQ tests and other characteristics at age 13, 
every additional year of schooling was associated with an additional 1.8 IQ points on 
the test administered at age 18. As noted by Ceci (1991), one criticism is that students 
who chose to dropout earlier may have done so because they were not performing 
well in school. Ceci doesn’t push this point hard and even argues that there is no 
evidence that this was the case. However, he does not point to any evidence 
suggesting that this was not the case. 
 
The third approach used in the correlational meta-class is based on the correlation 
between intermittent school attendance and IQ. A study by Hugh Gordon in 1923 
(reported in Freeman, 1934) reveals that children in London who rarely attended 
school had very low IQs. The reason for intermittent school attendance was usually a 
physical disability or being the offspring of transient parents (e.g. gypsies). In contrast, 
Gordon noted that children who regularly attended school and had very low IQs were 
retarded in the traditional sense. In other words, he argued that having very low IQs 
could only result from mental retardation or a lack of schooling. Ceci (1991) lists 
other studies that have exploited variation in schooling for specific reasons, such as 
living in mountainous regions in the United States (Sherman and Key, 1932; Tyler, 
1965; Wheeler, 1942). Although this approach is somewhat more compelling than 
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simply calculating correlations, there is still room for unobserved heterogeneity 
among students with different degrees of school attendance. For example, students 
with a physical disability may be limited in their academic work because of physical 
limitations (e.g. reading a book without assistance may be difficult for some). 
Students living in mountainous regions are there because of choices made by their 
parents, which may be correlated with the natural abilities of the youth themselves. 
The paper by Sherman and Key (1932) is an exception in this regard since they study 
variation in geography based on ethnicity. Of course, ethnicity may itself be related to 
cognitive ability.    
 
A second meta-class of studies actually consists of only one approach. It is the 
indirect evidence approach. The idea begins with the notion that schooling is expected 
to have a positive influence on achievement test scores that do not have an aptitude 
component. If this is the case, then observing a strong correlation between schooling 
and aptitude (relative to the correlation between schooling and achievement test 
scores) provides indirect evidence of an effect of schooling on aptitude. Schmidt 
(1967) reports that schooling is at least as strongly correlated with IQ than with 
achievement test scores. Other studies have come to similar conclusions (e.g. 
Coleman, 1968 and Jencks et al., 1972). Of course, this all depends on the original 
assumption that schooling exerts a positive influence on achievement. There could be 
an extraneous factor driving the correlation between schooling and the types of test 
scores. For example, as students progress through the school system, they also age (i.e. 
mature), they are exposed to their family environment or friends, their neighbours, etc. 
While a relatively strong correlation between schooling and aptitude is suggestive of a 
causal relationship, it is by no means proof of such a relationship. 
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A third meta-class offers more promise along the causality lines. Four approaches 
have been adopted. The first approach argues that historical changes in schooling are 
generated by exogenous forces (e.g. changes in policy, social norms, etc.), such that 
changes in IQ scores over these periods can be causally linked to changes in schooling. 
For example, Tuddenham (1948) compared test scores of World War II draftees with 
those of World War I draftees, and found that the former outperformed the latter by 
nearly one full standard deviation. Tuddenham notes that education accounts for about 
one half of this increase in performance. Although he lists other possibilities that 
could explain the remaining half, there are some factors that could explain the 
contribution of education. For example, the quality of education may have improved 
between the wars. Teaching methods were in their infancy at this time, and there 
could very well have been plenty of room for improvement. There could also have 
been substantial demographic changes resulting from immigration during the intra-
World Wars period.  
 
The second of the causal approaches involves variation in IQ before and after the 
summer months. Several studies find that IQ scores decline over the summer months, 
likely due to the absence of schooling (Jencks et al., 1972; Heyns, 1978; Hayes and 
Grether, 1982). This is especially the case among low-income youth. This is highly 
suggestive of a positive effect of schooling on IQ; however, two points of caution are 
worth pointing out. The first concerns symmetry. The variation in schooling exploited 
by the authors in this literature is based on a reduction in schooling equivalent to 
about two summer months. Would adding two months to the school year have the 
same size effect with the opposite sign? The answer is not known from these studies. 
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Another point of caution concerns the ability of these studies to credibly estimate the 
magnitude of the effect. During the summer months, schooling is removed from the 
equation, but parents may be added to the picture (especially when one parent does 
not work outside the home). This could serve to dampen the effect of the reduction in 
schooling. 
 
A more recent study that provides somewhat more insight into this question is 
Alexander, Entwistle, and Olson (2001). They tracked the achievement of 650 
students in the Baltimore public school system on the California Achievement Test, 
which measures math and reading abilities. Students were tested before and after the 
summer holidays, as well as in different months of the school year. Their findings 
over the summer months confirm those of the earlier studies; however, their results 
over the school year stand in stark contrast to the summer results: student test scores 
improve substantially. What is even more interesting is that children from low and 
high income families see similar improvements in their test scores over the school 
year, but not during the summer months. However, this study is limited by its low 
sample size (650) and its narrow focus (the Baltimore area). 
 
The third causal approach focuses on the delayed onset of schooling. This approach 
looks at children who delayed their school entry for reasons that are more or less 
exogenous to their abilities. It is similar to the intermittent schooling approach, except 
that children may attend schooling regularly once they enter the system. These studies 
have focused on delayed schooling for entire communities due to the Nazi siege 
during World War II (DeGroot, 1951) or the unavailability of teachers (Ramphal, 
1962). While the DeGroot study can be criticized on the basis of selective school 
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closures resulting from the Nazi Siege, the study by Ramphal is somewhat stronger 
from an identification point of view. Ramphal examines children of Indian Ancestry 
in South African villages. Among groups of children with similar genetic background, 
those who did not have teachers available experienced a decline in IQ equivalent to 5 
points per year.  
 
The final approach in the causal meta-class of studies examines variation in schooling 
based on small differences in chronological age. The idea is that children born just 
before a school entry cut-off date are no different than children born just after the cut-
off date, except in one respect: they will have one additional year of schooling. In the 
rare instance when these students wrote the same test, it is relatively simple to identify 
the effect of the additional school grade on performance. The approach is regression 
discontinuity (RD), which is described in Appendix A4.1. Briefly, this approach 
consists of regressing the test score on some function of chronological age, but allow 
for a discontinuity around the cut-off date. If the regression shows a significant jump 
at the cut-off date, then that is evidence of a schooling effect. One challenge is that 
students in different school grades almost always write tests that are designed for their 
grade.17  
 
                                                 
17  There is a separate, but related literature on the impact of relative age within school grades on 
outcomes. This literature compares school children within a given school grade, but who were born 
at different times in the year. The idea behind this research is that students who begin school at an 
older age are more mature than others, and thus, tend to outperform younger students. See Bedard 
and Dhuey (2006), McEwan and Shapiro (2008), and Elder and Lubotsky (2009) for examples of 
such studies. 
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There are three studies in the literature that exploit situations where students in 
different school grades wrote the same test. The first is Baltes and Reinert (1969), 
who examine German school children between the ages of 8 and 10 years old. The 
authors find a strong correlation between schooling and test scores. However, the 
authors did not adopt an RD approach. They simply compared test scores of students 
born before and after the school entry cut-off date. With a sufficient sample of school 
children born just before and just after the cut-off date, this approach may very well 
identify the effect of schooling on test scores. However, the authors only have data on 
hundreds of school children and do not have precise date of birth information (they 
have season of birth information). 
 
A second study more closely follows an RD approach. Cahan and Davis (1987) use 
data on grade 1 and 2 Israeli school children. Their data offer two advantages over the 
data used by Baltes and Reinert (1969). First, the sample size is larger (they use over 
2,000 observations for each grade). Second, they have information on month of birth. 
Cahan and Davis also better distinguish between school and age effects, calling for 
the use of RD. They also point out two potential problems concerning the selection of 
school children into school grades. First, birthdays may not be randomly distributed 
around the school entry cut-off date. This may result from a deliberate attempt by the 
parents to manipulate the school entry date and/or relative age (within grade) of their 
children. No attempts were made to address this point. Second, students born in the 
month before (after) the cut-off date are more likely to be one grade below (above) 
the usual grade for their age because of relative age effects. This sort of selection 
(termed a ‘fuzzy discontinuity’) can have a biasing effect on RD estimates, and is 
normally dealt with by instrumental variables, as described in Appendix A4.1. Their 
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solution to the problem is to drop all students who were born within one month of the 
cut-off date in either direction. This largely removes students who are not in their 
usual grade for their age, but it also introduces larger age differences around the 
discontinuity (a minimum of two months). In general, omitting certain students 
violates the ‘intention-to-treat’ principle. That is, the intention was to treat all youth of 
a given age with the treatment (i.e. the additional year of schooling). Removing some 
of those intended recipients based on the observed school grade may lead to biased 
results. They discuss and attempt to address this issue by showing test score data for 
the omitted students in order to get a sense for the extent of the bias. In the end, their 
preferred estimates (the ones where some students are dropped from the sample) 
suggests that one additional year of schooling (grade 2) leads to a 19 percentage point 
improvement in math achievement and to a 17 percentage point improvement in 
reading achievement.  
 
A similar study by Cahan and Cohen (1989) was conducted on older Israeli school 
children (grades 4 to 6). These data offer two advantages over the data used by Cahan 
and Davis (1987). First, the sample size is considerably larger (over 10,000 students 
in the three grades). Second, the exact date of birth (i.e. year, month, and day) is 
known from school administrative records. However, their approach is similar to 
Cahan and Davis in that they exclude students born near the cut-off date; therefore, 
they do not fully utilize the more precise information on the date of birth. Specifically, 
they exclude students born within two months before the cut-off date since those 
months contain the highest proportion of students who are not in their appropriate 
grade for their age. They also explicitly exclude any student not in the appropriate 
grade. Finally, they normalize their dependent variables (the t
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0 and a standard deviation of 1. This yields regression coefficients that are interpreted 
in standard deviation terms. 
 
What Cahan and Cohen find is that one additional year of schooling generates an 
increase in test scores ranging from 0.11 to 0.50 standard deviations. Verbal tests 
scores improve the most, while numerical and figural test scores less so. They also 
show that the school effect is about twice as large as the age effect when both are 
estimated in the same metric (years). 
 
The consensus at this point in the literature was clear: more schooling leads to 
superior academic performance. This view was challenged by Herrnstein and Murray 
(1994) in their influential book The Bell Curve. In it, they argue that schooling only 
has a marginal effect on academic performance, and that abilities are largely inherited. 
Herrnstein and Murray suggest that schooling is randomly assigned conditional on a 
pretest administered at a younger age. In other words, the value of the pre-test will 
determine how much schooling a child will eventually obtain. Schooling thus confers 
a ‘value-added’ in terms of academic performance. In their view, the ‘value-added’ 
can be captured by test results from the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), 
which is applied to respondents in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY), conditional on the results from the pretest administered earlier for certain 
NLSY respondents. Their results further support their view that schooling confers 
very little benefit in terms of academic performance. 
 
The controversy generated by The Bell Curve has led many researchers to challenge 
the new findings. For example, Winship and Korenman (1997) re-examine Herrnstein 
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and Murray’s analysis by addressing various technical issues and model specifications. 
A key element in their assessment involves the measure of education. Herrnstein and 
Murray, use educational attainment to proxy years of schooling rather than exact 
years of schooling. Since certain students may skip or fail a grade (perhaps based on 
ability), using educational attainment may bias the estimates of the impact of 
schooling on academic performance. Another important addition was to include 
parental socioeconomic status as a control variable in the educational production 
function (Herrnstein and Murray do not). In the end, Winship and Korenman estimate 
that schooling confers about twice the effect on academic performance found by 
Herrnstein and Murray.  
 
The approach of conditioning on a pretest used by Herrnstein and Murray and by 
Winship and Korenman has also been criticized since the pretest is not a perfect proxy 
for ability and is not comparable to the AFQT (Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen, 2004; 
Todd and Wolpin, 2003). Winship and Korenman actually question whether or not the 
pretest should be included as a control variable. They argue that there may be a 
spurious correlation between the pretest and the later test. Alternatively, Neal and 
Johnson (1996) and Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) use quarter of birth as an 
instrument for schooling. Quarter of birth is highly correlated with cut-off dates from 
school entry laws, but is purported to not belong in the education production function. 
These authors also find effects that are about twice as large as those found by 
Herrnstein and Murray.  
 
Cascio and Lewis (2006) critique the approach of Neal and Johnson and of Hansen et 
al. since earlier studies have found that quarter of birth is related to several outcomes 
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in jurisdictions not constrained by school entry laws. Cascio and Lewis take a 
different route in their study. In fact, their approach is similar to the regression 
discontinuity studies in the psychological development literature (e.g. Cahan and 
Davis, 1987; Cahan and Cohen, 1989), except that Cascio and Lewis tackle the issue 
of grade selection in a more direct fashion than previous authors. The older studies 
noted that students born near the school entry cut-off dates were more likely to not be 
in the grade that they were initially assigned. To account for this, those studies simply 
dropped students born near the cut-offs from the analysis. In a sense, they were 
treated as a nuisance. The issue of course is that this leaves students in the sample 
who are not exactly close in age, which was the original strength of the data made 
available to the authors.  
 
Cascio and Lewis also look at students born before and after school entry cut-off dates. 
They do so with US data on standardized test scores and knowledge of school entry 
laws in various states. Specifically, they use the NLSY data, which contains the 
AFQT test scores. Rather than drop students born near the cut-off dates, they include 
them in the analysis, but instrument the actual school grade with the initially assigned 
school grade based on the date of birth. Their model also includes parametric controls 
for the date of birth. In other words, their approach is to treat the school entry cut-off 
dates as a fuzzy discontinuity, which is the appropriate strategy.  
They also provide estimates in standard deviation units, albeit only by ethnicity and 
for general performance. Nevertheless, they generally find that an additional year of 
schooling boosts academic performance by 0.3 to 0.4 standard deviations.  
 
Contributions of the present chapter to the literature 
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This chapter contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, results are 
generated across three important dimensions: the conditional distribution of academic 
performance, sex, and parental income. Heterogeneity in the results is useful to 
document for policy purposes since it indicates for whom the schools are working. 
These are particularly important dimensions. Academi performance is perhaps 
obvious since schools might be concerned with trying to help those who are having 
the most difficulty. Sex and parental income are also very important dimensions since 
it is well-document that there exist important differences in academic performance 
along these measures. To date, only Cascio and Lewis (2006) look at ethnicity and 
Alexander et al. (2001) examine parental income. 
 
The second contribution concerns the range of academic areas examined. Among the 
most credible studies in the literature, the focus has either been on mathematics- and 
language-related scores (e.g. Cahan and Davis, 1987; Cahan and Cohen, 1989) or on a 
broad test score (Cascio and Lewis, 2006). In this Chapter, I consider three broad 
areas: reading, mathematics, and science. In addition, I show results for three sub-
components of the reading test: retrieving, interpreting, and reflecting. 
 
Finally, it is the only study to provide Canadian evidence on the impact of schooling 
on academic performance. As with the previous two chapters, this helps establish the 
robustness of the findings in the literature. 
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The identification strategy is based on comparing results from identical standardized 
tests that were administered to students in different school grades. As we shall see in 
the next section, students in the data were born in the same calendar year. In most 
Canadian provinces, children begin school based on their age on December 31. In 
contrast, children in Québec and Nova Scotia begin school based on their age on 
September 30 and October 1, respectively. 18 Recall that I collapse the dates to 
September 30 for both provinces (for ease of discussion and analysis), which only 
affected a very small handful of students in Nova Scotia. The school entry laws in 
Québec and Nova Scotia provide fertile grounds upon which to examine the impact of 
an additional school grade on academic performance. One way of doing so is to apply 
a regression discontinuity (RD) estimator to compare academic test scores of students 
born before and after September 30 for students in Nova Scotia and Québec (see 
Appendix A4.1 for a description of RD). This involves estimating the following 
baseline education production function using ordinary least squares: 
 
iiXiAGEFiNEDGRADEASSIGiSTDSCORE εαααα ++++= 3)(210)1.4(  
 
                                                 
18  Two other provinces stand out in terms of school entry legislation. In Prince-Edward-Island, the cut-
off date is January 31 of the following calendar year. This means that PISA students who were born 
prior to the cut-off date should be in grade 11. Since there were too few of these cases, this province 
could not be used in the identification strategy. In Alberta, the cut-off date depends on the school 
board. In many cases, the cut-off is February 28 of the following calendar year. Students born before 
this date should also be in grade 11 at the time of the test. Unfortunately, even if specific Alberta 
school boards were identified in the data, the resulting sample of grade 11 students would be very 
small. For this reason, Alberta also did not figure in the identification strategy. 
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This involves regressing standardized test scores (STDSCORE), on some function (F) 
of age (AGE).19 As is commonly done in the literature on test scores, the scores are 
standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 by subtracting the mean and 
dividing by the standard deviation (as described in Appendix A2.6). Coefficients are 
thus interpreted as the effects in standard deviation units. By policy design, Nova 
Scotia and Québec students born in September or earlier are normally in grade 10, 
while those born later are normally in grade 9. To capture this discontinuity, the 
regression includes a variable (GRADEASSIGNED) equal to 9 or 10, based on school 
entry laws and the age of the youth. 20 , 21  The vector X contains other variables 
belonging in the education production function. 
                                                 
19  Since the exact date of the test is not known, I use the exact age (in days) as of December 31, 1999. 
This is a reasonable proxy for age at the test since students wrote the test shortly thereafter (in either 
April or May). Furthermore, there is no systematic student-level bias based on age since the date of 
the test was the same for all students within a school.  
20 One potentially confounding factor is that some high schools begin in grade 10. In other words, the 
movement from grade 9 to grade 10 may not only pick up a ‘grade’ effect, but also the effect of 
going from the oldest grade to the youngest grade in school. However, high school begins in grade 7 
in Québec (Secondaire I), while in Nova Scotia, it usually begins in grade 9 (depending on the school 
board). Based on YITS data, 84.9% of grade 9 students in Nova Scotia and Québec are in a high 
school. Furthermore, Lipps (2005) finds little systematic evidence of a relationship between moving 
from middle school to high school and academic performance. Finally, I re-estimated the models by 
focusing only on high schools, and obtained similar results. These results are available in Appendix 
4.2, and they are comparable to the results in Tables 4.9a and 4.9b, which will be presented later in 
this chapter. 
21 Another possibly confounding factor is that we only know the province of school attendance at age 
15, which may or may not correspond to the province of school attendance at age of entry. According 
to Statistics Canada’s 2001 Census, only 13.8% of 15 year old youth living in Nova Scotia in 2001 
were born in a different province. The figure for Québec is even smaller (10.6%), and the rates were 
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The problem with this approach is one of compliance. In an ideal setting, all youth 
born before the cut-off date would be in grade 10, and otherwise in grade 9. This 
would constitute a ‘sharp’ discontinuity (i.e. the treatment status is a deterministic 
function of age). In reality, the discontinuity is more likely to be a ‘fuzzy’ one, 
meaning that the expected value of the school grade is a function of age with a break 
at the cut-off. 
 
There are many possible reasons why the treatment is not necessarily a deterministic 
function of age. One way is for parents to selectively choose the date of birth of their 
child (perhaps based on their expectations for the child, likely proxied by their own 
abilities). Nonetheless, even if this were possible, Lee (2008) concludes that the 
localized random assignment into the treatment will still occur as long as agents 
(parents in this case) do not have the ability to sort precisely around the threshold (i.e. 
near the threshold, individual characteristics are independent of the treatment status, 
and the threshold status follows some continuous probability distribution, and thus, is 
based on luck).  
 
This is likely the case since most women don’t know when they ovulate, so that the 
due date is typically calculated by counting 280 days (40 weeks) from the first day of 
the last menstrual period (Bennett, 2004). As a result, only 5% deliver on the due date, 
                                                                                                                                            
similar in other provinces. Furthermore, it appears that among this birth cohort, most inter-provincial 
moves occurred prior to attending school. According to the 1991 Census 11.5% of 5 year old 
children living in Nova Scotia in 1991 were born in a different province (7.2% for Québec).  
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although most deliver within two weeks of the due date. An ultrasound may help 
narrow the date further, but this does not apply in the pre-conception stage.  
 
What do the data suggest? Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of birthdates among 
youth born in 1984 from Statistics Canada’s Census of Population, 2001 (a 20% 
random sample of the population). For the most part, the relative frequencies are very 
similar in Nova Scotia and Québec compared to the rest of the country around the 
school entry cut-off dates. Specifically, there is no evidence that parents in Nova 
Scotia and Québec tried to speed up school entry (to reduce the total time sending the 
child to daycare or staying at home to rear the child) or delay it (to make their child 
relatively older in their grade). 
 
Figure 4.3: Distribution of date of birth
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Note: The sample consists of all children born in September or October, 1984. 
Source: Census of Population, 2001. 
 
Although there is no evidence that parents manipulate the treatment (i.e. the actual 
school grade) through timing of birth, it is still possible that students, parents, or 
schools may manipulate the treatment by holding children back or requesting that they 
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skip ahead. Over time, we expect this problem to become worse as opportunities for 
grade retention or acceleration accumulate. This is in fact the case. Although very few 
youth are in a grade above the usual one for their age (2.71% in the Nova Scotia and 
Québec sample), 19.45% of youth are in a grade below their expected grade in the 
same sample (of these, more than 80% of parents noted, when asked, that their child 
was held back by the school system, as opposed to starting school later). 
 
The appropriate estimation approach given this fuzzy discontinuity is instrumental 
variable (IV) regression. Equations 4.2 and 4.3 show the two stages of this IV 
approach: 
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Note that 
∧
GRADE  is the predicted value of from the first stage. Given the very real 
possibility that the discontinuity is fuzzy, the main estimation strategy will be IV. 
 
The data for the chapter are drawn from the Statistics Canada’s Youth in Transition 
Survey (YITS), Cohort A matched to data from the OECD’s Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA). Since these data were described in Chapter 
2, I only point out the key features that are relevant to the current chapter. Note that 
standard errors are calculated in the same way as in Chapter 2 (i.e. using the 100 
bootstrap weights provided by Statistics Canada). Bootstrapping generates consistent 
estimates of the standard errors. Thus, it will account for stratification and multi-stage 
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sampling of the YITS. It will also correct for heteroscedasticity if it is present. See 
Appendix A2.1 for more information on bootstrapping standard errors.  
 
Recall that the target population consisted of students enrolled in an educational 
institution on December 31, 1999 who were 15 years old on that day (i.e. they were 
born in 1984). The assessment took place in April or May, 2000, depending on the 
sampled school.  
 
The main analytical sample consists of students who were born in Canada, were 
within one school grade of the usual grade for their age, and lived in Québec or Nova 
Scotia at the time of the survey. The first two restrictions are an attempt to eliminate 
students who followed unusual paths in the school system for reasons other than their 
abilities. This may include, for example, foreign students who had their schooling 
delayed due to war or domestic students who were temporarily removed from school 
for health reasons. Given their loss in school years, they would show up as outliers in 
the data (e.g. students who are two years behind, yet they may perform relatively 
well). The third restriction is based on the identification strategy discussed above (i.e. 
the existence of particular school entry laws in these two provinces).   
 
What if some youth dropped out of school prior to the PISA assessment? In 2000, 
compulsory school laws required students in all provinces to remain in school until 
the age of 16, except in New Brunswick, where a minimum age of 18 was in place. 
Since the assessment was administered in April or May, some youth born in 1984 
were 16 years old when the tests were administered; specifically, those born in the 
earlier part of the year. This leaves open the possibility that some students had 
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dropped out of school prior to being assessed, which could introduce a selection bias 
in the results. Nonetheless, some of the results to follow will show differences in test 
scores around the school entry cut-off date, which consists exclusively of 15 year olds.  
 
The outcome variables in this chapter are the PISA scores in reading, mathematics, 
and science. Note that the raw PISA scores have already been standardized to a mean 
of 500 and a standard deviation of 100 for all participating countries combined (i.e. 
the ‘global’ mean is set to 500 and the ‘global’ standard deviation is set to 100 for 
each score). As in Chapter 2, most of the analysis here is based on transformed 
versions of the scores, where the mean is set to 0 and the standard deviation is set to 1.  
 
In 2000, the PISA assessment focused primarily on reading. All students wrote the 
reading exam, while about half wrote the mathematics exam, and the other half wrote 
the science exam (through random assignment). The reading portion accounted for 
about two-thirds of the total testing time. The assessment was administered in the 
language of instruction of the school, which was either English or French. The 
reading test consisted of having students perform a range of tasks with different kinds 
of text, including: retrieving specific information, interpreting text, and reflecting on 
the content and features of the text. The texts included standard prose passages and 
various types of documents such as lists, forms, graphs, and diagrams. An overall 
reading score is available, as are scores related to the retrieving, interpreting, and 
reflecting components of the test. The mathematics and science tests were more 
general than the reading test.  
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Since PISA is administered to students in several countries (i.e. several educational 
jurisdictions), it is non-curriculum based. This does not imply that schooling cannot 
possibly have an impact on the tests scores since learning the curriculum may still be 
useful for performing tasks that are not necessarily covered in the curriculum. For 
example, students may learn grammar and sentence structure in standard prose text. 
However, the grammar and sentence structure they learn may help them perform tasks 
with different kinds of text, or even to better understand the questions on the 
mathematics and science tests. Similarly, learning algebra or trigonometry may help 
develop logical thought, which could be useful in understanding diagrams or graphs. 
More details of the tests, including sample questions, appear in Appendix A2.5. 
 
The key explanatory variables include the observed and initially assigned grades of 
the student, as well as their age on December 31, 1999 (expressed in years, based on 
the exact date of birth). The age variable will control for two effects: chronological 
age and relative age within grade. The two cannot be separately identified in the 
current framework (i.e. students in the same grade and of the same chronological age 
will be of the same relative age).22  
                                                 
22 Controlling for relative age is particularly important since it may cause a permanent shift in the 
education production function, or it may affect the trend. For example, early starters may perform 
better than later starters in the early years (since early starters have one additional year of schooling), 
but this difference may narrow over time if the learning curve is shallower for early starters (e.g. if, 
within their own school grade, teachers pay more attention to older children). In this instance, the 
timing of the tests becomes important. In particular, testing at age 15 would understate the true 
schooling effect if we fail to properly control for relative age effects. As we shall see, however, the 
size of the effects found in this chapter lie well within the normal range of the estimates generated by 
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Several other variables belonging in the education production function are also 
included. For example, a series of birth order dummy variables are included. This 
represents the birth order of the siblings in their current family (i.e. relative to their 
current siblings, including step, adopted, and foster siblings). For some, the birth 
order in their original family will be different. Unfortunately, there is no information 
in the data on birth order within original families. Nevertheless, it is not clear which 
birth order is more relevant. 
 
In the literature on birth order and academic achievement, an important variable to 
take into account is the age of the mother. Kantarevic and Mechoulan (2006) find that 
first-born children complete more years of schooling than later born children only 
after they account for the fact that first-borns were raised by younger mothers than 
later-borns. Since the youth in this study were all born in 1984, using the current age 
of the person most knowledgeable is tantamount to using their age at the birth of the 
child.  
 
Socio-economic background characteristics are also taken into account in the models, 
including the highest level of education of either parent (for the purposes of this 
chapter: no postsecondary certificate, a non-university postsecondary certificate, an 
undergraduate degree, or a graduate or professional degree), total pre-tax income of 
the parents and its squared value23, and the presence of parents in the home (for the 
                                                                                                                                            
other studies in the literature, most of which focus on earlier school years. In other words, the timing 
of the test does not seem to affect the results in this literature.  
23  Equivalent income is used to construct a ‘per capita’ measure of income that accounts for economies 
of scale in households of different sizes. The specific method used here consists of dividing income 
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purposes of this chapter: one parent present, two parents present but fewer than two 
are birth parents, or two birth parents present).  
 
Important differences in academic performance have also been documented by sex. 
To account for this, a female dummy variable is included in the models. 
 
One reason for differences in academic performance by years of schooling might be 
the subjects that the students are taking currently in school. To account for this, I 
include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the student is taking a subject 
related to the test in question.  
 
Finally, province fixed effects are also included in each model. This is effectively a 
dummy for Québec. This is an important variable since education falls under 
provincial jurisdiction in Canada, so that it may pick up the quality differences in 
educational systems. The province dummy may also pick up unobserved abilities of 
students in the sample.  

In Table 4.1, I show means and standard errors of the variables used in the analysis by 
sample selection criteria. The reading sample is used here, and thus, only the reading 
score is shown. The goal here is simply to investigate the impact of sample selection 
on the data. The first sample selection criteria—dropping youth born outside 
Canada—has a moderate impact on the sample size and virtually no impact on the 
                                                                                                                                            
by the square root of the number of members in the household. This approach essentially combines 
the effects of parental income and family size into one measure (separating these effects is not 
necessary here, as it was in Chapter 2). 
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mean characteristics. The second criteria consists of dropping youth who are more 
than one grade ahead or behind the usual grade for their age. This measure has little 
impact on the sample (both in terms of size and characteristics). The final sample 
selection criterion, applied for identification purposes, consists of dropping youth 
living outside of Québec and Nova Scotia. The sample size obviously declines 
substantially (from 23,425 to 5,507), but the characteristics are also somewhat 
different. Compared to the rest of the country, youth in the final sample are higher 
achieving, have a lower birth order, and have slightly lower parental income. Not 
surprisingly, the average school grade of students in Québec and Nova Scotia is lower 
because of the school entry laws in those provinces.  
 
Table 4.1: Means and standard errors of variables used in the analysis by sample selection criteria
Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e.
Reading score 534.506 1.299 536.117 1.291 538.054 1.255 549.048 2.234
School grade 9.822 0.008 9.818 0.007 9.856 0.005 9.631 0.015
School grade initially assigned 9.755 0.004 9.756 0.004 9.755 0.004 9.756 0.010
Age of the youth 15.494 0.002 15.494 0.003 15.495 0.003 15.497 0.005
Birth order 1.537 0.007 1.533 0.007 1.534 0.007 1.486 0.014
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 43.642 0.069 43.621 0.068 43.637 0.068 43.800 0.113
Parent with no postsecondary certificate 0.366 0.006 0.377 0.006 0.372 0.006 0.389 0.012
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.356 0.005 0.366 0.005 0.367 0.005 0.369 0.008
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.180 0.005 0.171 0.005 0.174 0.005 0.167 0.007
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.097 0.005 0.086 0.005 0.087 0.005 0.076 0.008
Equivalent total parental income 34,290 462 34,688 449 34,915 454 32,197 627
One parent present 0.161 0.003 0.163 0.003 0.161 0.003 0.180 0.008
Two parents present, at least one not from birth 0.132 0.004 0.136 0.004 0.135 0.004 0.120 0.007
Two birth parents present 0.708 0.005 0.702 0.005 0.704 0.005 0.700 0.009
Female 0.499 0.005 0.497 0.005 0.500 0.005 0.497 0.012
Related course 0.970 0.002 0.969 0.002 0.970 0.002 0.983 0.002
Québec 0.214 0.004 0.223 0.005 0.214 0.005 0.866 0.004
N 25,064 23,715 23,425 5,507
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Initial sample of 
youth
Drop if more 
than one grade 
ahead/behind
Drop if not living 
in Québec/Nova 
Scotia
Drop if born 
outside Canada
 
 
Given the very specific group of students examined in this chapter, it is important to 
keep in mind that the results are only relevant for this group, namely students from 
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Québec and Nova Scotia. Their school system might also be very different than those 
in other jurisdictions. One difference evident from Table 4.1 is the higher test scores 
among this sample of students. Further analysis suggests this is entirely related to 
Québec students. Why students from Québec have above average test scores is not 
clear. Using the same data, Willms (2004) notes that scores in Québec were above 
average despite the fact that socio-economic characteristics are generally weaker in 
that province. This may suggest that the education system is more effective in Québec 
than in the rest of the country. However, on thing to keep in mind is that most Quebec 
students wrote the tests in French, as opposed to English in the rest of the country. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to decipher whether this had an impact on test scores. 
 
In any event, the key point from the above discussion is that the results to follow are 
specific to the sample studied here and no inferences should be made on the broader 
population of students. This does not invalidate the results (i.e. they are still relevant 
for the sample at hand); it simply means that different results might be obtained with 
youth from other jurisdictions. 
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I begin the results portion of the chapter with descriptive evidence of the impact of 
schooling on academic performance. First, I look at academic performance around the 
point of discontinuity. Figure 4.4 depicts the overall reading score by exact date of 
birth for students attending school in Nova Scotia and Québec (denoted by the dashed 
line) and those attending school in the rest of Canada (denoted by the solid line). 
Separate OLS regression quadratic trend lines are estimated for each region before 
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and after the school entry cut-off date (September 30). Students born in Nova Scotia 
and Québec after September 30 are usually in grade 9, while those born prior to 
October 1 are usually in grade 10. In other provinces, they are usually in grade 10 
regardless of their date of birth.  
 
500
510
520
530
540
550
560
570
Ja
n
. 
1
Ja
n
. 
2
2
F
e
b
. 
1
2
M
a
r.
 4
M
a
r.
 2
5
A
p
r.
 1
5
M
a
y
. 
6
M
a
y
. 
2
7
Ju
n
. 
1
7
Ju
l.
 8
Ju
l.
 2
9
A
u
g
. 
1
9
S
ep
. 
9
S
e
p
. 
3
0
O
c
t.
 2
1
N
o
v
. 
1
1
D
e
c
. 
2
D
e
c
. 
2
3
S
c
o
re
Date of birth (1984)
Figure 4.4: Reading scores by date of birth
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Rest of  Canada
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Note: The sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade of the 
usual one for their age. 
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A. 
 
Prior to October, there is a slight downward trend in Nova Scotia and Québec, as well 
as in the rest of Canada. Starting in October, there is a clear dip in reading scores in 
Nova Scotia and Québec. Do reading scores fall suddenly among students born in 
October or later in other provinces (where students are usually in grade 10)? 
According to Figure 4.4, there is little evidence of this. A small dip is noted, but it 
pales in comparison to the dip registered in Nova Scotia and Québec. This suggests 
that the dip that occurs between September and October birthdays in Nova Scotia and 
Québec is likely not related to nature. Results for the other tests appear in Figures 
A4.3.1 to A.4.3.5 in Appendix A4.3. Similar results are noted in interpreting and 
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reflecting scores. Smaller effects are evident in mathematics, while in retrieving and 
science, there is little or no effect.  Also in Appendix A4.3, I show the data without 
smoothing, as means by date of birth (Figures A4.3.6 for Québec and Nova Scotia and 
Figure A4.3.7 for the rest of Canada). While a noticeable dip appears between 
September and October for the Québec/Nova Scotia sample, the rest of Canada 
sample displays a flat trend. 
 
The problem with the regression discontinuity approach is one of compliance. Not all 
students initially assigned to a grade will be in that grade. As a result, the ‘dip’ in test 
scores we observed in Figure 4.4 is not necessarily associated with exactly one less 
school grade. 
 
To begin addressing this point, I show mean standardized academic scores by 
observed school grade in Table 4.2. As the observed grade rises, so too does the mean 
test score. This is true in a monotonic sense (i.e. scores rise for every additional 
school grade), and it holds true for each of the six test scores.  
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Table 4.2: Means of outcome variables by school grade
School grade
Standardized test score 8 9 10 11
   Reading -1.315 -0.445 0.269 0.854
      Retrieving -1.116 -0.375 0.229 0.593
      Interpreting -1.135 -0.407 0.242 0.856
      Reflecting -1.221 -0.352 0.222 0.636
   Mathematics -1.098 -0.441 0.253 0.642
   Science -1.217 -0.291 0.196 0.406
N - reading sample 142 1,842 3,488 35
N - mathematics sample 74 1,036 1,943 21
N - science sample 77 1,022 1,908 18
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Note: The sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade of
the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
 
 
Although one could easily derive interpretable estimates of the impact of schooling on 
academic performance from Table 4.2, those estimates would likely suffer from 
‘selection into the treatment bias’ (i.e. the observed school grade may be allocated 
based on performance). This section addresses this point in the tables to follow. 
Another point concerns the separability of school and age effects. The econometric 
section will deal with this point by introducing age controls.  
 
Rather than focus on observed grade, I now turn to the school grade initially assigned 
(Table 4.3). The differences shown below are likely to be estimated correctly since 
the school grade initially assigned is more likely to be random than the observed 
school grade. However, as with the regression discontinuity analysis in Figure 4.4, the 
interpretation is not clear. Nevertheless, the finding is qualitatively the same: test 
scores improve in all six areas.  
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Table 4.3: Means of outcome variables by school grade initially assigned
School grade initially assigned
Standardized test score 9 10 ∆
   Reading -0.243 0.078 0.321
      Retrieving -0.206 0.066 0.273
      Interpreting -0.222 0.071 0.293
      Reflecting -0.189 0.061 0.250
   Mathematics -0.233 0.075 0.308
   Science -0.178 0.056 0.234
N - reading sample 1,461 4,046
N - mathematics sample 826 2,248
N - science sample 792 2,233
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Note: The sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade of
the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
 
 
In Table 4.4, I show the mean differences in observed school grade by the school 
grade initially assigned for the three samples (reading, mathematics, and science). 
These differences can be used to adjust the estimates in Table 4.3 to obtain estimates 
in the unit of the treatment variable (i.e. the observed school grade). Note that, on 
average, one additional assigned school grade is associated with almost one additional 
observed school grade (about 0.86 to 0.87).  
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Table 4.4: Mean school grade by the school grade initially assigned
School grade initially assigned
School grade 9 10 ∆
   Reading sample 8.976 9.843 0.867
   Mathematics sample 8.990 9.848 0.858
   Science sample 8.969 9.841 0.872
N - reading sample 1,461 4,046
N - mathematics sample 826 2,248
N - science sample 792 2,233
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Note: The sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade of the usual
one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
 
 
Combining all of this information, we can derive Wald estimates (Table 4.5). The 
results suggest that one additional school grade is associated with an additional 0.370 
standard deviations (henceforth, ‘SD’) in reading, 0.359 SD in mathematics, and 
0.268 SD in science. Results for reading and mathematics are statistically significant 
at 1%, while those for science are only significant at 10%.  
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Table 4.5: Wald estimates
School grade initially assigned
9 10
Standardized test score Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Wald s.e.
   Reading -0.243 0.027 0.078 0.015 0.370 *** 0.045
      Retrieving -0.206 0.027 0.066 0.015 0.315 ** 0.048
      Interpreting -0.222 0.027 0.071 0.015 0.338 *** 0.047
      Reflecting -0.189 0.027 0.061 0.015 0.289 ** 0.045
   Mathematics -0.233 0.001 0.075 0.000 0.359 *** 0.045
   Science -0.178 0.001 0.056 0.000 0.268 * 0.066
Average grade - reading sample 8.976 9.843
Average grade - mathematics sample 8.990 9.848
Average grade - science sample 8.969 9.841
N - reading sample 1,461 4,046
N - mathematics sample 826 2,248
N - science sample 792 2,233
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of
youth born in Canada who were within one grade of the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or
Québec.
 
 
The conclusions drawn from these findings must be interpreted with some degree of 
caution. Many factors enter into the education production function, none of which 
were taken into account in the descriptive analysis (except for broad age group). In 
Table 4.6, I show the means of student characteristics used in the analysis by school 
grade initially assigned for the reading sample. 
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Table 4.6: Means of explanatory variables by school grade initially assigned
School grade initially assigned
9 10 ∆ s.e.
Age of the youth 15.127 15.616 0.488 *** 0.004
Birth order 1.492 1.485 -0.007 0.026
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 43.504 43.896 0.392 ** 0.178
Parent with no postsecondary certificate 0.404 0.384 -0.021 0.018
Parent with a non-university postsecondary certificate 0.363 0.371 0.008 0.017
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.158 0.170 0.011 0.015
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.074 0.076 0.002 0.009
Equivalent total parental income 33,071 31,916 -1,154 1,342
One parent present 0.200 0.173 -0.027 0.016
Two parents present, at least one not from birth 0.119 0.121 0.002 0.014
Two birth parents present 0.681 0.706 0.025 0.019
Female 0.475 0.504 0.028 0.019
Related course 0.974 0.986 0.012 * 0.007
Québec 0.848 0.872 0.025 * 0.013
N 1,461 4,046
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth
born in Canada who were within one grade of the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
 
 
It is not clear why there would be any difference in characteristics by birthday. 
However, with small surveys, sampling variation may result in some differences. 
Although most differences are quite small, some are statistically significant. For 
obvious reasons, the mean age is higher among students initially assigned to grade 10. 
Likewise, the mean age of the parent most knowledgeable of the child is higher 
among students initially assigned to grade 10. Some smaller, significant differences 
exist as well. For example, students assigned to grade 10 are less likely to have only 
one parent present in the home, and more likely to have two birth parents present. 
They are also slightly more likely to be female, to be taking a course related to 
reading, and to reside in Québec. Since these differences may matter in determining 
academic performance, they are taken into account in the econometric analysis to 
follow. 
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OLS approach 
 
I begin the econometric section with results from OLS. In Tables 4.7a and 4.7b, the 
estimated association between one year of schooling and the test scores is close to one 
full standard deviation in some cases. This is very large in comparison to the Wald 
estimates presented in the previous section. The reason is that the observed school 
grade is very likely to be endogenously chosen by students, parents, or schools.  
 
In terms of the control variables, the results are also worth mentioning. The age of the 
student is negatively related to performance, although this might be due to a high 
correlation with the school grade variable. The effect of the latter is not properly 
identified at this point. In the IV results to follow, the student age effects are no longer 
statistically significant.  
 
The test scores generally decline more or less monotonically with the order of birth. 
The age of the parent most knowledgeable is not linked to the academic performance 
of the youth. The socio-economic background of the child matters. Those with higher 
educated parents and those from more well-to-do families (proxied by parental 
income) generally perform better. In terms of parental presence, youth from 
reconstituted families (two parents, at least one not from birth) generally perform 
worse than other groups of youth, although results are not always statistically 
significant.  
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Girls perform better than boys in all areas of reading; however, they perform worse 
than boys in mathematics, although the gap is smaller than the one registered in 
reading. In science, the gap is small and not statistically significant. Not surprisingly, 
students who are currently taking a course related to the test subject generally perform 
better. Finally, students in Québec outperform those in Nova Scotia, in general. 
 
Table 4.7a: OLS regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade 
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.869 *** 0.034 0.823 *** 0.042 0.636 *** 0.055
Age of the youth -44.278 *** 6.077 -40.076 *** 7.060 -42.110 *** 10.054
Age of the youth
2 
1.410 *** 0.196 1.278 *** 0.228 1.348 *** 0.324
Second born -0.128 *** 0.038 -0.063 0.045 -0.106 ** 0.050
Third born -0.214 *** 0.059 -0.068 0.087 -0.226 *** 0.076
Fourth born -0.134 0.115 -0.087 0.158 -0.371 *** 0.126
Fifth born -0.394 0.427 0.794 ** 0.389 -0.689 0.795
Sixth born -0.508 1.029 -1.227 ** 0.614 0.574 ** 0.293
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth -0.006 0.033 0.023 0.044 -0.008 0.036
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.149 *** 0.027 0.186 *** 0.047 0.164 *** 0.048
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.342 *** 0.042 0.238 *** 0.071 0.262 *** 0.067
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.447 *** 0.052 0.417 *** 0.116 0.292 *** 0.098
Equivalent total parental income 0.037 *** 0.010 0.033 0.022 0.055 ** 0.022
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 * 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.127 ** 0.056 -0.073 0.064 -0.115 0.104
Two birth parents present -0.058 0.037 0.017 0.048 -0.127 * 0.069
Female 0.276 *** 0.027 -0.212 *** 0.036 -0.064 0.045
Related course 0.492 *** 0.128 0.420 *** 0.147 0.500 *** 0.108
Québec 0.389 *** 0.035 0.655 *** 0.049 0.429 *** 0.042
Intercept 337.824 *** 46.987 304.495 *** 54.397 321.712 *** 77.916
Adjusted R
2 
0.269 0.246 0.173
N 5,507 3,074 3,025
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Reading Mathematics Science
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth born in
Canada who were within one grade of the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
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Table 4.7b: OLS regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Reading sub-components
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.732 *** 0.035 0.796 *** 0.034 0.720 *** 0.034
Age of the youth -36.646 *** 6.988 -36.615 *** 5.803 -38.573 *** 6.426
Age of the youth
2 
1.168 *** 0.225 1.163 *** 0.187 1.230 *** 0.207
Second born -0.122 *** 0.041 -0.111 *** 0.037 -0.087 ** 0.039
Third born -0.163 *** 0.059 -0.176 *** 0.065 -0.204 *** 0.067
Fourth born -0.012 0.109 -0.170 0.125 -0.092 0.104
Fifth born -0.269 0.524 -0.087 0.334 -1.107 0.796
Sixth born -0.541 0.864 -0.540 0.631 -0.430 1.183
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.009 0.026 -0.022 0.035 -0.019 0.041
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.122 *** 0.034 0.137 *** 0.026 0.108 *** 0.031
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.246 *** 0.046 0.324 *** 0.040 0.261 *** 0.040
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.426 *** 0.068 0.461 *** 0.055 0.259 *** 0.051
Equivalent total parental income 0.027 ** 0.013 0.035 *** 0.011 0.030 *** 0.011
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.096 0.066 -0.102 * 0.058 -0.165 *** 0.049
Two birth parents present -0.035 0.039 -0.080 ** 0.038 -0.028 0.041
Female 0.099 *** 0.030 0.226 *** 0.028 0.359 *** 0.027
Related course 0.410 *** 0.135 0.459 *** 0.121 0.387 *** 0.117
Québec 0.330 *** 0.038 0.414 *** 0.032 0.207 *** 0.034
Intercept 279.079 *** 54.073 279.682 *** 44.981 294.769 *** 49.719
Adjusted R
2 
0.177 0.226 0.196
N 5,507 5,507 5,507
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Retrieving Interpreting Reflecting
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth born in
Canada who were within one grade of the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
 
 
IV approach 
 
To account for the endogenous selection of the school grade, I adopt an IV approach. 
Specifically, I instrument the observed school grade with the initially assigned school 
grade, based on the school entry laws in Québec and Nova Scotia and the exact date 
of birth. 
 
In Table 4.8, I show the first-stage regression results. The findings suggest a very 
strong association between the initially assigned school grade and the actual school 
grade. The coefficients are above 0.7 for each sample. The F-statistic is very high in 
each case: 185 is the lowest value (in the mathematics sample). 
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Table 4.8: First-stage regression of the school grade on the school grade initially assigned and other controls 
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade initially assigned 0.747 *** 0.043 0.713 *** 0.052 0.795 *** 0.053
Age of the youth 2.340 4.037 4.221 5.781 -0.342 5.022
Age of the youth
2 
-0.069 0.129 -0.128 0.185 0.015 0.161
Second born 0.007 0.014 0.004 0.019 0.015 0.019
Third born -0.037 0.034 -0.019 0.039 -0.048 0.046
Fourth born 0.032 0.052 0.015 0.065 0.028 0.081
Fifth born -0.493 0.354 0.024 0.025 -0.566 0.387
Sixth born 0.084 0.079 0.193 * 0.101 -0.032 0.038
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.018 0.015 0.002 0.019 0.033 0.020
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.075 *** 0.016 0.076 *** 0.023 0.108 *** 0.022
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.121 *** 0.023 0.104 *** 0.033 0.139 *** 0.027
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.174 *** 0.026 0.188 *** 0.028 0.196 *** 0.036
Equivalent total parental income 0.026 *** 0.006 0.030 *** 0.009 0.015 ** 0.007
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.094 *** 0.031 -0.094 ** 0.042 -0.101 ** 0.042
Two birth parents present 0.006 0.021 0.007 0.032 0.016 0.028
Female 0.070 *** 0.014 0.078 *** 0.018 0.063 *** 0.017
Related course 0.099 0.068 0.102 0.082 0.276 *** 0.071
Québec -0.062 *** 0.015 -0.057 *** 0.017 -0.051 ** 0.020
Intercept -18.094 31.175 -32.311 44.634 2.299 38.858
F-statistic 300.938 185.230 224.310
Adjusted R
2 
0.478 0.477 0.491
N
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Mathematics 
sample
3,0253,0745,507
Reading sample Science sample
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth born
in Canada who were within one grade of the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
 
 
The second stage IV results appear below in Tables 4.9a and 4.9b. These are 
considered the preferred estimates. In terms of reading, one additional year of 
schooling is associated with an increase of 0.419 SD (significant at 1%). Among the 
sub-components of reading, the effect of schooling is largest in interpreting (0.480 SD, 
significant at 1%) and smallest in reflecting (0.249 SD, significant at 5%). 
Mathematics scores also improve with an additional year of schooling (by 0.298 SD, 
significant at 5%), as do science scores (by 0.265 SD, significant at 10%). Note that 
the significance levels falls from 1% for reading, to 5% for mathematics, to 10% for 
science. Thus, at best, the evidence for science performance is weak 
 170
 
Table 4.9a: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade 
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.419 *** 0.119 0.298 ** 0.133 0.265 * 0.151
Age of the youth -14.060 9.906 -5.863 12.141 -16.737 13.748
Age of the youth
2 
0.451 0.316 0.192 0.388 0.541 0.440
Second born -0.127 *** 0.039 -0.060 0.046 -0.102 ** 0.051
Third born -0.218 *** 0.061 -0.077 0.089 -0.236 *** 0.080
Fourth born -0.101 0.115 -0.053 0.172 -0.363 *** 0.131
Fifth born -0.585 0.423 0.772 ** 0.380 -0.869 0.720
Sixth born -0.455 0.985 -1.088 ** 0.544 0.561 * 0.287
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.006 0.033 0.030 0.046 0.006 0.036
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.184 *** 0.028 0.224 *** 0.051 0.206 *** 0.048
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.402 *** 0.045 0.298 *** 0.074 0.318 *** 0.074
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.523 *** 0.051 0.510 *** 0.120 0.362 *** 0.104
Equivalent total parental income 0.048 *** 0.010 0.049 ** 0.024 0.059 ** 0.024
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.165 *** 0.059 -0.121 0.074 -0.149 0.106
Two birth parents present -0.053 0.037 0.020 0.053 -0.116 * 0.069
Female 0.309 *** 0.028 -0.166 *** 0.039 -0.038 0.047
Related course 0.536 *** 0.139 0.457 *** 0.157 0.606 *** 0.127
Québec 0.362 *** 0.038 0.628 *** 0.053 0.412 *** 0.044
Intercept 104.058 76.670 40.001 93.623 125.323 106.617
Adjusted R
2 
0.232 0.197 0.147
N 5,507 3,074 3,025
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Reading ScienceMathematics
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth born in
Canada who were within one grade of the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec. 
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Table 4.9b: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Reading sub-components
Retrieving Interpreting
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.292 ** 0.117 0.480 *** 0.129 0.249 ** 0.108
Age of the youth -7.115 9.760 -15.392 10.810 -6.964 9.452
Age of the youth
2 
0.230 0.312 0.489 0.345 0.226 0.302
Second born -0.121 *** 0.040 -0.111 *** 0.038 -0.086 ** 0.041
Third born -0.167 *** 0.060 -0.179 *** 0.067 -0.209 *** 0.069
Fourth born 0.021 0.116 -0.146 0.121 -0.057 0.105
Fifth born -0.456 0.503 -0.222 0.358 -1.307 * 0.672
Sixth born -0.490 0.821 -0.504 0.598 -0.375 1.139
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.020 0.027 -0.014 0.036 -0.006 0.040
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.156 *** 0.036 0.161 *** 0.026 0.145 *** 0.030
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.304 *** 0.051 0.366 *** 0.043 0.323 *** 0.043
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.500 *** 0.067 0.514 *** 0.055 0.338 *** 0.057
Equivalent total parental income 0.039 *** 0.013 0.043 *** 0.010 0.043 *** 0.011
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 * 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 0.000
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.134 * 0.070 -0.129 ** 0.057 -0.206 *** 0.053
Two birth parents present -0.031 0.040 -0.077 ** 0.038 -0.023 0.040
Female 0.131 *** 0.033 0.248 *** 0.028 0.393 *** 0.028
Related course 0.453 *** 0.141 0.489 *** 0.130 0.433 *** 0.127
Québec 0.303 *** 0.041 0.395 *** 0.034 0.178 *** 0.037
Intercept 50.626 75.486 115.506 83.740 50.246 73.177
Adjusted R
2 
0.141 0.207 0.154
N 5,507 5,507 5,507
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Reflecting
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth born in
Canada who were within one grade of the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec. 
 

Cascio and Lewis (2006) also provide estimates in standard deviation units, albeit 
only by ethnicity and for general performance. Nevertheless, they generally find that 
an additional year of schooling boosts academic performance by 0.3 to 0.4 standard 
deviations. These estimates are generally within close range of those provided above 
in Tables 4.9a and 4.9b. 
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In this section, I subject the preferred results shown in Tables 4.9a and 4.9b to three 
robustness tests that are commonly applied in the regression discontinuity literature 
(e.g. Lemieux and Milligan, 2008). First, several age specifications are applied (i.e. no 
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age controls, linear, quadratic, cubic, and quartic). Second, I re-estimate the models 
without parametric age controls, but on narrower windows around the cut-off date 
(i.e. +/- three months, +/- two months, and +/- one month). Third, the reduced-form 
models were estimated in Québec and Nova Scotia, as well as in the rest of Canada 
(where the cut-off dates hold no special significance). The main coefficients from 
these models appear below in Table 4.10. The full set of regressions results appear in 
Tables A4.4.1 to A4.4.10 in Appendix A4.4. 
 
Table 4.10: Robustness tests on the IV results
Reading Mathematics Science
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
No age controls 0.325 *** 0.045 0.279 *** 0.049 0.298 *** 0.047 0.253 *** 0.045 0.327 *** 0.047 0.238 *** 0.062
Linear 0.309 *** 0.074 0.236 *** 0.086 0.360 *** 0.073 0.194 *** 0.070 0.249 *** 0.082 0.141 0.104
Quadratic 0.419 *** 0.119 0.292 ** 0.117 0.480 *** 0.129 0.249 ** 0.108 0.298 ** 0.133 0.265 * 0.151
Cubic 0.422 *** 0.120 0.294 ** 0.119 0.488 *** 0.130 0.251 ** 0.108 0.311 ** 0.133 0.294 * 0.157
Quartic 0.422 *** 0.119 0.295 ** 0.118 0.488 *** 0.130 0.253 ** 0.109 0.310 ** 0.134 0.294 * 0.159
+/-Three months 0.322 *** 0.057 0.255 *** 0.065 0.332 *** 0.058 0.243 *** 0.053 0.257 *** 0.058 0.206 *** 0.078
+/-Two months 0.377 *** 0.078 0.293 *** 0.081 0.395 *** 0.084 0.255 *** 0.066 0.282 *** 0.081 0.195 * 0.106
+/- One month 0.407 *** 0.088 0.265 *** 0.089 0.493 *** 0.106 0.244 *** 0.080 0.332 *** 0.112 0.212 * 0.128
Québec/Nova Scotia 0.314 *** 0.096 0.219 ** 0.092 0.359 *** 0.104 0.186 ** 0.083 0.213 ** 0.100 0.211 * 0.125
Rest of Canada 0.028 0.048 0.072 0.050 0.010 0.050 0.024 0.054 0.020 0.069 0.080 0.066
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
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Note: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). 
Retrieving sub-
component
Interpreting sub-
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With regards to the first two robustness tests, we observe that schooling is still 
generally associated with significant improvements in tests scores. However, results 
for science are not always significant. For the third robustness test, note that being 
born prior to the Québec/Nova Scotia cut-off date is generally associated with a large 
improvement in tests scores in those provinces, but it has virtually no impact in the 
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rest of Canada. This suggests that the cut-off date is not picking up some sort of 
naturally occurring discontinuity. 
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For whom does academic performance improve the most with additional schooling? I 
examine this question along three important dimensions: the conditional distribution 
of academic performance, sex, and parental income. Examining results along the 
conditional distribution of academic performance is important since it suggests the 
extent to which the (largely public) school system works towards reducing variability 
in performance across students, and thus, variability in life opportunities. Why 
examine results by sex and parental income? One reason is that it is already well-
documented that girls perform better than boys on standardized reading tests (e.g. 
Frenette and Zeman, 2009) and that reading, mathematics, and science performance 
improve with parental income (e.g. Frenette, 2009a). However, it is not so well 
understood why these gaps exist in the first place. Is it because girls and high income 
youth benefit more from the schooling system? Alternatively, is it the case that girls 
and high income youth have access to better parental resources? This section will help 
shed some light on the observed gaps by examining the role of additional schooling 
on reading, mathematics, and science performance along the sex and parental income 
dimensions. 
 
Results across the conditional distribution of academic performance 
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This section looks at results across the conditional distribution of academic 
performance. To do so, I estimate quantile regressions in an IV framework (as 
described in Appendix A4.5). Briefly, OLS regression estimates the impact of a 
variable on the conditional mean of the outcome (i.e. it shows the relationship 
between the explanatory variables and the mean value of the outcome, conditional on 
the control variables). If one suspects that the impact is not the same for everyone, 
then estimating a quantile regression may be useful. The quantile regression simply 
estimates the relationship between the explanatory variables and the value of the 
outcome at a particular quantile of the distribution, conditional on the control 
variables. 
 
In the present context, I use quantile IV regression to estimate the impact that 
schooling has on shaping the distribution of academic performance. I do so by 
estimating quantile regressions at every 10th percentile, less the extremes (i.e. 0.1, 
0.2, …, 0.9). The approach I use (Quantile Treatment Effects, or QTE, for IV) was 
developed by Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002), which is appropriate for binary 
assignment and treatment variables. Until now, I have used continuous assignment 
and treatment variables (i.e. assigned grade and actual grade), but these can be easily 
dichotomized by setting a cut-off between grades 9 and 10 (i.e. the assignment binary 
variable is set to 1 if grade 10 is assigned, while the treatment binary variable is set to 
1 if the actual grade is 10 or above). Since this changes the metric slightly (i.e. we are 
now estimating the impact of being in grade 10 or above, relative to being in grade 9 
or below), I re-run the two-stage least squares IV using this approach to facilitate 
comparisons with the quantile estimates. The results of this exercise appear in Tables 
4.11a and 4.11b.   
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Reading Mathematics Science
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
IV 0.612 *** 0.048 0.476 *** 0.061 0.421 *** 0.076
QTE for IV
10th 0.658 *** 0.066 0.482 *** 0.069 0.591 *** 0.078
20th 0.617 *** 0.049 0.544 *** 0.067 0.611 *** 0.054
30th 0.626 *** 0.049 0.520 *** 0.055 0.597 *** 0.040
40th 0.650 *** 0.048 0.538 *** 0.049 0.621 *** 0.051
50th 0.618 *** 0.057 0.495 *** 0.044 0.629 *** 0.055
60th 0.548 *** 0.055 0.510 *** 0.060 0.608 *** 0.057
70th 0.599 *** 0.055 0.519 *** 0.066 0.645 *** 0.067
80th 0.590 *** 0.078 0.451 *** 0.077 0.658 *** 0.067
90th 0.587 *** 0.135 0.434 *** 0.108 0.762 *** 0.117
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Table 4.11a: Quantile Treatment Effects (QTE) for IV regression of standardized test
scores on being in grade 10 or above 
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The 
sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade of the usual one
for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.

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Retrieving Interpreting Reflecting
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
IV 0.459 *** 0.046 0.652 *** 0.051 0.413 *** 0.051
QTE for IV
10th 0.739 *** 0.067 0.576 *** 0.074 0.708 *** 0.074
20th 0.680 *** 0.051 0.612 *** 0.061 0.633 *** 0.054
30th 0.642 *** 0.047 0.593 *** 0.053 0.582 *** 0.045
40th 0.628 *** 0.052 0.583 *** 0.049 0.619 *** 0.052
50th 0.623 *** 0.064 0.582 *** 0.051 0.634 *** 0.054
60th 0.579 *** 0.052 0.617 *** 0.057 0.638 *** 0.057
70th 0.646 *** 0.060 0.644 *** 0.069 0.682 *** 0.070
80th 0.608 *** 0.095 0.562 *** 0.092 0.749 *** 0.081
90th 0.663 *** 0.135 0.543 *** 0.101 0.849 *** 0.116
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Table 4.11b: Quantile Treatment Effects (QTE) for IV regression of standardized test
scores on being in grade 10 or above - Reading sub-components
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The 
sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade of the usual one
for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.

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First, note that the regular IV effects are somewhat larger than what was found earlier. 
This is expected as we are now estimating the impact of being in grade 10 or above, 
relative to being in grade 9 or below. Earlier, we estimated the impact of one 
additional school grade. More importantly, the QTE for IV results suggest that there is 
little evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the effects. The point estimates are not 
very different across the conditional distribution of academic performance for all test 
scores. There are some exceptions (e.g. at the 10th and 90th percentiles), but in general, 
the estimates are similar across most of the distribution. In other words, there is little 
evidence that additional schooling benefits youth of certain performance levels more 
so than others.  
 
Results by sex 
 
We now examine results by sex. Here, we go back to the two-stage least squares (IV) 
approach. In Tables 4.12a and 4.12b, results are shown for males, while in Tables 
4.13a and 4.13b, results for females are shown. The results suggest that males benefit 
from additional schooling in all areas, except in retrieving and in science (at least not 
in a statistical sense). Females benefit in reading only—mathematics and science 
results are not statistically significant.  
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Table 4.12a: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Males
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.327 *** 0.117 0.365 ** 0.157 0.299 0.194
Age of the youth -2.844 10.710 -9.864 13.815 -20.867 20.737
Age of the youth
2 
0.091 0.343 0.323 0.442 0.674 0.664
Second born -0.112 ** 0.056 -0.044 0.063 -0.106 * 0.064
Third born -0.236 *** 0.079 -0.135 0.136 -0.329 *** 0.107
Fourth born -0.193 0.177 -0.113 0.276 -0.411 * 0.226
Fifth born -0.443 0.336 -- -- -0.632 0.965
Sixth born -0.393 0.980 -1.124 ** 0.567 0.674 * 0.350
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth -0.013 0.042 -0.001 0.070 -0.002 0.055
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.158 *** 0.046 0.272 *** 0.076 0.200 *** 0.072
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.374 *** 0.067 0.298 *** 0.098 0.206 ** 0.101
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.492 *** 0.078 0.519 *** 0.162 0.300 * 0.153
Equivalent total parental income 0.057 ** 0.026 0.041 0.042 0.083 *** 0.028
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.002
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.302 *** 0.079 -0.199 * 0.115 -0.157 0.146
Two birth parents present -0.105 ** 0.049 0.037 0.083 -0.149 0.108
Related course 0.652 *** 0.215 0.380 * 0.200 0.619 *** 0.156
Québec 0.388 *** 0.049 0.647 *** 0.072 0.418 *** 0.059
Intercept 17.824 82.924 70.645 106.337 157.506 161.052
Adjusted R
2 
0.199 0.212 0.145
N 2,773 1,555 1,541
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Reading ScienceMathematics
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of males born in Canada
who were within one grade of the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
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Table 4.12b: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Males, reading sub-components
Retrieving
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.228 0.148 0.344 *** 0.133 0.251 * 0.141
Age of the youth 5.812 11.996 -3.004 12.183 -4.982 11.915
Age of the youth
2 
-0.186 0.384 0.093 0.390 0.164 0.381
Second born -0.090 0.058 -0.095 * 0.056 -0.098 * 0.057
Third born -0.117 0.081 -0.216 ** 0.087 -0.253 *** 0.087
Fourth born -0.123 0.183 -0.156 0.198 -0.077 0.219
Fifth born -0.262 0.474 -0.077 0.156 -1.485 1.057
Sixth born -0.415 0.832 -0.459 0.587 -0.337 1.124
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.031 0.043 -0.041 0.046 -0.039 0.052
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.134 ** 0.055 0.183 *** 0.045 0.067 0.051
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.292 *** 0.069 0.348 *** 0.067 0.276 *** 0.070
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.476 *** 0.099 0.516 *** 0.078 0.267 *** 0.087
Equivalent total parental income 0.045 ** 0.019 0.057 ** 0.027 0.044 0.027
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.224 ** 0.096 -0.268 *** 0.081 -0.333 *** 0.089
Two birth parents present -0.082 0.054 -0.116 ** 0.051 -0.057 0.065
Related course 0.614 *** 0.213 0.608 *** 0.200 0.391 * 0.200
Québec 0.355 *** 0.054 0.417 *** 0.046 0.191 *** 0.049
Intercept -49.513 92.819 20.438 94.525 35.339 92.417
Adjusted R
2 
0.134 0.182 0.120
N 2,773 2,773 2,773
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of males born in Canada
who were within one grade of the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
Interpreting Reflecting
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Table 4.13a: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Females
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade initially assigned 0.493 *** 0.172 0.227 0.188 0.224 0.204
Age of the youth -23.940 15.543 -2.955 17.294 -11.656 17.838
Age of the youth
2 
0.768 0.497 0.096 0.554 0.378 0.572
Second born -0.148 *** 0.046 -0.060 0.057 -0.096 0.072
Third born -0.208 ** 0.085 -0.024 0.122 -0.086 0.130
Fourth born -0.068 0.155 -0.012 0.192 -0.392 ** 0.165
Fifth born -0.843 0.761 0.855 ** 0.422 -1.332 * 0.700
Sixth born -- -- -- -- -- --
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.028 0.042 0.050 0.046 0.034 0.050
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.215 *** 0.042 0.185 *** 0.065 0.209 *** 0.071
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.438 *** 0.061 0.316 *** 0.094 0.443 *** 0.098
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.559 *** 0.085 0.501 *** 0.146 0.426 *** 0.152
Equivalent total parental income 0.041 *** 0.014 0.048 0.032 0.032 0.039
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 * 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.044 0.075 -0.042 0.111 -0.121 0.114
Two birth parents present -0.008 0.053 0.007 0.074 -0.074 0.079
Related course 0.371 * 0.198 0.581 ** 0.267 0.560 *** 0.174
Québec 0.334 *** 0.050 0.613 *** 0.066 0.404 *** 0.061
Intercept 180.213 119.856 17.976 133.264 85.437 138.007
Adjusted R
2 
0.215 0.163 0.149
N 2,734 1,519 1,484
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Reading ScienceMathematics
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of females born in
Canada who were within one grade of the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
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Table 4.13b: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Females, reading sub-components
Retrieving
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade initially assigned 0.325 ** 0.165 0.599 *** 0.181 0.250 * 0.141
Age of the youth -17.261 15.223 -26.639 * 15.278 -10.042 14.151
Age of the youth
2 
0.558 0.487 0.849 * 0.489 0.323 0.453
Second born -0.161 *** 0.051 -0.126 *** 0.044 -0.076 0.046
Third born -0.241 *** 0.081 -0.142 0.093 -0.165 * 0.091
Fourth born 0.080 0.167 -0.171 0.142 -0.038 0.147
Fifth born -0.823 0.843 -0.393 0.667 -1.094 ** 0.516
Sixth born -- -- -- -- -- --
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.006 0.030 0.020 0.045 0.033 0.043
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.184 *** 0.051 0.144 *** 0.039 0.227 *** 0.046
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.330 *** 0.071 0.394 *** 0.058 0.373 *** 0.065
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.539 *** 0.093 0.516 *** 0.096 0.406 *** 0.088
Equivalent total parental income 0.033 * 0.019 0.033 ** 0.014 0.039 ** 0.017
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 * 0.000 -0.001 0.001
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.048 0.086 -0.016 0.081 -0.083 0.070
Two birth parents present 0.022 0.059 -0.047 0.056 0.002 0.052
Related course 0.196 0.210 0.316 * 0.182 0.521 ** 0.203
Québec 0.253 *** 0.052 0.369 *** 0.047 0.169 *** 0.051
Intercept 129.519 117.588 201.860 * 117.776 73.885 109.219
Adjusted R
2 
0.133 0.194 0.120
N 2,734 2,734 2,734
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of females born in
Canada who were within one grade of the usual one for their age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
Interpreting Reflecting
 
 
The fact that mathematics scores improve with additional schooling for males, but not 
necessarily for females is interesting. However, as Figure 4.5 suggests, this difference 
is not statistically significant. In fact, no differences are significant.  
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Figure 4.5: Standard deviation effects by sex
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Notes: ***=1% significance; **=5% significance; *=10% significance. The sample 
consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade of the usual one for their 
age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.  
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A. 
 
If schooling (at the secondary level) is not contributing towards the gender divide in 
reading, then what is? One candidate explanation is that gender differences are shaped 
earlier in the school system. One possible reason for this is that in elementary school, 
83% of teachers are female (Statistics Canada’s Census, 2001), and being taught by a 
teacher of the same sex has been shown to benefit students (e.g. Dee, 2007). In high 
school, only 54% of teachers are female (Statistics Canada’s Census, 2001), which 
may explain why girls don’t benefit more from grade 10 in reading. Other possible 
reasons why girls outperform boys in reading include different experiences in the 
home (e.g. differential treatment of boys and girls by the parents), or differences that 
are present at birth. Frenette and Zeman (2009) list several physical, developmental, 
and behavioural fronts upon which boys face challenges relative to girls in early 
childhood. For example, relative to girls, boys face higher infant mortality and 
hospitalization rates, fare more poorly on copying and symbol use tests, display less 
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independence in dressing, and have weaker attention spans and more aggressive 
behaviour.  
 
Returning to the gender composition of teachers in high school, we might expect that 
high school would tend to improve mathematics scores for boys more than for girls. This 
is especially so if most high school mathematics teachers are men. However, this is not 
the case. In French Québec, 59% of mathematics teachers of 16 year olds are female, 
while in English Nova Scotia, the number stands at 46% (Council of Ministers of 
Education, Canada, 2001). Note that almost all of Québec is French speaking, while 
almost all of Nova Scotia is English speaking. 
 
Results by parental income 
 
The other dimension I examine is parental income. In this case, I have selected youth 
in the top and bottom quartiles of the income distribution. In Tables 4.14a and 4.14b, I 
show results for the bottom quartile, while in Tables 4.15a and 4.15b, results appear 
for the top quartile. Note that sample sizes become smaller since I drop 50% of the 
population (i.e. those in the middle) in order to focus on the most and least privileged 
youth. 
 
The results generally show that both high and low income youth benefit from the 
school system, although results are not always significant given the sample sizes. In 
fact, statistical significance is only achieved for low-income youth. Furthermore, the 
differences in the estimated effects are never statistically significant (Figure 4.6). Of 
importance, there is no evidence that higher income youth benefit more from 
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additional schooling than lower income youth, which is in line with Alexander et al. 
(2001).  
 
Table 4.14a: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Bottom income quartile
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.480 *** 0.169 0.112 0.236 0.396 * 0.209
Age of the youth -30.343 ** 13.340 0.729 19.881 -39.429 ** 18.938
Age of the youth
2 
0.977 ** 0.426 -0.017 0.635 1.275 ** 0.606
Second born -0.168 ** 0.079 0.000 0.083 -0.039 0.097
Third born -0.170 * 0.099 0.036 0.157 0.093 0.145
Fourth born -0.138 0.213 -0.122 0.178 -0.187 0.235
Fifth born -1.042 *** 0.399 -- -- -1.492 ** 0.632
Sixth born -1.543 ** 0.768 -0.913 ** 0.464 -- --
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth -0.036 0.037 0.016 0.049 -0.025 0.042
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.108 * 0.059 0.215 ** 0.090 0.149 0.091
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.395 *** 0.093 0.158 0.149 0.399 *** 0.136
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.756 *** 0.196 0.718 *** 0.200 0.296 0.297
Equivalent total parental income -0.096 0.232 -0.176 0.440 0.036 0.274
Equivalent total parental income
2 
0.102 0.096 0.096 0.175 0.087 0.113
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.153 0.095 -0.031 0.160 -0.181 0.152
Two birth parents present -0.071 0.060 -0.017 0.092 -0.210 * 0.108
Female 0.298 *** 0.056 -0.117 0.080 0.028 0.083
Related course 0.619 ** 0.253 0.569 ** 0.255 0.502 *** 0.157
Québec 0.377 *** 0.056 0.645 *** 0.080 0.391 *** 0.072
Intercept 230.118 ** 103.256 -10.077 153.332 300.079 ** 146.704
Adjusted R
2 
0.259 0.134 0.172
N 1,678 965 900
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Reading ScienceMathematics
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth in the bottom
income quartile who born in Canada, who were within one grade of the usual one for their age, and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
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Table 4.14b: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Bottom income quartile, reading sub-components
Retrieving
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.475 *** 0.177 0.630 *** 0.163 0.083 0.178
Age of the youth -44.093 *** 13.937 -35.433 *** 13.316 0.309 16.702
Age of the youth
2 
1.421 *** 0.445 1.133 *** 0.426 -0.002 0.535
Second born -0.138 * 0.073 -0.147 ** 0.071 -0.132 * 0.079
Third born -0.194 ** 0.095 -0.129 0.095 -0.120 0.118
Fourth born -0.026 0.239 -0.174 0.218 -0.093 0.171
Fifth born -1.068 *** 0.387 -0.536 ** 0.249 -1.970 ** 0.864
Sixth born -1.357 ** 0.674 -1.103 ** 0.551 -1.683 ** 0.838
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth -0.039 0.042 -0.031 0.033 -0.053 0.047
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.087 0.063 0.070 0.053 0.103 0.065
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.351 *** 0.105 0.341 *** 0.101 0.299 *** 0.097
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.563 *** 0.161 0.568 ** 0.261 0.802 *** 0.198
Equivalent total parental income 0.079 0.242 -0.179 0.238 -0.166 0.235
Equivalent total parental income
2 
0.037 0.097 0.115 0.096 0.118 0.095
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.189 ** 0.096 -0.023 0.095 -0.271 *** 0.105
Two birth parents present -0.045 0.063 -0.100 * 0.056 -0.027 0.074
Female 0.109 ** 0.046 0.238 *** 0.059 0.389 *** 0.066
Related course 0.531 * 0.291 0.453 ** 0.209 0.632 *** 0.209
Québec 0.387 *** 0.059 0.427 *** 0.054 0.096 * 0.051
Intercept 336.714 *** 107.819 270.408 *** 102.894 -5.082 129.337
Adjusted R
2 
0.211 0.244 0.114
N 1,678 1,678 1,678
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth in the bottom
income quartile who born in Canada, who were within one grade of the usual one for their age, and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
Interpreting Reflecting
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Table 4.15a: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Top income quartile
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.283 0.297 0.227 0.348 0.521 0.405
Age of the youth -5.787 24.991 17.721 30.427 -65.995 ** 33.435
Age of the youth
2 
0.180 0.799 -0.570 0.974 2.117 ** 1.070
Second born -0.056 0.068 -0.094 0.095 -0.110 0.110
Third born 0.008 0.162 -0.015 0.192 -0.423 ** 0.167
Fourth born -0.374 0.250 -0.880 ** 0.384 -0.600 0.535
Fifth born -- -- -- -- -- --
Sixth born -- -- -- -- -- --
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.076 0.077 0.108 0.111 0.120 0.104
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.110 0.113 0.262 * 0.158 -0.103 0.151
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.405 *** 0.102 0.403 ** 0.164 0.085 0.137
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.538 *** 0.102 0.684 *** 0.181 0.178 0.152
Equivalent total parental income 0.020 0.018 0.042 0.048 -0.019 0.040
Equivalent total parental income
2 
0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.165 0.127 -0.149 0.176 -0.138 0.225
Two birth parents present 0.012 0.143 0.121 0.147 0.146 0.177
Female 0.348 *** 0.059 -0.133 0.091 -0.075 0.098
Related course 0.221 0.365 0.030 0.416 1.204 *** 0.455
Québec 0.180 ** 0.088 0.490 *** 0.124 0.445 *** 0.113
Intercept 41.249 193.554 -143.091 234.510 505.187 * 258.799
Adjusted R
2 
0.149 0.134 0.119
N 1,067 602 572
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Reading ScienceMathematics
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth in the top income
quartile who born in Canada, who were within one grade of the usual one for their age, and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
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Table 4.15b: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Top income quartile, reading sub-components
Retrieving
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade -0.071 0.320 0.360 0.276 0.249 0.312
Age of the youth 23.081 25.909 -7.980 22.180 -4.272 26.219
Age of the youth
2 
-0.742 0.828 0.248 0.708 0.133 0.838
Second born -0.044 0.078 -0.091 0.081 -0.004 0.062
Third born 0.040 0.164 -0.013 0.179 0.002 0.139
Fourth born -0.469 0.391 -0.316 0.309 -0.086 0.351
Fifth born -- -- -- -- -- --
Sixth born -- -- -- -- -- --
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.152 * 0.082 0.020 0.090 0.053 0.072
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
-0.002 * 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.170 0.118 0.045 0.110 0.078 0.143
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.348 *** 0.105 0.356 *** 0.106 0.282 ** 0.112
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.581 *** 0.118 0.512 *** 0.111 0.306 *** 0.116
Equivalent total parental income 0.041 0.027 0.015 0.016 -0.004 0.021
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.142 0.166 -0.083 0.147 -0.288 ** 0.136
Two birth parents present -0.089 0.165 0.114 0.170 -0.060 0.136
Female 0.144 * 0.076 0.265 *** 0.057 0.439 *** 0.065
Related course 0.684 ** 0.269 0.285 0.389 -0.116 0.504
Québec 0.147 0.091 0.219 ** 0.088 0.072 0.080
Intercept -183.185 200.437 59.412 171.972 30.383 203.288
Adjusted R
2 
0.040 0.132 0.124
N 1,067 1,067 1,067
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth in the top income
quartile who born in Canada, who were within one grade of the usual one for their age, and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.
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Figure 4.6: Standard deviation effects by parental income
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Notes: ***=1% significance; **=5% significance; *=10% significance. The sample 
consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade of the usual one for their 
age and lived in Nova Scotia or Québec.  
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A. 
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If secondary schooling does not explain why higher income youth outperform lower 
income youth, then what does? It may be that lower income youth face considerable 
challenges outside of the school system, and that schooling may act as an equalizer. 
Alternatively, it may be that there is a ceiling effect in place (i.e. it is more difficult 
for higher income youth to improve their performance in school since it is so high to 
begin with). Whatever the reason may be, the results strongly suggests that 
understanding the income gap in academic performance may require looking at other 
factors, such as earlier years of schooling, parental influences, or factors present at 
birth (as was the case for the gender gap in reading and mathematics performance). 
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In this chapter, I estimate the effect of schooling on academic performance, with a 
particular aim of understanding how schooling impacts students along various 
dimensions (ability, sex, and parental income). To do so, I take advantage of a setting 
whereby large samples of students of similar age wrote the same standardized tests, 
but were in different school grades simply because of age of school entry legislation. 
In some cases, students who were one day apart in age were in adjacent school grades, 
but wrote the same tests.  
 
The findings suggest that one additional year of schooling (grade 10 in most cases) is 
associated with significant improvements in reading, mathematics, and science 
performance. More importantly, schooling confers the same benefits in each academic 
area across three important dimensions: the conditional distribution of academic 
performance, sex, and parental income. These findings suggest that factors outside of 
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the secondary school system may be the driving force behind heterogeneous academic 
performance. 
 
The chapter contributes to the literature in three important ways. First, it places more 
emphasis on heterogeneity in the impact of schooling on academic performance. 
Second, a wider range of test scores is considered here. Third, it is the first Canadian 
study on the topic.  
 
So what is behind the gender gap in reading and mathematics performance and the 
broader income gap in academic performance? The findings suggest that high school 
factors fail to provide much insight. Candidate explanations that cannot be ruled out 
are those related to earlier school experiences, influences in the home, or even factors 
present at birth. As a result, more work is needed in this area. For example, it would 
be useful to investigate the role of earlier school years in developing learning, 
especially in view of understanding gender differences in academic performance. 
More detailed data on classroom strategies might be useful in this case. Also, the role 
of the teacher’s gender may be important at this stage, as suggested by a recent 
American study (Dee, 2007). It may also be useful to estimate the role of parental 
resources in shaping the income gap in academic performance, especially in the early 
years.  


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Previous research from Canada and the US suggests that student financial aid 
generally helps reduce liquidity constraints. However, rising student debt load is a 
concern in both countries and in many others. Student debt may have an impact on 
post-graduate outcomes (e.g. job quality, life outcomes), while prospective student 
debt may impact the decision to enroll in postsecondary education (PSE) in the first 
place.  
 
This chapter is devoted to analyzing the latter of these two hypotheses by studying the 
introduction of two large non-refundable grants made available to low-income youth 
in Canada. An interesting aspect of these grants is that they help reduce debt, but they 
have no impact on liquidity constraints since they are simply clawed back from loans. 
Furthermore, there is a sharp discontinuity in the eligibility criteria, based on parental 
income. These two features, the clawback of the grants from loans and the sharp 
discontinuity in eligibility, provide the ideal conditions to study the impact of 
prospective debt load on PSE attendance (while holding liquidity constraints constant). 
To date, no study in the world has looked at prospective debt load and attendance 
under these circumstances. 
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Using a large longitudinal administrative data set that is linked at the family level, I 
find evidence that the grants helped raise enrolment in university among a group of 
students who face low net returns to attending university: males who were raised far 
from a university. These students must bear additional direct transportation costs and 
opportunity costs associated with their travel time. Moreover, they face lower labour 
market returns to university than females, and particularly so if they plan on working 
in their hometown (where opportunities for university graduates are relatively rare).24 
As a result, these students may view university as a bad investment given the added 
cost of attending in absence of the grants. I find that reducing prospective debt by up 
to $6,000 led to a 7 percentage point increase in university attendance rates for males 
raised beyond 40 km of a university. For youth in general, there is no statistical 
evidence that the grants helped raise enrolment in PSE in general nor in university in 
particular. 
 
In the next section (Section 5.2), I provide an overview of the postsecondary 
education system in Canada, including its fee structure and the financial aid system 
available to Canadian postsecondary students. In Section 5.3, I provide some 
background for the analysis presented in this chapter by discussing the roles of the 
student financial aid system. Following this, I begin examining student debt and 
postsecondary attendance by reviewing the relevant literature (Section 5.4). I then 
present a very simple theoretical model to better conceptualize the relationship 
between debt and attendance (Section 5.5). The remainder of the chapter is devoted to 
the empirical analysis. To this end, I begin by discussing the identification strategy, 
                                                 
24 The returns to a university degree are higher for females, largely because they earn less than males 
when both have a high school diploma (Christofides, Hoy, and Yang, 2006). 
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the data, some critiques of the identification strategy (manipulation effects and 
program awareness), and the methods used in the chapter in Section 5.6 to Section 5.9, 
in that order. In Sections 5.10 and 5.11, I present the results from differences-in-
differences estimators and regression discontinuity estimators, respectively. In Section 
5.12, I apply robustness tests on the main results. In Section 5.13, I generate results 
across different dimensions. Finally, the chapter is summarized and the findings put 
into perspective in Section 5.14.  
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Postsecondary schooling generally includes three types of institutions in Canada: 
university, college, and trade school. However, trade school doesn’t necessarily 
require a high school diploma for entry. University and college generally require a 
high school diploma, although some students may be eligible to begin postsecondary 
studies without a high school diploma if they are deemed to be ‘mature students’ (i.e. 
usually 21 years old or above). A typical university undergraduate degree takes four 
years to complete, which may be followed by a graduate degree (a Master’s or a PhD) 
or a professional degree (Medicine, Dentistry, Law, etc.) A college diploma can 
normally be obtained after two or three years of study, while a trade school diploma is 
even shorter in duration. 
 
The system in the province of Québec is quite different. For students wishing to 
pursue university, they must first complete a two-year college program at CEGEP 
(Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel, meaning ‘College of General and 
Vocational Education’). Following this two year program, Québec students normally 
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only require three years to complete a university undergraduate degree. For those 
wishing to obtain a terminal college diploma, students must complete a three year 
CEGEP program. 
 
With the exception of the small number of private career colleges and some elite 
professional university programs, postsecondary institutions are heavily regulated by 
government. Provincial governments usually set a price ceiling on tuition fees, 
although they often allow for some variability in tuition fees to reflect differences in 
costs. To ensure that the price ceiling does not reduce enrolment too much, 
governments provide supply side subsidies to universities for every student enrolled. 
Fees are not always regulated, although de facto price ceilings still exist since 
subsidies are reduced when tuition increases. 
 
Average tuition fees are about $4,000 at Canadian universities. Fees range from about 
$2,000 in Québec for in-province students, to more than $6,000 in Nova Scotia. 
Within provinces, fees are fairly similar across programs, with the exception of some 
recently deregulated elite professional programs (particularly in Ontario). Although 
Statistics Canada no longer maintains data on college tuition fees, they are generally 
about half that of university fees. College tuition fees are remarkably similar across 
programs and most provinces. The one exception is in Québec, where in-province 
CEGEP students pay only nominal registration fees. 
 
How do Canadian students finance the costs associated with a college or university 
education? In Canada, governments provide direct funding for postsecondary 
education through non-merit based aid in the form of loans and grants (including loan 
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remissions). The bulk of this aid is in the form of student loans. When students apply 
for loans, they may also qualify for special grants that are generally targeted at low 
income youth. This process is automatic with the loan application. The formula for 
determining the amount of student aid (AID) is simply: 
 
ResourcesNeedsAid −=)1.5( ,  
 
where Needs correspond to the costs associated with attending the program (tuition, 
books, moving expenses, living expenses, etc.), and Resources correspond to parental 
income, as well as other student resources (e.g. savings). The calculated amount of aid 
is disbursed by the federal and provincial governments. Although there is a limit on 
the total amount of aid available per student, this is non-binding in the vast majority 
of cases. In other words, if youth want to enroll in a postsecondary program and are in 
need of funds, the money is generally available, albeit at the cost of becoming 
indebted. 
 
Of course, many other factors come into play in the decision to attend postsecondary, 
including high school marks, parental and peer influences, returns to schooling, 
discount rates, etc. As a result, there remain considerable inequities in postsecondary 
attendance in Canada, especially at the university level. Of particular relevance for 
this chapter, research has shown that three groups of students face low odds of 
attendance: low-income youth (Frenette, 2009a), males (Frenette and Zeman, 2009), 
and youth who grew up far from a university (Frenette, 2004; 2006; 2009b).  
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The main purpose of student financial aid is to reduce liquidity constraints for 
students contemplating attending postsecondary schooling. The Canadian student 
financial aid system generally covers all or most of the cost of attending PSE in the 
form of grants and loans. Frenette (2009a) provides some empirical evidence that 
supports this claim. The study shows that only 10% of high school graduates from 
Canada claimed to not have attended university (despite wanting to do so) due to their 
financial situation (including a lack of credit). Furthermore, this figure may be 
overstated since the majority of these students registered high school grades that were 
well below the usual minimum grades required for university admission. In other 
words, many students who reported a financial barrier to attending university may not 
have been able to attend in any event. Of course, their financial situation may have 
influenced the level of effort invested in school in order to achieve their goals. 
   
Studies in the US also come to the same general conclusion using different methods. 
For example, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) found that, at most, 8% of youth are 
credit constrained in terms of PSE access. They identified credit constraints by using a 
residual approach: they suggest that the unexplained portion of the gap in attendance 
rates between high- and low-income youth is due to credit constraints, under the 
assumption that high-income youth (those in the top quartile) are not credit 
constrained. However, Belley and Lochner (2007) update this work and find that the 
proportion doubled in recent years (to about 17%).   
 
Perhaps a larger concern regarding student financial aid is the debt load that students 
carry with them upon graduation. This is especially so given that tuition fees have 
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been increasing substantially over the last two decades in Canada. As Figure 5.1 
below suggests, debt load upon graduation (from a regular undergraduate degree) has 
increased with tuition fees. Between 1990 and 2006, real tuition fees have increased 
by 147%, while real debt load upon graduation has increased by 107%.  
 
Figure 5.1: Undergraduate tuition fees and student 
debt levels
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Note: 1990 dollars = 100. 
Source for tuition data: Tuition and Living Accomodation Costs (TLAC) survey. 
Sources for debt data: National Graduate Survey (NGS), 1990-2000; Canadian 
Undergraduate Survey Consortium (CUSC), 2006. 
 
Does debt matter, given that students generally have enough money to attend 
university or college? Surprisingly very little work has been done in this area. In the 
US, some very recent studies have concluded that higher debt loads are associated 
with poorer post-graduation job quality from a ‘public interest’ point of view 
(Rothstein and Rouse, 2007) and lower odds of marriage and homeownership (Chiteji, 
2007). In line with the general theme of this thesis (human capital acquisition), this 
chapter is concerned with another aspect of student debt: whether or not prospective 
debt affects enrolment decisions. I begin this inquiry in the next section by reviewing 
the relevant literature.  
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Overview 
 
As noted in the previous section, the two primary roles of a well functioning student 
financial aid system are to reduce liquidity constraints for those facing them, as well 
as to ensure that borrowers are not saddled with large debts following graduation. 
Both of these aspects of aid—liquidity constraints and total expected debt upon 
graduation—may impact on decisions to enrol in postsecondary education in the first 
place. Liquidity constraints do so in a mechanical fashion by affecting students’ 
ability to pay for the education, while debt reduction through a non-refundable grant 
does so by affecting the net returns to PSE (i.e. the wage premium less the loan 
repayment). 
 
This chapter is concerned with the latter of the two (debt reduction), but as we shall 
see, there are very few studies relating prospective debt to enrolment decisions. Thus, 
the vast majority of the available evidence on the relationship between student aid and 
enrolment comes from liquidity constraints studies. For this reason, this section 
begins by reviewing this literature before moving on to the literature on debt and 
enrolment. 
 
Literature on liquidity constraints and postsecondary attendance 
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In terms of theory, liquidity constraints affect enrolment in a very straightforward 
manner. Students facing a liquidity constraint cannot attend, while those facing no 
constraint may attend as long as they apply and get accepted. Thus, programs aimed at 
reducing liquidity constraints will have an impact on enrolment if certain conditions 
are met:  
 
· There are some students who face liquidity constraints. 
· The additional aid erases the liquidity constraints for certain students. 
· Some students who saw their liquidity constraints disappear applied and were 
accepted to PSE. 
 
We know that some students face liquidity constraints (e.g. Carneiro and Heckman, 
2002; Belley and Lochner, 2007; Frenette, 2009a), but whether or not an increase in 
student aid will actually raise enrolment is an empirical question. Thus, this section 
will focus on the empirical work in the literature.  
 
The early studies were reviewed by Leslie and Brinkman (1988). The consensus 
finding from these studies is that a $1,000 decrease in the net price of college (fees 
less non-refundable aid) is associated with an increase in college enrolment of 3 to 5 
percentage points in the US. As a point of reference, the National Center for 
Education Statistics, or NCES (http://nces.ed.gov/) reports that on average, tuition, 
fees, and room and board cost $2,373 ($5,470) in public (private) four-year colleges 
and universities in 1980-81 in the US.  
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The limitation of many of these early studies is that they are largely based on 
observed correlations. However, students must choose to apply for and accept aid. 
Student aid eligibility is often based on observable characteristics such as parental 
income, savings, student work patterns, etc. There is no guarantee that in the absence 
of aid, students who qualified for aid based on these characteristics would have a 
similar probability of attending as those who did not qualify. The purpose of the aid is, 
after all, to reduce inequities in enrolment. Hence, estimating the impact of aid on 
enrolment by simple differences in enrolment by borrowing status is, by design, 
flawed since enrolment rates are likely to be different under the counterfactual (no 
aid). 
 
Later studies focused on temporal variation in student aid derived from natural 
experiments. Changes in student aid policies provide such variation, and the US is not 
short on this front. The majority of aid provided to American students comes from the 
Pell Grants and the Stafford Loans. The Pell Grants were initially offered in 1974, 
when they were named the Basic Educational Opportunity Grants. Pell Grants are 
needs-based, and form the majority of federal grants for students in the US. Aside 
from grants, US students could also secure federally-sponsored loans. In 1965, the 
Guaranteed Student Loan Program was created, which was later renamed the Stafford 
Loan Program in 1987. According to McPherson and Shapiro (1991), federal grants 
accounted for $3.5 billion in aid in 1980, compared to $5.5 billion in federal loans 
(both expressed in 1982 US dollars).   
 
Kane (1995) noted that Pell Grants had no impact on attendance when they were 
introduced in the 1970s, a period when real tuition was relatively stable. The resulting 
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supply constraints may have prevented enrolment from rising despite the increased 
aid. This view was supported by McPherson and Shapiro (1991), who then extended 
the analysis into the 1980s—a period when tuition fees rose—and found that a $1,000 
increase in the Pell Grant was associated with a 6.8 percentage point increase in the 
enrolment of low-income students.
 
Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2008) later argued that the complexity in the system may 
have discouraged students to apply. They contrast the Pell Grant system with the 
relatively simpler Georgia Hope Scholarship and similar programs, noting that 
research has consistently pointed to significant effects in the latter, but not the former.      
 
Arguably, the studies related to the Pell Grant system were not able to implement a 
compelling identification strategy. This is because the system was introduced in 1974 
and was targeted at low-income youth. National level changes in enrolment rates pre- 
and post-treatment by income class is hardly a desirable research design.  
 
In contrast, the aforementioned Georgia Hope Scholarship (GHS) and similar 
programs did offer more promising avenues of research. Dynarski (2000) examined 
the GHS, which was a merit-based aid package offered to college students in the US 
state of Georgia beginning in 1993. Students who obtained a B average in high school 
were eligible for the grant. Specifically, eligible students who are residents of Georgia 
could attend any of Georgia’s state colleges for free. 
   
Dynarski (2000) finds that a $1,000 increase in student aid is associated with a 3.7 to 
4.2 percentage point increase in enrolment compared to nearby ‘control’ states. 
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However, since merit is based on grades, and grades tend to rise with parental 
affluence, the gap in enrolment between high- and low-income students rose 
following the GHS.  
 
In Dynarski (2003), the same author adopts a very different identification strategy. 
Social Security is a monthly benefit available to elderly Americans. Prior to 1965, 
benefits were also allocated to children of deceased, disabled, or retired Social 
Security beneficiaries as long as they were in school full-time and less than 18 years 
old. Between 1965 and 1982, the benefits to children were extended to college or 
university age children. Specifically, 18 to 22 year-old children of deceased, disabled, 
or retired Social Security beneficiaries received monthly payments if they were 
enrolled in school full-time (most students were enrolled in postsecondary schooling 
at that age). The average annual payment in 1980 was $6,700 (in 2000 US dollars). In 
1982, the extension beyond age 18 was terminated.  
 
Using a differences-in-differences approach with the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY), and a proxy for Social Security beneficiaries (a deceased father), 
Dynarski (2003) finds that the elimination of the extended benefits led to a decline in 
postsecondary attendance. Specifically, a $1,000 decrease in benefits (a form of aid 
since it is tied to education) led to a 3.6 percentage point decline in enrolment. 
 
Around the same time, van der Klaauw (2002) exploited discontinuities in financial 
aid rules at one US East Coast college. Using administrative data on students who 
applied to the college, he finds that aid increases enrolment. While the identification 
approach in this study—a regression discontinuity design—is very strong, it does not 
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address the relationship between aid and enrolment in general; rather, it looks at aid in 
the form of helping a specific college compete for students.  
 
Some recent reforms in Europe provide the groundwork for compelling research in 
the area. Baumgartner and Steiner (2006) use the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) to examine a German reform in student aid in 2001. Using a differences-in-
differences approach (pre-/post-reform for low-/high- income students), the authors 
find no statistically significant relationship between aid and enrolment. However, 
unlike the US system, the German postsecondary system was well-funded to begin 
with: loans and non-refundable grants covering all costs were available to students in 
need. 
 
A similar reform in Denmark in 1988 was studied by Nielsen, Sørensen, and Taber 
(2008). Using a longitudinal register of high school graduates from the classes of 
1985 to 1990, they find that a $1,000 increase in aid is associated with a 1.35 
percentage point increase in college enrolment. Although the effect is significant (in a 
statistical sense), it is somewhat smaller than the US findings. Once again, this could 
be due to the funding in place in Denmark prior to the 1988 reform. In fact, tuition 
was already free in that country.  
 
Literature on prospective debt and postsecondary attendance 
 
Linsenmeier, Rosen, and Rouse (2006) derive a simple theoretical model relating the 
decision to enroll to the anticipated debt load. Their model is applied to the case 
where students decide between competing institutions. In the next section, I show that 
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this model can be easily adapted to study the decision to enroll in postsecondary 
schooling in general. For now, note that their model predicts that demand will 
increase following a reduction in loan repayment, holding liquidity constraints fixed 
(in fact, assuming no liquidity constraints). I discuss why this result does not 
necessarily hold in the case examined here. Furthermore, Linsenmeier, Rosen, and 
Rouse (2006) do not (need to) consider the supply side in their scenario. In contrast, 
the supply side is critical to the analysis of the market for postsecondary education in 
Canada. My version of the model leads me to conclude that a reduction in student 
loan repayment may or may not lead to an increase in demand. In the end, enrolment 
among the target group may increase, or it may remain fixed. In other words, there is 
no guarantee that a reduction in loan repayment will improve access among targeted 
students.  
 
For the moment, I consider the empirical literature on the topic. Surprisingly, there are 
only three studies that are relevant. Note that in the previous section, I only reviewed 
a small handful of the existing studies on total aid and PSE enrolment. 
 
The three studies have all surfaced in recent years. The first is from Germany 
(Baumgartner and Steiner, 2004), where a substantial reform to the loan repayment 
schedule happened in 1990. Prior to that year, student aid was in the form of loans, 
which had to be repaid in full. Following the reform, only half of the aid had to be 
repaid. This represented a significant reduction in debt for eligible students. The 
authors report that a fully supported student saw their debt load reduced by 23,500 
EUR.  
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Using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the authors estimate a 
differences-in-differences model, the results of which suggest that the aid reform was 
ineffective in raising enrolment rates. Although this contrasts with most of the studies 
on total aid and enrolment, recall that the same authors looked at a reform in the total 
amount of aid available in Germany in 2001 (Baumgartner and Steiner, 2006), and 
also found no impact of aid. It is possible that there is something specific about 
Germany, perhaps about their system, their labour market, or about students 
themselves, that works towards dampening the effect of aid or loan repayment on 
enrolment decisions.  
 
As an alternative, consider the US evidence. Recall that US studies have found that 
total aid tends to boost enrolment, but what about loan repayment schemes? 
Linsenmeier et al. (2006) examine a significant program change at a major 
northeastern US university (ANON U). Prior to 1998, the university’s financial aid 
package available to freshmen from low-income families consisted of grants, loans, 
and jobs. Beginning with the 1998 freshmen class, the loan component of the aid 
package was converted to non-refundable grants.  
 
Using admissions and financial aid data from the university, the authors used a 
differences-in-differences approach and found that the loan reduction program had no 
statistically significant impact on the probability of enrolment at ANON U. However, 
for low-income minority students, loan reduction was associated with an increase in 
the probability of enrolment (significant at 10% only).  
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There are several limitations regarding this study. First, the amount of loans converted 
to grants was small relative to the tuition fees at the institution. The authors report that 
tuition fees were $34,171 in 2000. However, only about $4,000 in loans was 
converted to grants.  
 
Second, competing institutions may have altered their funding scheme in order to 
attract students. While the authors show that seven competing institutions in the 
northeast did not alter their funding substantially, they also admit that this is only 
suggestive. Although not discussed, it can be argued that a major university would 
compete for students at the national level.25   
 
Third, total aid relative to costs did not remain fixed over the period, although the 
variation was small. This highlights one of the weaknesses of a differences-in-
differences design: there is no guarantee that all else remains constant. 
 
One additional study in this area is worth noting, this time based on a social 
experiment. Field (2009) examines enrolment rates of New York University (NYU) 
law students in various areas of law. The experiment was set up to test the hypothesis 
that debt matters to students. Students were randomly assigned to two groups. The 
control group received a loan that would be forgiven for up to 10 years following 
graduation if they pursued a career in ‘public interest law’ (i.e. legal fields with a 
public good aspect to it, which often is lower-paying than other forms of law). The 
                                                 
25 Although the anonymity of the university was maintained throughout the study, it is worth noting 
that all three authors list their affiliation as Princeton University, which is a major northeastern US 
university.  
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treatment group received a non-refundable grant if they pursued a public interest law 
career. In both cases, the amount of aid covered two-thirds of tuition fees. The results 
suggest that the treatment group was twice as likely to enroll in a public interest field 
of law, and substantially more likely to hold a first job in public interest law. 
 
Three issues stand out here. First, the experiment only involved 140 test subjects, 
including the control and treatment groups. The low sample size (and the resulting 
potential for sampling error) limits the effectiveness of random assignment. Second, 
the results pertain to a very specific group of people: law school students at NYU. 
Tuition fees are very high at NYU law: about $40,000. As a result, a large loan 
reduction program such as the one implemented above is likely to have an effect. 
Third, the outcome was the choice of specialization, as opposed to the decision to 
enroll or not in university.  

Contributions of the present chapter to the literature 
 
The present chapter adds to the literature in three important ways. First, it is the only 
study in the world that examines the impact of prospective debt on postsecondary 
enrolment decisions in a situation where the policy change led to a sharp discontinuity 
in prospective debt load based on parental income. Other studies have had to rely on 
differences-in-differences estimators, which may be susceptible to confounding 
factors (i.e. other policies may have changed at the same time, as part of a broad 
reform).  
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Second, the chapter examines results across several dimensions. The motivation for 
adopting this approach lies in the possibility that certain groups of students may be 
more or less sensitive to prospective debt load. For example, males and females may 
have different tolerance levels for debt, especially if their expected returns to PSE are 
different. Moreover, students who must displace themselves geographically in order 
to attend may be more sensitive to debt than others. The only other study in this 
literature to examine results by sub-group is Linsenmeier et al. (2006), who examine 
low-income youth from visible minority groups. 
 
Finally, this is the only Canadian study on the topic. As discussed in the background 
section, the issue is of importance in Canada given that tuition fees have risen 
considerably in recent years, leading to rapidly rising student debt load. Furthermore, 
the literature review describes how there is only a scant number of studies in this area 
and they come to very different conclusions. This may be the result of the very 
different policy environments already in place when the debt reduction programs were 
introduced in the various countries/settings. It may also be due to the varying size of 
the debt reduction programs. Other explanations are possible. For these reasons, 
adding more evidence from the Canadian context will help inform this relatively 
nascent literature. 

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What is the anticipated impact of prospective student debt load on postsecondary 
enrolment? The answer depends on both the demand and supply associated with 
postsecondary education.  This section begins with the demand side, as is so often the 
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case in the literature. The supply side, as well as the expected market outcome will 
follow.  
 
Demand side 
 
Linsenmeier et al. (2006) derive a simple theoretical model relating the decision to 
enroll in one institution over another to the prospective debt load. I modify their 
model to fit the case of a student deciding between enrolling in PSE or not.  
 
First, I begin with the model assumptions:  
 
· There are two periods. 
· In period 1, the agent decides between enrolling in postsecondary school ( S ) 
or not ( N ). 
· Agents are able to gain entry into PSE (i.e. they face no liquidity or academic 
constraints).  
· PSE attendees will graduate within one period. 
· Students fund their education with loans; the balance (C  dollars) is paid by 
the student in period 1.   
· In period 2, a postsecondary graduate must repay L  dollars back from their 
student loans.  
· There are only two types of jobs, based solely on wages: a good job, paying G  
dollars, and a bad job, paying B  dollars ( BG > ). 
· The discount rate, r , is positive. 
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· Postsecondary graduates will receive a good job with probability p and a bad 
job with probability )1( p− .  
· Non-postsecondary graduates will receive a good job with probability q  and a 
bad job with probability )1( q− . 
· The probability of obtaining a good job is higher for PSE graduates ( qp > ). 
· If an agent is in school, they cannot hold a job. However, they must hold a job 
if not in school. 
· Agents maximize expected lifetime utility, where ‘lifetime’ is defined as the 
two periods. 
· Utility depends solely on net income ( NI ), defined as income from a job (G  
or B ) less the loan repayment ( L ). There are no psychic costs or benefits 
associated with attending school or working.  
· Utility increases with net income [ 0)(' >NIU ].  
 
Based on these assumptions, the expected lifetime utility of an agent who chooses to 
attend PSE ( S ) is: 
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For an agent who chooses to work in period 1 instead ( N ), it is: 
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Agents attend PSE if the net benefit (in utility terms) is greater than the alternative: 
 
0)()()4.5( >−= NS UEUEθ , or: 
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How does a loan repayment ( L ) affect the net benefit function (θ )? The answer lies 
in the first derivative. Applying the chain rule, we get: 
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By rearranging the terms, we obtain: 
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Since 0)(' >NIU , Equation 5.7 implies that 0/ <∂∂ Lθ . In words, the net benefit of 
attending PSE increases as loan repayment obligations decline.  
 
However, whether a decline in loan repayment obligations will actually lead to an 
increase in demand is another issue. Suppose we have two types of students: type A 
(who value PSE above the alternative) and type B (who value PSE below the 
alternative). Although the net benefit is expected to rise for all students, demand will 
not increase among type A students since they would attend in any event. Only among 
type B students will demand stand a chance of rising (as long as the increase in net 
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returns transforms PSE into a better investment than the alternative). Of course, if net 
returns are too far below the threshold, then ‘crossing over’ may be a challenge.26  
 
What factors will determine the student type? From Equation 5.5, these include the 
relative probabilities of obtaining good and bad jobs under each scenario, the relative 
net incomes arising from these jobs, the discount rate, and the self-financed costs. The 
number of capitalization periods also matter. In this simple two-period model, agents 
who choose to pursue a postsecondary education only have one period to capitalize on 
their investment. In reality, PSE graduates have 30 years or more to capitalize.  
 
It is interesting to go back to the empirical literature at this point. The discussion 
above suggests that lowering loan repayment obligations may only increase demand 
among type B students. This result may explain the findings from the three studies on 
prospective debt and attendance. In Baumgartner and Steiner (2004), no effects were 
found, but this may simply be the result of the low costs of attending a German PSE 
institution back in 1990. In other words, perhaps many students were of type A. In 
Linsenmeier et al. (2006), the major US university they examined may have in fact 
been a good investment for most students even prior to the loan repayment reform (i.e. 
many students may have been of type A, explaining why the authors found no impact). 
Finally, the experiment conducted by Field (2009) considered public interest law 
(relative to private interest law) as the outcome. Since public interest law careers pay 
                                                 
26 This is in contrast to the expected impact of liquidity constraints. In that case, enrolment critically 
depends on obtaining liquidity. Assuming that some (otherwise qualified) students face liquidity 
constraints, then a reduction in these constraints will lead to an unambiguous increase in the demand 
for PSE. This may explain why relatively more liquidity constraints studies find that aid matters 
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less than private interest law, it is quite likely that most students would have been 
classified as type B in this instance. Again, this is consistent with the author’s finding 
that lower debt has a positive impact on choosing public law.   
 
Supply side and expected market outcome 
 
The supply side of the market consists of postsecondary institutions. They are 
indifferent to the amount of loans students must repay since it is the government who 
provides these loans. Thus, a change in the loan repayment schedule should have no 
impact on supply.  
 
However, supply does come into play as a result of a market intervention in Canada.27 
Specifically, tuition fees are often regulated through a price cap. Even when no tuition 
freeze is imposed, fees tend to be stable since universities lose subsidies from the 
government when they raise fees, resulting in a de facto price cap.  
 
Figure 5.2 below depicts the anticipated impact of a reduction in student debt given 
the Canadian context. Prior to the decrease in debt, the equilibrium point is (E1, T1) 
since we are in a supply constrained environment. Excess demand is ED1.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Again, to be fair to Linsenmeier et al. (2006), this discussion may not apply in their case since they 
(almost certainly) looked at the unregulated private postsecondary education market in the US.  
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Figure 5.2: The market for higher education in Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let’s suppose that the debt reduction program is not associated with a change in 
liquidity. This would be the case if the government offers non-refundable grants to 
students that are clawed back from loans. As a result of this new program, demand 
may not respond, as described in the demand side model above. In this case, nothing 
would change, and the program would have no impact on enrolment.  
 
Now, suppose that the program does lead to an increase in demand (from D1 to D2), 
which is also consistent with the demand side model above. Since tuition fees are still 
regulated (either explicitly or implicitly), enrolment remains fixed at E1 even when 
demand increases. What does change is the level of excess demand (from ED1 to ED2). 
In other words, university applications would increase. This may result in a change in 
the mix of students attending. How does the mix change? The answer is not clear. 
Since student financial aid is normally targeted to low-income youth, we might expect 
that they are the ones driving the shift in demand. However, these low-income youth 
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are still required to achieve a certain minimum grade point average to gain entry into 
PSE. Empirical evidence suggests that a strong positive relationship exists between 
parental income and high school grades (Frenette, 2009a). 
 
The end result of this simple conceptualization is that, while a reduction in 
prospective student debt load should reduce enrolment among targeted youth, it may 
not increase it either. Essentially, enrolment among this group may increase (if 
demand increases and targeted students are able to displace students who would 
otherwise attend), or it may remain fixed (if demand does not increase or if targeted 
students are not able to displace others). Critical in this discussion is the movement of 
the demand curve. If some students have a negative valuation of PSE as an investment 
relative to the alternative (no PSE), then we may see demand increase for that group 
following the introduction of a non-refundable grant.  

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To identify the impact of prospective student debt load on PSE attendance, an 
important ingredient would be an exogenous increase in expected debt, but with no 
change in total student financial aid provided. The implementation of the Canada 
Access Grant for Low-Income youth (CAG-LI) and the Millenium Access Bursaries 
(MAB) provides such a setting. Note that in both cases, the main objective was to 
increase enrolment in postsecondary schools (as their names imply).  I discuss both in 
turn. 
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The CAG-LI consists of a non-refundable grant whereby loans are clawed back by the 
amount of the grant. In other words, CAG-LI does not provide more aid to students. 
Rather, it changes the amount of aid that must be repaid.  
 
Another convenient aspect of the grant is that students are eligible for the full grant if 
their parental income is below a certain threshold. If parental income is above the 
threshold (even by $0.01), students are not eligible for the grant. Thus, there is a sharp 
discontinuity in the amount of the non-refundable grant available (and therefore, debt) 
around the threshold. The threshold thus acts as a random assignment of debt since 
students with parents with very similar incomes are likely to have been quite similar 
in their PSE choices in absence of the CAG-LI.  
 
These two features, the clawback of the grant from loans and the sharp discontinuity 
in eligibility, provide the ideal conditions to study the impact of prospective debt load 
on PSE attendance (while holding liquidity constraints constant). To date, no study in 
the world has looked at debt load and attendance under these circumstances. 
 
The CAG-LI was introduced in 2005, and became available to students in the 2005-06 
academic year. The grant applies to first-year, full-time PSE students only. The 
amount of the CAG-LI is one half of first year tuition, up to a limit of $3,000. 
University tuition fees average about $4,000 in Canada, but range from about $2,000 
in Quebec to just over $6,000 in Nova Scotia; college tuition fees are normally close 
to $2,000.  
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Eligibility is based on the net income of the parent(s), as per line 236 of their income 
tax return in the previous year. Net income consists of the sum of employment income, 
other market income (e.g. investment income, rental income, etc.), transfer income 
(including Social Assistance, Employment Insurance, Old Age Security, etc., but 
excluding the Child Tax Benefit and the National Child Benefit Supplement, and the 
Goods and Services and Harmonized Sales Tax Credit), minus certain deductions 
such as Registered Pension Plan contributions, union dues, etc. 28 The threshold for 
CAG-LI eligibility is the same threshold used for the National Child Benefit 
Supplement (NCBS), which is around $35,000, depending on family size and year.29  
 
The CAG-LI coincided with the introduction of a similar grant: The Millenium 
Access Bursary (MAB). In four provinces, the MAB worked in a very similar way as 
CAG-LI in that eligibility for both programs were based on the NCBS threshold. In 
Ontario (beginning in 2005) and Manitoba (beginning in 2006), the MAB was also 
similar to CAG-LI in terms of the amount of the grant (i.e. one half of tuition, up to a 
limit of $3,000). In New Brunswick (beginning in 2006), the grant was larger 
($4,000), but was spread out over three years. In a fourth province, Prince-Edward-
Island, the MAB was also similar to CAG-LI, but for reasons discussed in the 
                                                 
28 Of these income components, perhaps the easiest to manipulate (in order to qualify for the grants) is 
the contributions to a Registered Pension Plan. I will investigate later whether or not net income was 
manipulated. 
29 The NCBS income itself does not create a discontinuity of its own since it does not jump suddenly at 
the threshold. Rather, it goes from zero when net income is above the threshold, to a positive but 
gradually increasing amount as net income falls below the threshold and becomes smaller. Just below 
the threshold, NCBS income is very close to zero. Details are available at 
http://www.nationalchildbenefit.ca/eng/o4/chap2.shtml.   
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methods section, this province cannot be included in the analysis. In other provinces, 
different versions of the MAB were available, but in all of those cases, no clear 
discontinuities could be identified based on program parameters. As a result, analysis 
will be restricted to New Brunswick, Ontario, and Manitoba. The combination of 
CAG-LI and MAB provided up to $6,000 ($7,000 in New Brunswick) in debt 
reduction for qualified students in these provinces. Again, the actual amount of the 
grants depended on tuition fees.  
 
In both cases, students need only apply for student loans to receive the grants. No 
additional application is necessary. The CAG-LI and MAB take-up rate for eligible 
PSE students is 100%.30 
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The data required to conduct this study should contain information on PSE attendance 
of youth, their parental income, the province of residence, and a sufficiently large 
sample to allow one to look very closely around the point of discontinuity.  
 
The Canadian Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD), developed by Statistics 
Canada, satisfies all of these requirements. The LAD is built from personal income 
tax records (the T1s). The T1 data are combined into families to form the T1 Family 
                                                 
30 This is among students who were enrolled in the first-year of full-time studies at a post-secondary 
institution. This is not entirely surprising, as the grants represent free money to students. Thanks to 
Malgorzata Winizewska from the Canada Student Loans Program at Human Resources and Skills 
Development Canada and to Anne Motte from the Canadian Millenium Scholarship Foundation for 
confirming that no eligible PSE student had turned down the grants.   
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File (T1FF). The T1FF contains not only records for tax filers, but also for their non-
filing dependents.31 The LAD is a 20% simple random sample of T1FF, with the 
records linked longitudinally (until they leave the sample through death, out-
migration, or if everyone in their family stops filing taxes).32  Currently, data are 
available from 1982 to 2006. 
 
Given the fact that LAD is a simple random sample of an administrative data base, 
stratification and multi-stage sample are non-issues in this chapter. However, 
heteroscedasticity is still a potential issue. To correct for heteroscedasticity in this 
chapter, I calculate robust standard errors using the standard Huber-White sandwich 
estimator.   
 
Since CAG-LI and MAB apply to first year students, it is necessary to identify the 
year in which youth become eligible for first year enrolment in PSE. In six of the 10 
Canadian provinces (Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Ontario, 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia), this is simply the year in which the 
youth turned 18. This is because age of entry in those provinces is determined based 
on one’s age as of December 31. In the LAD, we know the year of birth for all 
                                                 
31 Dependents are imputed through information provided by tax filers on their returns. This includes 
spouses and children. The population coverage in T1FF is about 97% compared to census data.  
32 Since 1993, virtually all families with children (even ones with low incomes) have had an incentive 
to file taxes in Canada. This is largely because of the introduction of the Child Tax Benefit, which is 
available to about 90% of families with children below the age of 18. 
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children33, allowing one to identify the year when youth first become eligible for PSE 
attendance. Of the six provinces, CAG-LI and MAB were quite similar in New 
Brunswick, Ontario and Manitoba. For these reasons, analysis is limited to those three 
provinces.34 A final point worth noting is that in Ontario prior to 2003, students could 
normally only begin university at age 19 (they could begin college at age 18). Since 
2003, both college and university normally begin at age 18. For this reason, analysis 
is limited to the 2003-2006 period.  
 
It is of course possible that students take a ‘gap-year’ (i.e. they begin postsecondary 
studies after taking a year-long break following high school). This can pose a problem 
if we only focus on 18 year olds and there is a systematic bias in the propensity to 
take a gap-year by parental income level. According to Finnie and Johnson (2010), 
32% of post-secondary students from Ontario took a gap-year following high school 
based on the same YITS data used in Chapters 2 and 4. However, their econometric 
evidence suggests that there is no statistical relationship between taking a gap-year 
and parental income, both for college and university students. 
 
The specific variables used in the analysis are as follows: 
 
Dependent variable 
 
                                                 
33 Unless they are tax filers themselves, in which case we know the exact date of birth. However, many 
children do not file taxes, so a certain degree of selection bias might be introduced by selecting 
children with detailed birth date information. 
34 CAG-LI and MAB were also quite similar in Prince-Edward-Island, but their school entry laws are 
based on age as of January 31.  
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· Full-time PSE attendance in year t (age 18) 
 This is derived from full-time tuition credits and full-time education 
deductions. If either of these is greater than zero, then the indicator is 
set to 1. 
 These credits/deductions can be transferred to a higher income family 
member (specifically, a parent); since the late 1990s, we can identify 
which family member actually attended PSE. 
 
Independent variables
35
 
 
· Net parental income in year (t-1) 
 This variable will be used to identify eligibility for CAG-LI and MAB 
by mapping the relevant NCBS threshold to each family. 
· Province in year (t-1) 
· Lone-parent family dummy in year (t-1) 
· Number of children in family in year (t-1) 
· Sex of the youth 
 
The means of the variables used in the analysis and sample sizes appear below in 
Table 5.1. Note that for confidentiality reasons, all reported dollar estimates from 
                                                 
35 Many of these variables are captured in year (t-1), at age 17, since in year t, many youth may move 
from the parental home in order to attend PSE. As such, their ‘family’ on the tax files may simply 
consist of themselves. All variables derived from this family will thus omit information on their 
parents, their parental home, their siblings, etc. Note also that even if youth tried to strategically 
move out of their home at age 17 (to lower their income in hopes of qualifying for the grants), this 
would have no bearing on grant eligibility since parental income is used in determining eligibility. 
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LAD must be rounded to the nearest 100, while all sample sizes must be rounded to 
the nearest 5. Note that the actual micro-data I use in the calculations are not rounded. 
Slightly fewer than half of 18 year olds have attended PSE. There is some provincial 
variability in this figure, which is not surprising given that each province has its own 
postsecondary education system. Parental income also varies by province (highest in 
Ontario, lowest in New Brunswick, among the three affected provinces). Note that 
parental income among this sample is relatively high since only families with at least 
one child of age 17 are included here (i.e. they are relatively older families). About 
one in five youth live in families with income that is sufficiently low to qualify them 
for the NCBS (and thus, the CAG-LI and MAB grants in certain years). The other 
variables—lone-parent status, the number of children in the family, and sex—are 
included as control variables. Of interest is the fact that slightly less than 50% of the 
sample consists of females. This is because 17 year-old males are more likely to 
remain in their parental home than 17 year-old females. A final point worth 
mentioning is that Ontario is far more populous than the other provinces, and thus, its 
sample size is much larger. Hence, the analysis to follow will focus somewhat more 
on Ontario.  
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Table 5.1: Sample means of variables used in analysis
New Brunswick Ontario Manitoba Rest of Canada
Full-time PSE attendance 0.482 0.426 0.376 0.453
Net parental income 65,600 99,600 77,900 84,800
Below NCBS threshold 0.259 0.178 0.210 0.214
Lone-parent family 0.139 0.134 0.133 0.142
Number of children in family 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.7
Female 0.464 0.490 0.476 0.477
N 3,705 56,735 5,530 75,795
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except
full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).
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Although CAG-LI and MAB provide a nice framework to study the causal impact of 
prospective debt on PSE access, there are still reasons to believe that this is not 
necessarily so. First, as with any discontinuity, there is always the possibility of 
manipulation effects. Parents would have a very high incentive to hide their income 
on aid applications in order to help their children qualify for the grant. However, 
parental income has to match line 236 of their income tax returns. In some provinces, 
tax documents have to be included with the student loan application. In other 
provinces, random checks are applied. 
 
Alternatively, parents could manipulate the income reported on their tax files through 
legitimate or illegitimate means. To test this, I used the LAD data to generate the 
distribution of the gap between net parental income and the CAG-LI/MAB threshold 
among parents in the sample (described in the previous section) for each of the three 
affected provinces, as well as the rest of Canada, for the years 2003 to 2006, inclusive. 
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If manipulation effects are present, we would expect to see a change in this 
distribution following the implementation of the policies within a narrow window 
around the threshold in the three affected provinces, relative to the rest of Canada. In 
particular, we would expect to see a jump (dip) in the frequency to the left (right) of 
zero following the introduction of the programs in the affected provinces. However, 
the results in Figures 5.3 to 5.6 suggest no such jump or dip, especially when one 
compares Ontario (Figure 5.4)—where sample sizes are largest—with the rest of 
Canada (Figure 5.6). 

Figure 5.3: Percent distribution of (parental income - 
NCBS threshold) - New Brunswick 
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
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at  
age 17. 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).  
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Figure 5.4: Percent distribution of (parental income - 
NCBS threshold) - Ontario 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-1
,0
0
0
-9
0
0
-8
0
0
-7
0
0
-6
0
0
-5
0
0
-4
0
0
-3
0
0
-2
0
0
-1
0
0 0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
6
0
0
7
0
0
8
0
0
9
0
0
1
,0
0
0
%
2003 2004
2005 2006

Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at  
age 17. 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 


Figure 5.5: Percent distribution of (parental income - 
NCBS threshold) - Manitoba 
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Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at  
age 17. 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
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Figure 5.6: Percent distribution of (parental income - 
NCBS threshold) - Rest of Canada 
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
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at  
age 17. 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
 
To be sure, I tested whether or not there was a statistically significant increase in the 
proportion of cases below the threshold as we move from the pre-grant period (2003 
and 2004) to the post-grant period (2005 and 2006). The results are shown below in 
Table 5.2. For all three provinces, there is no evidence of any change for any 
combination of pre- and post-grant years.   
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New Brunswick Ontario Manitoba
Year Proportion s.e. Proportion s.e. Proportion s.e.
2003 0.478 *** 0.035 0.458 *** 0.011 0.429 *** 0.032
2004 0.498 *** 0.035 0.481 *** 0.011 0.466 *** 0.033
2005 0.440 *** 0.035 0.475 *** 0.012 0.498 *** 0.034
2006 0.480 *** 0.036 0.471 *** 0.012 0.473 *** 0.032
2005-2004 -0.058 0.049 -0.005 0.016 0.032 0.047
2006-2004 -0.018 0.050 -0.010 0.016 0.006 0.046
2005-2003 -0.038 0.049 0.017 0.016 0.069 0.047
2006-2003 0.002 0.050 0.013 0.016 0.044 0.046
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Table 5.2: Proportion with net family income below NCBS threshold (within a $1,000 band of 
the threshold)
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample
consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17.
 
 
Second, program awareness is always an issue. If students do not know that a program 
exists, there is no reason to believe that they will modify their behaviour because of it. 
However, all students were assessed for CAG-LI and MAB eligibility once they 
applied for student aid, and take up was 100%. Of course, students may not have 
applied for student aid if they were not aware of the new grants since they may not 
have planned on attending PSE. To help make students aware of financial aid 
opportunities (including loans and grants), the Canadian government provides a 
convenient on-line loan calculator.36 Still, there are no guarantees that students were 
made aware of these programs. The closest direct form of evidence on this issue 
comes from the Canadian Survey of Youth in 2008. Published data indicates that 
among 17 to 30 year olds, 59% were aware of study grant opportunities. Of course, it 
                                                 
36  The calculator is available at http://tools.canlearn.ca/cslgs-scpse/cln-cln/40/sfae-eafe/sfae-eafe-0-
eng.do. 
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is not clear why a typical 30 year old would need to be aware of study grant 
opportunities, so the rate may be higher among younger individuals. 
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Two econometric approaches will be used in this study. The first exploits the fact that 
the CAG-LI/MAB programs were introduced at different times in different provinces, 
and were targeted at low-income youth (those below the NCBS threshold). Thus, a 
differences-in-differences (DD) approach will be used (essentially, how does the gap 
in PSE access between low- and high-income youth evolve over time across 
provinces?) 37 An issue with DD estimators is that other programs or events may have 
occurred at the same time in the same provinces that may interfere with our estimate 
of the impact of the CAG-LI/MAB programs. For example, the student loan limits 
rose at the same time that CAG-LI and MAB were introduced. This may have also 
contributed to a rise in attendance among youth from low-income families. 
 
The second approach exploits the discontinuity of the grant eligibility by applying a 
regression discontinuity (RD) estimator (see Appendix A4.1). In short, this consists of 
regressing a binary PSE attendance variable on some flexible function of parental 
income, as well as a dummy variable indicating eligibility for the NCBS. In the years 
when the grants were offered, the coefficient on the NCBS dummy will provide an 
estimate of the impact of the grant eligibility on enrolment.  
 
                                                 
37 The differences-in-differences estimator is described in more detail in Appendix A5.1. 
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This is perhaps the stronger of the two approaches, given the design of the programs. 
The idea here is that students near the threshold should otherwise be quite similar in 
their PSE choice behaviour (in absence of the grants). In other words, they are 
randomly assigned to the treatment/control groups around the point of discontinuity, 
thus mimicking an experimental design (Lee, 2008).    
 
After providing baseline results from the RD estimator, I then apply three robustness 
tests that are commonly used in the literature.38 The first consists of ‘narrowing the 
window’ of the analysis around the NCBS threshold. This is also termed ‘imposing a 
caliper’. In an ideal world, the researcher would have access to thousands of 
observations straddling the point of discontinuity (i.e. one dollar more or less than the 
threshold). In that world, youth with different amounts of grants offered to them 
would come from families with very similar incomes. To attempt to mimic these ideal 
conditions, I gradually narrow the window to the extent possible with the data. 
Specifically, I apply windows of +/- $10,000 and $5,000 around the threshold.  
 
For the second robustness test, I change the specification of the functional form of 
income. The baseline specification for income is a quartic function. However, the 
danger in estimating a very flexible function is that the function may absorb the effect 
of the discontinuity. To be sure, I simplify the functional form by estimating cubic, 
quadratic, linear, and constant functions.   
 
                                                 
38 See Lemieux and Milligan (2008) for an example of this approach.  
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All of the discussion so far assumes that the NCBS threshold will actually capture the 
effect of the grants when they are offered. But what if there is a naturally occurring 
discontinuity at the NCBS threshold? As noted earlier, the NCBS income does not 
pose a problem since it rises very gradually from zero dollars at the threshold. 
However, it is difficult to rule out other possibilities. To be sure, the third robustness 
test consists of examining the trend around the discontinuity in a time when the 
discontinuity was less (or not) relevant (i.e. New Brunswick and Manitoba prior to 
2006 and Ontario prior to 2005, respectively). This is termed a ‘falsification test’. 
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The first portion of the empirical analysis leans on a differences-in-differences (DD) 
approach. In Figures 5.7 to 5.9 below, I plot full-time PSE attendance rates among 
first-year age eligible youth by year and income category in New Brunswick, Ontario, 
and Manitoba. Although CAG-LI and MAB were in full effect from 2006 in New 
Brunswick, 2005 in Ontario, and 2006 in Manitoba, full-time, first-year PSE 
attendance rates did not increase at a faster rate among low-income youth (i.e. those 
eligible for NCBS) in the relevant years.  
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Figure 5.7: Full-time PSE attendance by NCBS eligibility - New 
Brunswick 
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Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, 
except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
 
Figure 5.8: Full-time PSE attendance by NCBS eligibility - Ontario
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Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, 
except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
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Figure 5.9: Full-time PSE attendance by NCBS eligibility - Manitoba
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Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, 
except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
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Although the results above suggest no association between prospective debt reduction 
and PSE attendance, no other factors were taken into account. The sample sizes and 
means of the variables used in the analysis are broken down by province, year, and 
NCBS eligibility below in Tables 5.3 to 5.5. As can be seen from these tables, there 
are considerable differences in the socio-characteristics of youth in families whose 
income qualifies them (or not) for the NCBS. For example, those who qualify for the 
NCBS are far less likely to attend PSE. The gap is about 15 to 20 percentage points. 
This is likely because of the substantial difference in net parental income. Those who 
qualify for the NCBS genrally have net parental incomes in the $20,000 to $25,000. 
In contrast, net parental income is generally above $80,000 among youth who do not 
qualify for the NCBS. Not surprisingly, this group is also less likely to be raised in a 
lone-parent family (only about 5% to 8% of them are in lone-parent families, 
compared to about 40% for youth in families who qualify for the NCBS). If parental 
income and presence matter for attending university, then it is obviously important to 
account for these factors in the analysis. 
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Table 5.3: Sample means of variables used in analysis by NCBS eligibility - New Brunswick
2003 2004 2005 2006
Full-time PSE attendance 0.500 0.300 0.556 0.346 0.542 0.333 0.546 0.333
Net parental income 81,800 23,800 79,300 23,700 78,700 23,800 81,600 22,600
Lone-parent family 0.049 0.340 0.059 0.385 0.056 0.422 0.054 0.400
Number of children in family 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.2
Female 0.458 0.480 0.467 0.481 0.465 0.489 0.454 0.444
Sample size 710 250 675 260 710 225 650 225
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Not 
eligible 
for NCBS
Eligible 
for NCBS
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance
(captured at age 18).
Not 
eligible 
for NCBS
Eligible 
for NCBS
Not 
eligible 
for NCBS
Eligible 
for NCBS
Not 
eligible 
for NCBS
Eligible 
for NCBS
 
 
Table 5.4: Sample means of variables used in analysis by NCBS eligibility - Ontario
2003 2004 2005 2006
Full-time PSE attendance 0.425 0.270 0.447 0.294 0.457 0.304 0.482 0.343
Net parental income 112,000 22,700 114,800 22,700 117,500 22,200 120,800 22,500
Lone-parent family 0.071 0.401 0.079 0.407 0.075 0.398 0.082 0.398
Number of children in family 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
Female 0.492 0.474 0.488 0.478 0.492 0.490 0.490 0.496
Sample size 12,030 2,480 11,690 2,520 11,595 2,550 11,335 2,540
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance
(captured at age 18).
Not 
eligible 
for NCBS
Eligible 
for NCBS
Not 
eligible 
for NCBS
Eligible 
for NCBS
Not 
eligible 
for NCBS
Eligible 
for NCBS
Not 
eligible 
for NCBS
Eligible 
for NCBS
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Table 5.5: Sample means of variables used in analysis by NCBS eligibility - Manitoba
2003 2004 2005 2006
Full-time PSE attendance 0.402 0.237 0.409 0.242 0.407 0.246 0.427 0.241
Net parental income 89,000 24,100 90,000 23,000 93,800 23,800 97,000 24,400
Lone-parent family 0.058 0.390 0.068 0.339 0.067 0.421 0.068 0.370
Number of children in family 2.8 3.1 2.8 3 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.9
Female 0.482 0.475 0.473 0.468 0.478 0.456 0.491 0.463
Sample size 1,120 295 1,100 310 1,045 285 1,100 270
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Eligible 
for NCBS
Not 
eligible 
for NCBS
Eligible 
for NCBS
Not 
eligible 
for NCBS
Eligible 
for NCBS
Not 
eligible 
for NCBS
Eligible 
for NCBS
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance
(captured at age 18).
Not 
eligible 
for NCBS
 
 
We now turn to the regression portion of the DD analysis. In Table 5.6, results for 
models estimated on the three provinces are shown. The models consist of regressing 
a dummy indicating PSE attendance on interactions between the grant eligibility 
indicator and the year t dummy variables, as well as the control variables described 
earlier. Whether the grants had an impact is difficult to ascertain directly from this 
table. In Table 5.7, I show the results from various F-tests (i.e. differences in 
coefficients from Table 5.6).  The idea here is to test whether the gap in PSE 
attendance between those eligible and not eligible for the NCBS changed once the 
grants were introduced.  
 
Based on the p-values in Table 5.7, the answer is a definite ‘no’. However, the 
interaction terms in Table 5.6 suggest that the gap in attendance by income appears to 
close somewhat following policy changes, and especially so between 2005 and 2006 
(albeit not in a statistically significant way). This may suggest that, over time, more 
potential PSE students are learning about the new grants, and this may be contributing 
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towards closing the attendance gap. However, this impact, if it exists at all, is not 
large enough as of yet to be detected statistically. 
 
Table 5.6: Results from differences-in-differences estimation of full-time PSE attendance
New Brunswick Ontario Manitoba
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Above NCBS threshold*2004 0.065 ** 0.027 0.023 *** 0.006 0.012 0.021
Above NCBS threshold*2005 0.052 ** 0.026 0.032 *** 0.006 0.011 0.021
Above NCBS threshold*2006 0.054 ** 0.027 0.058 *** 0.006 0.029 0.021
Below NCBS threshold*2003 -0.165 *** 0.035 -0.119 *** 0.010 -0.131 *** 0.029
Below NCBS threshold*2004 -0.132 *** 0.036 -0.095 *** 0.010 -0.123 *** 0.030
Below NCBS threshold*2005 -0.142 *** 0.037 -0.087 *** 0.010 -0.113 *** 0.031
Below NCBS threshold*2006 -0.114 *** 0.037 -0.050 *** 0.011 -0.121 *** 0.031
Lone-parent family -0.053 ** 0.025 -0.085 *** 0.006 -0.082 *** 0.020
Number of children in family 0.099 *** 0.028 0.063 *** 0.007 0.021 0.022
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.013 *** 0.005 -0.009 *** 0.001 -0.003 0.004
Female 0.171 *** 0.016 0.182 *** 0.004 0.162 *** 0.013
Intercept 0.264 *** 0.042 0.251 *** 0.011 0.296 *** 0.035
Adjusted R
2 
0.068 0.054 0.048
N 3,710 56,790 5,530
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample
consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE
attendance (captured at age 18).
 
 
Table 5.7: F-test results of differences-in-differences coefficients
p-values
New Brunswick Ontario Manitoba
2005=2003 0.5571 0.9771 0.8567
2005=2004 0.9503 0.9853 0.7958
2006=2003 0.9464 0.4724 0.6552
2006=2004 0.5641 0.4688 0.7180
2006=2005 0.6114 0.4597 0.5428
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Gap in full-time PSE attendance 
between those eligible and not eligible 
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17,
except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).
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
The other coefficients in Table 5.6 are also worth noting. Youth from lone-parent 
families are less likely to attended PSE. Sibling size is positively related to PSE 
attendance in New Brunswick and Ontario (albeit at a decreasing rate), as is being 
female in all three provinces. 

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The differences-in-differences approach used in the previous section may suffer from 
omitted factors that may bias the results. Since no significant effects were found, it 
may still be the case that confounding factors may have worked in the opposite 
direction, thus ‘masking’ a true effect. This may be the case when policies are 
‘bundled’ together, which is often the rule rather than the exception. Rather than 
attempt to identify all possible confounding factors, an alternative strategy is to adopt 
an approach that is not susceptible to this problem. This is the spirit of this section, as 
I turn to a regression discontinuity (RD) approach. 
 
I begin the RD analysis with pictures. This is appropriate since an RD estimator is 
nothing more than a very close look at the dependent variable (PSE attendance) 
around some critical threshold. In Figures 5.10 to 5.13, I show quadratic trends in full-
time PSE attendance rates by the gap between net parental income and the NCBS 
threshold in Ontario for each year from 2003 to 2006. Separate quadratic trend 
functions are estimated above and below the NCBS cut-off (denoted by the vertical 
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bars). Note that I focus primarily on Ontario from this point since sample sizes in 
other provinces are often too small to support the regression discontinuity analysis.39 
 
If the prospective debt reduction programs worked, we should expect to see a higher 
PSE rate when the gap is slightly negative compared to when it is slightly positive in 
2005 and 2006 (the years when the grants were offered), relative to earlier years when 
the grant was not offered. However, there is no evidence of this in the figures. In all 
years, the trends are essentially flat, or they display a slight dip as we move from the 
positive to the negative. 
 
Figure 5.10: Mean full-time PSE attendance by (net parental 
income-NCBS threshold) - Ontario, 2003
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Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, 
except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
 
 
                                                 
39 Recall that in Chapter 4, I also showed the raw data (in slightly aggregated form). This was very 
effective since those data (standardized test scores) were continuous. In the current case, the data 
consist of rates, which in small samples are more often than not equal to zero. As a result, the 
underlying discontinuity (or lack thereof) is very difficult to detect visually with the raw data, and 
some degree of parametrization becomes necessary (as in Figures 5.10 to 5.13).  
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Figure 5.11: Mean full-time PSE attendance by (net parental 
income-NCBS threshold) - Ontario, 2004
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Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, 
except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
 
Figure 5.12: Mean full-time PSE attendance by (net parental 
income-NCBS threshold) - Ontario, 2005
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Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, 
except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
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Figure 5.13: Mean full-time PSE attendance by (net parental 
income-NCBS threshold) - Ontario, 2006
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Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, 
except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
 
In Table 5.8, I estimate a regression discontinuity model separately for the three 
provinces in the years when the grants were offered. The idea here is to regress the 
PSE attendance dummy on a flexible set of variables capturing net parental income (a 
quartic in this case), and a dummy indicating eligibility for the NCBS, as well as other 
control variables. The coefficient on the NCBS dummy will provide an estimate of the 
impact of the grants since income is more or less held fixed. 
  
Table 5.8: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time PSE attendance
New Brunswick - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Manitoba - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.021 0.070 -0.020 0.013 -0.027 ** 0.013 -0.010 0.046
Net parental income 4.E-06 3.E-06 1.E-06 *** 9.E-08 1.E-06 *** 9.E-08 4.E-06 *** 1.E-06
Net parental income
2  
7.E-12 2.E-11 -1.E-12 *** 1.E-13 -8.E-13 *** 1.E-13 -1.E-11 *** 4.E-12
Net parental income
3  
-7.E-17 7.E-17 2.E-19 *** 2.E-20 2.E-19 *** 3.E-20 1.E-17 *** 5.E-18
Net parental income
4  
8.E-23 5.E-23 -9.E-27 *** 1.E-27 -1.E-26 *** 2.E-27 -4.E-24 *** 2.E-24
Lone-parent family 0.012 0.054 -0.062 *** 0.013 -0.053 *** 0.013 -0.005 0.042
Number of children in family 0.066 0.062 0.067 *** 0.014 0.062 *** 0.014 0.017 0.044
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.009 0.011 -0.010 *** 0.002 -0.010 *** 0.002 -0.003 0.007
Female 0.222 *** 0.032 0.176 *** 0.008 0.187 *** 0.008 0.165 *** 0.026
Intercept 0.039 0.138 0.146 *** 0.022 0.192 *** 0.022 0.081 0.081
Adjusted R
2 
0.093 0.074 0.070 0.070
N 885 14,150 13,870 1,360
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth.
All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).
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The coefficients in the first row (‘Eligible for NCBS’) are never statistically 
significant except for Ontario, 2006; however, in that case, it is negative (this result 
disappears following robustness tests below). If the grants improved access to PSE, 
we would have expected to see a positive sign. In terms of other coefficients in the 
model, they are generally quite similar to their counterparts from the differences-in-
differences models (Table 5.6). 
 
In the next two sections, I use the results from Table 5.8 as the starting point for 
further analysis. In Section 5.12, I test the robustness of these results by using three 
common approaches in the RD literature: narrowing the window (i.e. looking more 
closely around the point of discontinuity), implementing specification tests (i.e. 
changing the functional form of the income controls), and applying falsification tests 
(i.e. examining the trend around the discontinuity at a time when the grants were not 
offered). 
 
In Section 5.13, I examine heterogeneity in the results along several dimensions: sex, 
type of PSE institution, and presence of a local university. This exercise is useful 
since sensitivity to prospective debt load may vary along these dimensions, which 
means that important effects may still be present even though the general results to 
date suggest no effect in the aggregate.   

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Narrowing the window 
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Although the functional forms described so far are quite flexible, the best way to 
control for income differences is by looking very closely around the point of 
discontinuity (as we did in Figures 5.10 to 5.13). In Table 5.9, I select a +/- $10,000 
window around the NCBS threshold, and find no statistically significant coefficients 
on the NCBS dummy. In Table 5.10, I repeat the exercise with a +/- $5,000 window, 
and obtain the same result. 

Table 5.9: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time PSE attendance - $10,000 window
New Brunswick - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Manitoba - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.014 0.172 0.001 0.046 -0.023 0.045 -0.103 0.136
Net parental income 3.E-03 6.E-03 -8.E-05 8.E-04 2.E-04 8.E-04 4.E-03 * 2.E-03
Net parental income
2  
-1.E-07 2.E-07 5.E-09 3.E-08 -1.E-08 3.E-08 -1.E-07 * 8.E-08
Net parental income
3  
2.E-12 4.E-12 -1.E-13 5.E-13 2.E-13 5.E-13 2.E-12 * 1.E-12
Net parental income
4  
-1.E-17 3.E-17 1.E-18 3.E-18 -1.E-18 3.E-18 -1.E-17 * 8.E-18
Lone-parent family 0.110 0.095 -0.094 *** 0.024 -0.055 ** 0.025 -0.070 0.072
Number of children in family 0.032 0.158 0.043 0.040 0.071 * 0.040 0.061 0.107
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.002 0.032 -0.009 0.007 -0.006 0.008 -0.006 0.020
Female 0.192 *** 0.073 0.171 *** 0.022 0.185 *** 0.022 0.134 ** 0.062
Intercept -22.723 53.227 0.493 7.295 -1.390 7.513 -34.428 * 20.656
Adjusted R
2 
0.011 0.039 0.042 0.006
N 195 1,845 1,860 235
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. The
sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).


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Table 5.10: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time PSE attendance - $5,000 window
New Brunswick - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Manitoba - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.065 0.242 0.020 0.059 -0.063 0.055 -0.120 0.178
Net parental income 1.E-02 3.E-02 4.E-03 5.E-03 4.E-03 4.E-03 9.E-03 2.E-02
Net parental income
2  
-6.E-07 1.E-06 -1.E-07 2.E-07 -2.E-07 2.E-07 -3.E-07 8.E-07
Net parental income
3  
1.E-11 2.E-11 2.E-12 3.E-12 3.E-12 3.E-12 6.E-12 1.E-11
Net parental income
4  
-6.E-17 1.E-16 -9.E-18 2.E-17 -2.E-17 2.E-17 -4.E-17 8.E-17
Lone-parent family 0.127 0.146 -0.082 ** 0.034 -0.066 ** 0.033 -0.120 0.103
Number of children in family 0.236 0.268 0.024 0.069 0.028 0.067 0.085 0.180
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.052 0.058 -0.007 0.014 0.002 0.014 -0.007 0.038
Female 0.247 ** 0.110 0.175 *** 0.031 0.212 *** 0.031 0.074 0.091
Intercept -130.374 269.901 -42.258 45.940 -35.630 45.006 -82.364 211.460
Adjusted R
2 
-0.017 0.040 0.053 -0.046
N 95 940 975 115
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. The
sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).

 
Specification tests 

One issue with narrowing the window and having income controls in the main model 
at the same time is that a real effect may exist, but the associated jump (or dip) may 
be absorbed by the flexible income function, rather than by the NCBS dummy. This is 
especially problematic with a quartic income function, which allows for three 
inflexion points. One way to deal with this is to alter the specification of income by 
gradually making it more restrictive (i.e. fewer inflexion points). 
 
In Table 5.11 to 5.13, I re-estimate the model using a cubic, quadratic, and linear 
specification, in that order. In each case, I find no significant impact of the grants on 
PSE enrolment. In Table 5.14, I drop the income control from the model, and hinge 
my identification completely on the size of the window around the threshold (still +/- 
$5,000). Again, I find no significant effect.  
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Table 5.11: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time PSE attendance - $5,000 window, cubic specification
New Brunswick - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Manitoba - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.117 0.224 0.026 0.058 -0.054 0.055 -0.109 0.173
Net parental income -2.E-03 2.E-03 2.E-03 *** 5.E-04 -7.E-04 5.E-04 -1.E-03 2.E-03
Net parental income
2  
5.E-08 6.E-08 -4.E-08 *** 1.E-08 2.E-08 1.E-08 3.E-08 4.E-08
Net parental income
3  
-3.E-13 5.E-13 3.E-13 *** 1.E-13 -1.E-13 1.E-13 -2.E-13 3.E-13
Lone-parent family 0.134 0.145 -0.082 ** 0.034 -0.066 ** 0.033 -0.114 0.100
Number of children in family 0.270 0.265 0.025 0.069 0.026 0.067 0.085 0.178
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.060 0.058 -0.007 0.014 0.002 0.014 -0.006 0.037
Female 0.244 ** 0.109 0.176 *** 0.031 0.212 *** 0.031 0.065 0.090
Intercept 25.980 31.610 -20.081 *** 6.714 10.136 6.886 16.906 22.546
Adjusted R
2 
-0.009 0.041 0.053 -0.039
N 95 940 975 115
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. The
sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).

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Table 5.12: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time PSE attendance - $5,000 window, quadratic specification
New Brunswick - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Manitoba - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.109 0.223 0.039 0.058 -0.048 0.055 -0.107 0.172
Net parental income -3.E-04 2.E-04 3.E-05 6.E-05 3.E-06 6.E-05 -4.E-05 2.E-04
Net parental income
2  
4.E-09 3.E-09 -3.E-10 8.E-10 -1.E-10 8.E-10 3.E-10 2.E-09
Lone-parent family 0.131 0.145 -0.079 ** 0.034 -0.067 ** 0.033 -0.122 0.099
Number of children in family 0.302 0.262 0.015 0.070 0.034 0.067 0.083 0.177
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.066 0.057 -0.007 0.015 0.001 0.014 -0.005 0.037
Female 0.248 ** 0.107 0.174 *** 0.031 0.213 *** 0.031 0.070 0.090
Intercept 4.762 4.253 -0.621 1.074 0.279 1.098 1.260 3.455
Adjusted R
2 
-0.003 0.033 0.052 -0.033
N 95 940 975 115
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. The
sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).

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Table 5.13: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time PSE attendance - $5,000 window, linear specification
New Brunswick - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Manitoba - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.069 0.225 0.043 0.057 -0.047 0.055 -0.106 0.171
Net parental income 1.E-05 4.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 -6.E-06 9.E-06 -2.E-05 3.E-05
Lone-parent family 0.103 0.144 -0.078 ** 0.034 -0.067 ** 0.033 -0.123 0.098
Number of children in family 0.120 0.232 0.028 0.061 0.039 0.060 0.076 0.175
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.022 0.050 -0.009 0.012 0.000 0.012 -0.004 0.036
Female 0.214 ** 0.106 0.174 *** 0.031 0.213 *** 0.031 0.070 0.090
Intercept -0.300 1.594 -0.253 0.398 0.439 0.396 0.831 1.141
Adjusted R
2 
-0.012 0.034 0.053 -0.024
N 95 940 975 115
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. The
sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).

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Table 5.14: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time PSE attendance - $5,000 window, no income controls
New Brunswick - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Manitoba - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.002 0.106 -0.024 0.031 -0.017 0.030 -0.015 0.090
Lone-parent family 0.103 0.144 -0.081 ** 0.034 -0.066 ** 0.033 -0.117 0.097
Number of children in family 0.066 0.171 -0.018 0.052 0.062 0.049 0.132 0.145
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.008 0.029 0.003 0.009 -0.006 0.008 -0.020 0.024
Female 0.216 ** 0.106 0.170 *** 0.031 0.213 *** 0.031 0.067 0.090
Intercept 0.215 0.246 0.314 *** 0.075 0.182 *** 0.070 0.136 0.212
Adjusted R
2 
-0.002 0.033 0.054 -0.018
N 95 940 975 115
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. The
sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).


Falsification tests 
 
So far, there is no evidence that the grants improved access to PSE for low-income 
youth. This is ascertained by observing (using various techniques) that there is no 
sudden change in enrolment patterns around the critical threshold for grant eligibility 
during the period when the grants were offered. However, what if there is a naturally 
occurring discontinuity around this threshold and the introduction of the grants simply 
counterbalanced this natural effect? Although it is not clear why a natural 
discontinuity would exist40, a safe approach is to test for this possibility. The results of 
such tests are shown below in Tables 5.15 to 5.17. More precisely, the same model as 
in Table 5.8 is estimated, but for earlier years (prior to the introduction of the grant).  
 
The results suggest that the coefficients were about the same before and after the 
introduction of the grant in each of the three provinces. This is true in the empirical 
                                                 
40 One possibility, the fact that the NCBS kicks in at the same point as the grant eligibility, was 
dismissed earlier since NCBS amounts rise very gradually from zero dollars at the threshold. 
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and statistical sense. Thus, the possibility of a natural discontinuity is more or less 
ruled out. 
 
Table 5.15: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time PSE attendance - Falsification tests, New Brunswick
2003 2004 2005 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS -0.039 0.060 0.007 0.064 0.023 0.065 0.021 0.070
Net parental income 2.E-06 2.E-06 6.E-06 * 3.E-06 9.E-06 *** 3.E-06 4.E-06 3.E-06
Net parental income
2  
7.E-12 2.E-11 -2.E-11 2.E-11 -4.E-11 3.E-11 7.E-12 2.E-11
Net parental income
3  
-3.E-17 4.E-17 2.E-17 6.E-17 9.E-17 8.E-17 -7.E-17 7.E-17
Net parental income
4  
3.E-23 3.E-23 -7.E-24 5.E-23 -6.E-23 8.E-23 8.E-23 5.E-23
Lone-parent family 0.054 0.052 -0.095 * 0.050 0.013 0.052 0.012 0.054
Number of children in family 0.119 ** 0.055 0.061 0.054 0.113 ** 0.055 0.066 0.062
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.020 ** 0.010 -0.007 0.009 -0.018 * 0.010 -0.009 0.011
Female 0.178 *** 0.031 0.135 *** 0.032 0.171 *** 0.032 0.222 *** 0.032
Intercept 0.036 0.122 0.084 0.128 -0.099 0.134 0.039 0.138
Adjusted R
2 
0.093 0.083 0.089 0.110
N 965 935 930 885
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All
variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).
 
 
Table 5.16: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time PSE attendance - Falsification tests, Ontario
2003 2004 2005 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS -0.019 0.013 -0.021 * 0.012 -0.020 0.013 -0.027 ** 0.013
Net parental income 2.E-06 *** 1.E-07 1.E-06 *** 9.E-08 1.E-06 *** 9.E-08 1.E-06 *** 9.E-08
Net parental income
2  
-1.E-12 *** 1.E-13 -9.E-13 *** 1.E-13 -1.E-12 *** 1.E-13 -8.E-13 *** 1.E-13
Net parental income
3  
4.E-19 *** 5.E-20 2.E-19 *** 3.E-20 2.E-19 *** 2.E-20 2.E-19 *** 3.E-20
Net parental income
4  
-3.E-26 *** 4.E-27 -1.E-26 *** 2.E-27 -9.E-27 *** 1.E-27 -1.E-26 *** 2.E-27
Lone-parent family -0.052 *** 0.013 -0.062 *** 0.012 -0.062 *** 0.013 -0.053 *** 0.013
Number of children in family 0.034 ** 0.014 0.056 *** 0.014 0.067 *** 0.014 0.062 *** 0.014
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.006 *** 0.002 -0.009 *** 0.002 -0.010 *** 0.002 -0.010 *** 0.002
Female 0.182 *** 0.008 0.180 *** 0.008 0.176 *** 0.008 0.187 *** 0.008
Intercept 0.150 *** 0.022 0.150 *** 0.022 0.146 *** 0.022 0.192 *** 0.022
Adjusted R
2 
0.072 0.077 0.074 0.070
N 14,520 14,250 14,150 13,870
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All
variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).
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Table 5.17: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time PSE attendance - Falsification tests, Manitoba
2003 2004 2005 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.030 0.043 0.020 0.052 0.058 0.044 -0.010 0.046
Net parental income/1000 4.E-06 *** 9.E-07 3.E-06 * 2.E-06 5.E-06 *** 7.E-07 4.E-06 *** 1.E-06
(Net parental income/1000)
2  
-9.E-12 ** 4.E-12 -6.E-12 1.E-11 -1.E-11 *** 2.E-12 -1.E-11 *** 4.E-12
(Net parental income/1000)
3  
8.E-18 * 4.E-18 3.E-19 3.E-17 9.E-18 *** 2.E-18 1.E-17 *** 5.E-18
(Net parental income/1000)
4  
-2.E-24 * 1.E-24 2.E-24 1.E-23 -2.E-24 *** 4.E-25 -4.E-24 *** 2.E-24
Lone-parent family -0.080 ** 0.038 -0.076 ** 0.039 -0.009 0.041 -0.005 0.042
Number of children in family -0.030 0.045 -0.040 0.042 0.111 *** 0.042 0.017 0.044
(Number of children in family)
2 
0.004 0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.018 *** 0.007 -0.003 0.007
Female 0.188 *** 0.025 0.143 *** 0.025 0.139 *** 0.026 0.165 *** 0.026
Intercept 0.111 0.083 0.166 * 0.101 -0.103 0.073 0.081 0.081
Adjusted R
2 
0.084 0.065 0.023 0.070
N 1,420 1,420 1,330 1,360
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All
variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).
 

The main finding arising from both the DD and RD main results, as well as their 
robustness tests, is that there is no evidence that the grants had an impact on 
postsecondary enrolment among youth. This finding must be qualified, however, as 
the analysis so far has focused on the average youth. More to the point, some youth 
may have benefited from the grants if they are more sensitive to debt. I turn to this 
possibility in the next section.  

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Perhaps there are certain groups of youth who are sensitive enough to prospective 
debt, and thus, may have altered their behaviour following the introduction of the 
CAG-LI/MAB grants. Males and females may be different in this respect, especially 
since returns to schooling vary by sex. Returns are higher for females, largely because 
they earn less than males when both have a high school diploma (Christofides, Hoy, 
and Yang, 2006).  
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Also, students who are raised far from a university may also be more sensitive to 
prospective debt.41 Previous studies have suggested that these students are less likely 
to attend university, particularly if they are from a lower income family (Frenette, 
2004, 2006, 2009b). One possible reason is the higher cost of attending when students 
leave the home to attend (Barr-Telford et al., 2003). If students face a long 
commuting distance, then they likely also face direct transportation costs, as well as 
opportunity costs associated with their travel time. It may also be the case that the 
labour market returns to higher education are lower in rural areas, where many distant 
students may plan to live. This too will work towards lowering net returns.  
 
In Table 5.18 and 5.19, I re-run the base model (from Table 5.8) on males and females, 
respectively. The results are more or less the same. Importantly, there is no evidence 
that enrolment was higher as a result of the new grants (i.e. the coefficient on the 
NCBS dummy is never positive and statistically significant). 
 
Table 5.18: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time PSE attendance - Males
New Brunswick - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Manitoba - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS -0.013 0.097 0.017 0.016 -0.001 0.018 -0.036 0.059
Net parental income 4.E-06 4.E-06 2.E-06 *** 1.E-07 2.E-06 *** 2.E-07 3.E-06 *** 1.E-06
Net parental income
2  
4.E-12 4.E-11 -1.E-12 *** 1.E-13 -2.E-12 *** 3.E-13 -6.E-12 4.E-12
Net parental income
3  
-5.E-17 1.E-16 2.E-19 *** 3.E-20 5.E-19 *** 1.E-19 6.E-18 5.E-18
Net parental income
4  
6.E-23 1.E-22 -9.E-27 *** 1.E-27 -5.E-26 *** 1.E-26 -2.E-24 2.E-24
Lone-parent family -0.014 0.075 -0.069 *** 0.016 -0.059 *** 0.017 0.052 0.054
Number of children in family 0.075 0.084 0.055 *** 0.019 0.054 *** 0.019 0.026 0.059
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.014 0.015 -0.008 *** 0.003 -0.009 *** 0.003 -0.003 0.010
Intercept 0.084 0.199 0.139 *** 0.029 0.168 *** 0.031 0.068 0.102
Adjusted R
2 
0.065 0.052 0.043 0.056
N 490 7,185 7,060 700
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). All variables are captured at age 17, except
full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).
 
                                                 
41 Distance to college is less of an issue as the vast majority of Canadian youth have local access to a 
college (Frenette, 2004).   
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Table 5.19: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time PSE attendance - Females
New Brunswick - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Manitoba - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.074 0.112 -0.022 0.020 -0.033 * 0.019 0.024 0.081
Net parental income 6.E-06 7.E-06 2.E-06 *** 2.E-07 1.E-06 *** 1.E-07 5.E-06 * 3.E-06
Net parental income
2  
-2.E-11 8.E-11 -3.E-12 *** 4.E-13 -7.E-13 *** 1.E-13 -2.E-11 2.E-11
Net parental income
3  
5.E-17 3.E-16 1.E-18 *** 2.E-19 1.E-19 *** 3.E-20 2.E-17 3.E-17
Net parental income
4  
-8.E-23 4.E-22 -2.E-25 *** 3.E-26 -9.E-27 *** 2.E-27 -9.E-24 2.E-23
Lone-parent family 0.042 0.081 -0.045 ** 0.019 -0.042 ** 0.019 -0.068 0.065
Number of children in family 0.059 0.091 0.080 *** 0.021 0.069 *** 0.021 0.010 0.066
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.005 0.016 -0.013 *** 0.004 -0.011 *** 0.003 -0.004 0.011
Intercept 0.161 0.239 0.273 *** 0.034 0.375 *** 0.032 0.254 * 0.147
Adjusted R
2 
0.058 0.041 0.030 0.029
N 395 6,965 6,810 660
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). All variables are captured at age 17, except
full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).
 
 
I now turn to results by distance to school. Since this is only an issue for university 
attendance, I begin by re-estimating the base model with a dependent variable 
indicating university attendance (as opposed to any PSE). In the tax files, we only 
know PSE attendance with certainty since there is no distinction between college and 
university tuition credits and education deductions. However, based on the amount of 
the tuition credits claimed, as well as known tuition fees in Canadian provinces 
(which are somewhat constant across institutions), a series of proxies for university 
attendance can be created. I create two such variables.42 In the first, I set university 
attendance equal to 1 if tuition credits are at least 80% of mean tuition fees in the 
province and year in question (for one semester only since students normally begin 
school in September, and the tax year ends in December—coinciding with the end of 
the first semester). In the second, I take a reverse approach: I code anyone claiming 
tuition credits that are 150% or more of average college tuition fees as having 
                                                 
42 I thank Alex Usher, Ross Finnie, and Theresa Qiu for providing me with university and college 
tuition fees, as well as for sharing their imputation approach (which I adapted for my own purposes).  
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attended university. In the end, the same result is generated from both specifications 
in each of the relevant jurisdictions and periods: university attendance did not rise as a 
result of the debt reduction program (Tables 5.20 and 5.21).  
 
Table 5.20: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time university attendance - Method 1
New Brunswick - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Manitoba - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.085 0.059 0.019 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.018 0.039
Net parental income 3.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 *** 9.E-08 9.E-07 *** 8.E-08 3.E-06 *** 9.E-07
Net parental income
2  
3.E-12 2.E-11 -1.E-12 *** 1.E-13 -6.E-13 *** 9.E-14 -9.E-12 ** 4.E-12
Net parental income
3  
-4.E-17 7.E-17 2.E-19 *** 2.E-20 1.E-19 *** 2.E-20 9.E-18 ** 5.E-18
Net parental income
4  
5.E-23 6.E-23 -1.E-26 *** 1.E-27 -8.E-27 *** 2.E-27 -3.E-24 * 2.E-24
Lone-parent family 0.038 0.047 -0.048 *** 0.011 -0.022 ** 0.010 0.023 0.037
Number of children in family 0.005 0.055 0.051 *** 0.013 0.031 *** 0.011 0.024 0.037
(Number of children in family)
2 
0.001 0.010 -0.008 *** 0.002 -0.005 *** 0.002 -0.005 0.006
Female 0.118 *** 0.029 0.150 *** 0.008 0.053 *** 0.007 0.104 *** 0.023
Intercept -0.065 0.120 0.044 ** 0.020 0.053 *** 0.018 -0.033 0.069
Adjusted R
2 
0.054 0.075 0.031 0.048
N 885 14,150 13,870 1,360
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All
variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). In Method 1, the student is coded as
having attended university full-time when tuition credits surpasses 80% of the mean full-time undergraduate university tuition in
the province. 
 
 
Table 5.21: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time university attendance - Method 2
New Brunswick - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Manitoba - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.092 0.066 0.008 0.012 0.014 0.012 -0.001 0.044
Net parental income 6.E-06 ** 3.E-06 2.E-06 *** 9.E-08 1.E-06 *** 1.E-07 4.E-06 *** 9.E-07
Net parental income
2  
-1.E-11 3.E-11 -1.E-12 *** 1.E-13 -9.E-13 *** 1.E-13 -1.E-11 *** 4.E-12
Net parental income
3  
-2.E-17 7.E-17 2.E-19 *** 2.E-20 2.E-19 *** 3.E-20 1.E-17 *** 5.E-18
Net parental income
4  
4.E-23 6.E-23 -1.E-26 *** 1.E-27 -1.E-26 *** 2.E-27 -5.E-24 *** 2.E-24
Lone-parent family 0.017 0.052 -0.062 *** 0.012 -0.040 *** 0.012 0.014 0.041
Number of children in family 0.035 0.061 0.064 *** 0.013 0.064 *** 0.013 0.014 0.042
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.004 0.011 -0.010 *** 0.002 -0.011 *** 0.002 -0.003 0.007
Female 0.233 *** 0.032 0.158 *** 0.008 0.165 *** 0.008 0.145 *** 0.025
Intercept -0.140 0.132 0.063 *** 0.021 0.061 *** 0.021 0.028 0.078
Adjusted R
2 
0.114 0.076 0.074 0.069
N 885 14,150 13,870 1,360
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All
variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). In Method 1, the student is coded as
having attended university full-time when tuition credits surpasses 80% of the mean full-time undergraduate university tuition in
the province. 
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I now replicate the results using the first method (in Table 5.20) by distance to school. 
Using an approach described in Appendix A5.2, I calculate the straight-line distance 
in kilometres (km) between the student’s residence and the nearest university. In 
Table 5.22, I show the results for youth who are within 40 km of a university and 
others.43 The results are shown for Ontario only since sample sizes are very small in 
New Brunswick and Manitoba when we focus on distant youth, and RD estimators 
require fairly large samples for estimation. Note that 24% of youth grew up in a home 
that is at least 40 km from a university.  
 
                                                 
43 The goal of the exercise in the current section is to identify a group of students who may be 
particularly sensitive to prospective debt, based on the costs they face. This is particularly useful for 
policy purposes since it may facilitate better targeting of the grants. Appendix A5.3 shows and 
discusses results for different distance thresholds. The results indicate that distance does seem to 
matter in general, although this is not the case for very long thresholds, either because the samples 
become too small for reliable analysis or because the costs of displacement are too high for grants to 
matter at those distances. What is clear from the exercise, however, is that students beyond 40 km (as 
a whole) are particularly sensitive to prospective debt. Also, 40 km has been used in the literature on 
distance to school and university attendance (e.g. Frenette, 2006). For these reasons, I use 40 km as a 
threshold in the chapter.  
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Table 5.22: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time university attendance by distance to university
Local youth (< 40 km) Distant youth (≥ 40 km) 
Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.013 0.014 0.002 0.012 0.055 ** 0.027 0.059 *** 0.020
Net parental income 1.E-06 *** 1.E-07 9.E-07 *** 9.E-08 3.E-06 *** 6.E-07 2.E-06 *** 4.E-07
Net parental income
2  
-1.E-12 *** 1.E-13 -5.E-13 *** 1.E-13 -4.E-12 2.E-12 -3.E-12 ** 1.E-12
Net parental income
3  
2.E-19 *** 2.E-20 1.E-19 *** 2.E-20 2.E-18 3.E-18 2.E-18 1.E-18
Net parental income
4  
-9.E-27 *** 1.E-27 -7.E-27 *** 2.E-27 -3.E-25 1.E-24 -2.E-25 3.E-25
Lone-parent family -0.062 *** 0.014 -0.039 *** 0.012 -0.005 0.022 0.010 0.017
Number of children in family 0.050 *** 0.016 0.023 0.014 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.019
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.009 *** 0.003 -0.004 * 0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.003
Female 0.152 *** 0.009 0.053 *** 0.008 0.147 *** 0.014 0.058 *** 0.012
Intercept 0.087 *** 0.025 0.097 *** 0.023 -0.085 * 0.046 -0.066 ** 0.033
Adjusted R
2 
0.071 0.029 0.074 0.026
N 10,180 9,935 3,250 3,205
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All
variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). The student is coded as having attended
university full-time when tuition credits surpasses 80% of the mean full-time undergraduate university tuition in the province. 
 
 
Since most youth are near a university, those results are similar to our previous ones 
(i.e. no statistically significant coefficients). However, there are positive, statistically 
significant effects among distant students. This marks a first in this chapter, and 
indicates that perhaps the grants helped raise enrolment in university among youth 
who grew up out-of-commuting distance or facing a long commute to university. This 
may be because these students face higher costs of attending, and thus, lower net 
returns. In other words, they are likely type B students.  
 
As noted earlier, males face lower labour market returns to higher education than 
females. This had no implications for the results when I examined PSE attendance. 
However, when combined with facing higher costs to attending (i.e. being out-of-
commuting distance or facing a long commute to university), university attendance 
rates for males increase substantially when debt is reduced, and results are statistically 
significant in each case (Table 5.23). Specifically, reducing prospective debt by up to 
$6,000 (depending on the tuition fees) led to a 7 percentage point increase in 
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university attendance rates for males raised far from a university. For females, no 
effect is discerned.  
 
Table 5.23: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time university attendance by sex (≥ 40 km)
Males Females
Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006 Ontario - 2005 Ontario - 2006
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.074 ** 0.032 0.070 *** 0.026 -0.002 0.044 0.024 0.037
Net parental income 2.E-06 *** 7.E-07 2.E-06 *** 6.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-06 -2.E-08 1.E-06
Net parental income
2  
-2.E-12 3.E-12 -6.E-12 *** 2.E-12 9.E-12 6.E-12 6.E-12 7.E-12
Net parental income
3  
2.E-18 4.E-18 4.E-18 * 2.E-18 -2.E-17 *** 9.E-18 -1.E-17 1.E-17
Net parental income
4  
-6.E-25 1.E-24 -8.E-25 6.E-25 1.E-23 *** 4.E-24 5.E-24 7.E-24
Lone-parent family -0.027 0.025 0.029 0.021 0.012 0.034 -0.014 0.025
Number of children in family 0.064 ** 0.028 0.037 0.023 -0.017 0.039 0.008 0.032
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.011 ** 0.005 -0.006 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.005
Intercept -0.078 0.054 -0.121 *** 0.042 0.142 * 0.080 0.092 0.069
Adjusted R
2 
0.043 0.032 0.056 0.010
N 1,635 1,590 1,615 1,615
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth.
All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). The student is coded as having
attended university full-time when tuition credits surpasses 80% of the mean full-time undergraduate university tuition in the
province. 
 
 
There is another potential reason why positive results are found for distant students. 
The quality of the universities that are geographically available to them may be lower 
than those available to youth raised in large cities. This is obviously very difficult to 
evaluate, but it remains a possibility. However, note that this follows the same line of 
reasoning: if university quality is lower in outlying areas, then perhaps youth in those 
areas face lower net returns to attending in absence of the grants. The grants may have, 
once again, pushed them over the break-even point. Since this possibility is difficult 
to defend (compared to returns by sex and distance related costs), I leave it as a 
possibility.  
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In this chapter, I estimate the impact of prospective debt load on the probability of 
PSE attendance among youth. To identify this effect, I exploit a setting whereby non-
refundable grants were offered to students, but were clawed back from their 
calculated loan amount. This feature ensured that liquidity constraints remained 
constant since students were offered the same amount of total aid (loans and grants). 
The only variable factor was the amount of aid that had to be repaid. For identification 
purposes, the interesting (and unique) feature of the program related to eligibility: 
students with parental income below a critical threshold were eligible to receive the 
full grant, while those above the threshold could not receive the grant. This created a 
sharp discontinuity in eligibility.  
 
Using a large longitudinal administrative data set that is linked at the family level, I 
find evidence that the grants helped raise enrolment in university among a group of 
students who face low net returns to attending university: males who were raised far 
from a university. Specifically, reducing prospective debt by up to $6,000 led to a 7 
percentage point increase in university attendance rates for males raised beyond 40 
km of a university. For youth in general, there is no statistical evidence that the grants 
helped raise enrolment in PSE in general nor in university in particular. 
 
The magnitude of the impact of prospective debt on university attendance for men 
who grew up beyond 40 km from a university is quite large in relative terms. The raw 
enrolment rate among this group was 15.37% in 2005 and 10.12% in 2006.44 Thus, a 
                                                 
44 These results are for Ontario youth since it corresponds to the sample used in the analysis by distance 
to school and sex (due to sample size limitations in other provinces). 
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reduction in debt of up to $6,000 led to an increase in enrolment equivalent to 48% 
and 70% relative to the baseline rate. 
 
The chapter adds to the literature in three important ways. First, the sharp regression 
discontinuity design is likely a more convincing identification strategy than what is 
available in most previous studies. Second, results are generated across several 
dimensions, which is an important feature given that certain students may face 
different net returns to PSE in absence of the grants, and thus, may differ in their 
propensity to change their decisions regarding attendance. The only other study in this 
literature to examine results by sub-group is Linsenmeier et al. (2006), who examine 
low-income youth from visible minority groups. Finally, this is the only Canadian 
study on the topic.  
 
It is worth placing the findings of the study in the context of the simple theoretical 
model presented in this chapter. This model suggests that offering a non-refundable 
grant that is clawed back from loans raises the net present value of lifetime earnings 
associated with attending PSE. However, demand for PSE may not rise if students 
already valued the net discounted returns to PSE more than the alternative (no PSE) 
before the introduction of the grants. However, if they estimate net returns to PSE to 
be smaller than no PSE, then there is an opportunity for the grants to make a 
difference in this calculation.  
 
The empirical evidence in this chapter suggests that most students may have viewed 
PSE as a good investment in the first place (and thus, the grants simply generated 
economic rents for them). For males who faced a geographic barrier or challenge, 
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they may have viewed PSE as a bad investment given that they faced higher costs of 
attending (related to long commutes or displacement from the parental home) and 
given that the labour market returns to higher education are lower for males (and 
perhaps particularly so if they plan on returning to their hometown). However, many 
of them may have viewed PSE as a good investment once the grants were factored in.  
 
Could there be other reasons why the loan reduction program had no impact on PSE 
attendance for most students? I ruled out manipulation effects earlier. However, I also 
noted the possibility that students simply were not aware of the grant opportunities, 
despite the fact that they were assessed for the grants with their loan application, and 
the Canadian government has made available an online loan calculator, which 
includes information on grant eligibility. This is unlikely, however, given that certain 
students appear to have benefited from the grant program, namely males facing a 
geographic barrier or challenge. It is not clear why they would have obtained more 
information about the grants. 
 
Given the strength of the identification approach, future work using a similar 
framework could focus on other possible outcomes of student debt. These include 
persisting in PSE (including completing the program), pursuing further studies after 
graduation, and life outcomes following graduation (i.e. marriage, childbearing, 
homeownership, retirement savings, etc.) 
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The objective of this thesis has been to estimate the role of various factors in 
determining human capital acquisition among Canadian youth. In the current context, 
human capital has been measured from an educational perspective, including 
academic performance and progression to higher education. An important focus 
throughout has been to pay careful attention in attempting to identify causal 
relationships, as opposed to simple correlations.  
 
In Chapter 2, I examined the relationship between family size (i.e. the number of 
children) and child quality. According to Becker’s Quantity-Quality model (Becker, 
1960), there exists a trade-off between the number of children in the household and 
the investments that parents make in their children.  
 
Using Cohort A of the Canadian Youth in Transition Survey (YITS), I estimated the 
impact of family size on parental investments in children. After instrumenting family 
size with the incidence of a multiple birth on the second or later birth, I found that 
family size was indeed negatively related to all available measures of parental 
investments in children, including enrolment in private school, the number of 
computers per child, and saving for higher education.  
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However, despite the fact that parental investments in children decline as families 
grow, the academic performance of the child does not suffer. In fact, I found weak 
evidence suggesting that it improves.  
 
Several candidate explanations were discussed. The first was the possibility that the 
parental investments are not causally linked to the child’s academic performance. In 
fact, the best evidence in the literature suggests that there is no link between parental 
investments and the child’s academic performance. Another candidate—the existence 
of economies of scale in rearing larger families and/or in selecting effective sibling 
interactions—explains some, but not all of the puzzle. Specifically, I demonstrated 
that test scores did not fall with family size even among youth who had no siblings 
born within two years of them, and thus, were unlikely to be affected by economies of 
scale. A third possibility is that larger families draw mothers away from the paid 
labour force and into the home to take care of their children. Maternal contact has 
been shown to be positively correlated with the cognitive development of children. 
Since decisions regarding household allocation of labour supply require a different 
framework than the one in place in Chapter 2, I explored this issue in Chapter 3.  
 
According to Becker’s theory of specialization (Becker, 1985), combined with 
Lundberg and Rose’s theory of home intensity (Lundberg and Rose, 1999), larger 
families will induce mothers to spend less time in market work and more time 
performing housework and childcare. For fathers, the theoretical prediction is 
ambiguous.  
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I tested the models in Chapter 3 by using Canadian Census data, which contains 
detailed information on paid and unpaid work hours of individuals. To identify the 
impact of family size on work hours, I used two strategies. The first is similar to the 
one used in Chapter 2, which involved instrumenting family size with the incidence of 
a multiple birth on a second or later birth. The second IV was the sex composition of 
the first two children. Both approaches generated qualitatively similar findings. 
Specifically, mothers respond to larger families by spending more time in the home 
performing housework and childcare and less time performing paid work. In contrast, 
the labour supply response of fathers is close to nil, although a small positive impact 
on unpaid childcare was found. 
 
In Chapter 4, I set out to estimate the impact of schooling on academic performance. 
To identify the impact of schooling, I explored a setting whereby students of close age 
wrote the same standardized tests (PISA), but were in different school grades simply 
because of school entry laws. Most students were in secondary school in this setting. 
 
Using the same YITS data as in Chapter 2, I implemented an IV approach (under a 
fuzzy regression discontinuity design) whereby the actual school grade is 
instrumented with the initially assigned school grade based on age and the entry laws. 
I found that schooling confers significant benefits to students in the area of reading, 
mathematics, and science. Moreover, I found that schooling provides more or less the 
same benefits to students along several important dimensions, including the 
conditional distribution of academic performance, sex, and parental income.  
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The focus of the thesis shifted somewhat in Chapter 5. At this point, I moved from 
academic performance as a measure of human capital, to postsecondary attendance. 
More specifically, I looked at the impact of prospective student debt on PSE 
attendance. Using a very simple theoretical model, I demonstrated that following a 
reduction in prospective debt, the demand for PSE can only rise among youth who 
initially had a negative valuation of PSE relative to the alternative of no PSE. 
Furthermore, a rise in demand will not necessarily lead to a rise in enrolment since 
supply side factors (i.e. capacity constraints, tuition freezes, etc.) may limit entry into 
PSE. It may, however, lead to a re-allocation of students receiving offers from PSE 
institutions. 
 
Using the Canadian Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD), which is a 20% 
file of personal tax records and family members linked over time, I explored a unique 
policy change regarding prospective debt. Specifically, non-refundable grants were 
offered to entering PSE students if they came from a low-income family. For 
identification purposes, the grants had two interesting features. First, they did not 
increase the amount of total aid received since they were simply clawed-back from 
student loans. In other words, liquidity constraints were held fixed. Second, the full 
grant was offered if parental income was below a certain threshold. If income was just 
above the threshold, no grant was available. I exploited this feature by adopting a 
sharp regression discontinuity design.  
 
The findings suggested that in general, the grants did not raise enrolment in PSE. 
However, positive effects were found for one group of students who may otherwise 
face negative returns to university education: males who were raised far from a 
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university. Specifically, reducing prospective debt by up to $6,000 led to a 7 
percentage point increase in university attendance rates for males raised beyond 40 
km of a university. This effect represented between 48% and 70% of the baseline 
attendance rate among this group.     
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This thesis has contributed to several strands of the literature. In each chapter, one of 
the important contributions was to provide Canadian evidence. In fact, each of the 
chapters constituted a Canadian first in the literature. However, for the remainder of 
this section, I will highlight contributions to the international literature.  
 
The work in Chapter 2 was only the second to provide quasi-causal estimates of the 
link between family size and academic performance. Examining the impact of fertility 
on parental investments in children provided an important test to Becker’s Quantity-
Quality model of household production. For more than four decades, no solid 
evidence was available to support this theory. To date, only the study by Cáceras-
Delpiano (2006) provides empirical evidence on the topic. Chapter 2 added to this 
body of knowledge by confirming Cáceras-Delpiano’s finding of a negative 
relationship between fertility and private school enrolment. It also lent more 
credibility to Becker’s model by finding a negative relationship between fertility and 
other forms of parental investments, namely the number of computers per child and 
savings for the child’s higher education. These investments have not been previously 
examined. Finally, the chapter offered three possible explanations as to why increased 
family size is linked to reduced parental investments in children, yet does not 
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necessarily reduce child academic performance (in fact, evidence suggests it bolsters 
it). The candidates examined included: the absence of hard evidence in the literature 
linking parental investments to child outcomes, economies of scale in rearing more 
children or in selecting effective sibling interactions, and increased parental time at 
home.  
 
In Chapter 3, studying the relationship between fertility and labour supply contributed 
to the literature in three important ways. First, it is the only study to provide quasi-
causal estimates of the impact of fertility on unpaid work. This provided a possible 
reason behind the finding that increased fertility leads to less parental investments in 
children, but not necessarily to a decline in child quality. To date, two studies using 
credible identification strategies have come to this conclusion (Cáceras-Delpiano, 
2006; Chapter 2). According to Cáceras-Delpiano, one possible reason is that mothers 
of larger families spend more time taking care of children. However, the data 
available to him only contained information on the paid labour force. In Chapter 3, I 
confirmed that mothers spend considerably more time in the home performing unpaid 
childcare when there are more children. This finding is also important since the 
theories regarding fertility and labour supply critically depends on the allocation of 
labour between the husband and the wife in both paid an unpaid work (Becker, 1985; 
Lundberg and Rose, 1999). The findings in Chapter 3 confirmed the unified theories 
of Becker and Lundberg/ Rose. Second, I also examined the relationship between 
fertility and paid work in Chapter 3. Although this is not new, the analysis of paternal 
work patterns in this chapter stands among a small handful of studies on this topic. 
Finally, the chapter assessed the IVs used in this literature by proposing a test of 
validity based on the predictive power of previous patterns of paid work. 
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Chapter 4 also contributed to the literature by exploring heterogeneity in the impact of 
schooling on academic performance to a much greater extent than before. Specifically, 
results were generated across three important dimensions: the conditional distribution 
of academic performance, sex, and parental income. This is important since it 
indicates for whom the schools are working. Differences by performance level are 
perhaps obvious since schools might be concerned with trying to help those who are 
having the most difficulty. Sex and parental income are also very important 
dimensions since it is well-documented that there exist important differences in 
academic performance along these measures. To date, only Cascio and Lewis (2006) 
look at ethnicity and Alexander et al. (2001) examine parental income. 
 
The second contribution Chapter 4 made to the literature concerned the range of 
academic areas examined. Among the most credible studies in the literature, the focus 
has either been on mathematics- and language-related scores (e.g. Cahan and Davis, 
1987; Cahan and Cohen, 1989) or on a broad test score (Cascio and Lewis, 2006). In 
Chapter 4, I considered three broad areas: reading, mathematics, and science. In 
addition, I showed results for three sub-components of the reading test: retrieving, 
interpreting, and reflecting. Identifying the areas in which students are benefiting the 
most from additional schooling is critical for effectively allocating resources.  
 
Two important advances were made in Chapter 5 regarding the literature on 
prospective debt and postsecondary attendance. The first advance concerns the 
identification strategy used in the chapter. Two of the three previous studies on this 
topic all exploited a differences-in-differences approach. While this is a popular and 
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useful approach for identification purposes, the possibility that education reforms are 
‘bundled’ and the inherent difficulties in falsifying this critique cast some doubt on 
the findings. A third study (Field, 2009) implemented a social experiment with 
random assignment, but with a very small sample. As an alternative, I adopted a 
‘sharp’ regression discontinuity approach, which was possible given the policy 
change I examined. This design is similar to random assignment as long as the sample 
is large enough around the discontinuity and manipulation effects are not present (two 
conditions that were met in the design in Chapter 5). In other words, this approach 
may be as good as the one adopted by Field, if not better (given her small sample). 
 
Second, I developed a framework for understanding the conditions when debt 
reduction may help raise PSE attendance. I adapted a simple model by Linsenmeier et 
al. (2006) to show that the discounted net returns to PSE will rise when less debt 
needs to be repaid, all else constant. I then argued that this is no guarantee that the 
demand for PSE will rise since students may have already viewed PSE as a good 
investment. Moreover, supply constraints in the system may further limit enrolment 
increases and may lead to a re-allocation of students receiving offers from PSE 
institutions. I then provided empirical evidence supporting the framework above. 
Specifically, overall enrolment in PSE did not rise among youth targeted by a debt 
reduction program. However, university enrolment rose among youth who faced 
higher costs and lower labour market returns (thus, lower net returns).  
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There are several policy implications that arise from the findings in this thesis. Taken 
at face value, the finding that family size does not necessarily negatively affect the 
academic performance of children (Chapter 2) may suggest that offering financial 
incentives to influence fertility has no negative implications for children. However, 
this may simply be the case because mothers tend to spend more time at home as their 
family grows (Chapter 3). As suggested by Alexander et al. (2001), the home 
environment may actually be detrimental to children in low-income families in 
particular. That is, parents of low-income children have fewer resources to devote to 
learning activities (e.g. sending their children to camp). Thus, the counterbalancing 
maternal contact effect may simply not be present for low-income children. Does this 
imply that rising fertility is detrimental to children in low-income families? There is 
no definitive answer, as data limitations (number of multiple births) prevented this 
sort of analysis. What this argument does suggest, however, is that targeting financial 
incentives to higher income families might be optimal in terms of child outcomes 
(albeit perhaps less effective at inducing fertility). Tying the incentives to labour force 
attachment might be particularly effective in this case (e.g. tax deductions for the 
lower earning spouse).   
 
Another policy implication regarding Chapter 3 relates to a different objective of 
fertility policies: replenishing the labour force. This is important because of the aging 
population in developed countries. A common strategy in this regard is to take in 
more skilled immigrants, but research has shown that many new entrants face 
integration issues in Canada and in many industrialized nations. An alternative 
approach is to create financial incentives for families to have more children. Such 
incentives are already in place throughout most of the developed world since the tax 
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and transfer systems of 28 out of 30 countries in the OECD contain special provisions 
for families with children (OECD, 2002a). In the Canadian case, many programs that 
have been developed in recent years may arguably contain such incentives, either by 
design or by coincidence. For example, the maternity/parental leave benefits available 
through the employment insurance program were extended from six months to one 
year in 2001. More recently, the Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB) was 
introduced in 2006, and consists of a $100 monthly cheque that is mailed to parents 
for each child below the age of six. All parents qualify to receive the benefit 
regardless of income, although the benefit is taxable.  
 
However, the fertility strategy is a long-term one, as children can only begin work in 
their teenage years. In the short to medium term, the strategy may actually be 
counterproductive since maternal labour supply declines considerably as family size 
grows. To compensate for the reduction in paid work hours, the mother may increase 
her paid work hours in advance of having children or once she has stopped caring for 
her children; however, data limitations preclude further investigation into this area. 
 
The research in Chapter 4 regarding the impact of schooling on academic 
performance has obvious implications for education policy. Specifically, the 
methodology provides an alternative framework for evaluating the benefits that 
schooling confers to students. Education departments in Canada and around the world 
spend considerable time and financial resources in administering standardized tests. In 
the current framework, students in different school grades are administered different 
tests. Thus, there is no way to evaluate student progress throughout the school system. 
To mimic the PISA test conditions in Québec and Nova Scotia, education departments 
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could administer the same test to students in adjacent school grades on a bi-annual 
basis (so that most students do not write the same test twice). 
 
The findings in Chapter 4 also made important contributions to policy. Specifically, 
educational policymakers can use the results to better target spending. Significant 
effects were found in all areas, but the evidence was weak for science. Should more 
resources be spent on promoting the sciences?  If so, then perhaps a useful starting 
point might be before students attend university given the findings in Chapter 4.  
 
On a more positive note, the results in Chapter 4 suggest that students from various 
backgrounds benefit equally from schooling, at least at the secondary level. 
Specifically, schooling confers the same benefits to high and low performing students, 
to boys and to girls, and to students from well-to-do and less favourable 
socioeconomic backgrounds. This signals to policymakers that other arenas may be 
better targets for attempting to equalize learning opportunities. For example, 
economically disadvantaged youth may struggle in school not because of factors 
present in them, but because of conditions in their home life. This was suggested by 
Alexander et al. (2001) who saw tests scores decline in the summer months for these 
youth, but not during the school months relative to richer children. Of course, policies 
designed to influence learning in the home might be difficult to implement. A solution 
might be to extend the school year, or perhaps more feasibly, kindergarten. Recent 
quasi-experimental work from the Netherlands supports the strategy of expanding 
learning opportunities in the early years (Leuven, Lindahl, Oosterbeek, and Webbink, 
2010). Their findings suggest that extending kindergarten for ‘disadvantaged’ four 
year-olds has large beneficial effects on cognitive ability at age 6. To match the Dutch 
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funding scheme for primary schools, the authors define ‘disadvantaged’ as any child 
whose parents have at most a degree from a low level technical school. An alternative 
option is to improve the quality of early learning opportunities. Many programs in the 
US have been targeted to disadvantaged youth, such Head Start, the Perry School 
project, and others. Currie (2001) and Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) report the 
existence of substantial short and long-term benefits of such programs in several areas 
(e.g. cognitive ability, educational attainment, criminal activity, spillovers to younger 
siblings, etc.) 
 
For the gender gap, the home is not likely a useful target since socio-economic 
conditions are usually the same for boys and girls. Factors in elementary school might 
be more appropriate; for example, teacher gender might matter (Dee, 2007). If so, 
then wage incentives to attract male elementary school teachers could be adopted. 
 
The results in Chapter 5 provide a clear framework for policy. Specifically, the fact 
that overall PSE attendance rates do not improve among students targeted by the non-
refundable grants suggest that most grant recipients are receiving economic rents. In 
other words, the grants represent a transfer from taxpayers to students who would 
have attended PSE in any event. Perhaps having less debt to repay will help these 
students establish themselves following graduation, but that is not clear at this point. 
 
The findings do suggest, however, that the grants could be better targeted. For the 
moment, they are geared towards youth from low-income families. Since university 
attendance rates improved among males who face a geographic barrier or challenge 
with regards to attending, perhaps the eligibility criteria for the grants could be 
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modified to incorporate the location of the parental home relative to universities. 
Adding the gender of the student may prove to be a slightly more difficult challenge 
from a political point of view.45 If better targeting is not possible, one alternative 
might be to subsidise the additional costs associated with leaving the parental home 
for students who must do so, although this would not address the gender dimension.  
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Although the thesis has helped shed light on several important topics, there are many 
directions that future related work could take. For example, the broad finding in 
Chapter 2 that fertility does not negatively affect the academic performance of 
children may need to be qualified. This finding may critically depend on the 
counterbalancing effect of increased maternal contact. As suggested by Alexander et 
al. (2001), this counterbalancing effect is not present for low-income youth. However, 
this is an empirical question, and a useful avenue of future research.  
 
Another possible reason why increased fertility does not necessarily negatively affect 
academic performance is because reduced parental investments in children may 
simply not matter. The research on parental investments and children’s academic 
performance is not very well established and could benefit substantially from studies 
that pay more attention to causal relationships. 
 
                                                 
45 The reverse has been implemented. Canada has offered scholarships to encourage women to take on 
doctoral studies.  
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There are other potential implications of fertility aside from those examined in 
Chapters 2 and 3 (i.e. academic performance, parental investments, and labour 
supply). For example, research could focus on the well-being of the mother given her 
additional hours of unpaid work in response to increased fertility. A research design 
similar to the one employed in Chapter 3 could be implemented in a study of fertility 
and maternal health (both physical and emotional). If fertility does affect maternal 
health, this could cause strain in the couple’s relationship. Thus, examining the impact 
of fertility on divorce or separation may be another useful avenue of research. 
 
In Chapter 4, I suggested that the evidence regarding the effect of schooling on 
science performance is weak. Whether policymakers should be concerned about this 
critically depends on the marginal benefit of raising knowledge in science. Coulombe 
and Tremblay (2006) use national level data over time to demonstrate that literacy 
scores (averaged over several areas) are positively associated with GDP per capita. A 
similar study comparing the effects of different types of tests scores on GDP per 
capita would be very informative.  
 
The findings in Chapter 4 also suggest that the key to understanding differences in 
academic performance may lie in factors outside of secondary school. For example, 
earlier school factors, the home environment, or genetic factors. Future work could 
then focus on studying factors within these domains as possible determinants of 
achievement for different groups of students.  
 
Finally, the work in Chapter 5 could be enhanced by examining other potential 
consequences of prospective student debt. For example, one could look at the impact 
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of prospective debt on persistence in PSE or completion (graduation). Another usual 
avenue would be the ‘life outcomes’ of graduates. Rothstein and Rouse (2007) look at 
the impact of student debt on job quality (from a public interest point of view), while 
Chiteji (2007) looks at homeownership and marriage as outcomes. Other outcomes 
would be of interest, such as childbearing, saving for the child’s education, and saving 
for one’s retirement.   
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In Chapters 2 and 4, I use complex survey data. When data are generated from a 
simple random sample of the population, standard variance formulae apply. However, 
when complex survey designs are introduced (e.g. multi-stage or stratified sampling), 
the formulae for variances or standard errors of estimates become more complex. 
Bootstrapping is one way to estimate the standard errors of the point estimate (see 
Chernick, 2008). 
 
In an ideal world, the standard error of a point estimate (e.g. a mean or regression 
coefficient) could be obtained from several samples taken from the population. The 
point estimate would be calculated for each sample, thus providing a sample 
distribution of the point estimate. In reality, we usually only have one sample to work 
with. However, we can still generate an estimate of the distribution of point estimates 
by re-sampling with replacement from the original sample. This is the method of non-
parametric bootstrapping for independent and identically distributed observations, 
which is used in this thesis.  
 
For convenience, survey methodologists often produce bootstrap weights, which are 
designed to replicate the re-sampling with replacement process (when different sets of 
bootstrap weights are applied). This makes standard error estimation under a complex 
survey design relatively straightforward: researchers begin by producing the point 
estimate with the standard set of weights. To calculate the standard error, the point 
estimate is re-generated once for each set of bootstrap weights, producing a sample 
distribution of point estimates. The estimate of the standard error is then calculated by 
 292
producing the standard error of the point estimates. Note that bootstrapping provides a 
consistent estimate of the standard errors, and as such, will also correct for potential 
heteroscedasticity (i.e. non-constant variance of error terms across observations). 
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The goal of the empirical analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 is to estimate the impact of 
fertility (the number of children) on child quality measures and parental labour supply, 
respectively. In Chapter 4, the goal is to estimate the impact of schooling on academic 
performance. To meet these objectives, two estimation approaches are adopted. The 
first approach is the Wald estimate (Angrist, 1990). The second approach will be 
described in Appendix A2.3.  
 
The idea behind the Wald estimate is that some exogenous force influences some 
outcome through some mediating factor. Three exogenous forces are examined in the 
thesis: the incidence of a multiple birth on the second or later birth (Chapters 2 and 3), 
the incidence of two same sex children on the first two (Chapter 3), and the school 
grade initially assigned based on the exact date of birth and school entry laws 
(Chapter 4).  These are described in more detail in the chapters.  
 
More formally, the Wald estimate is a measure of the impact of a variable N on Y, 
where N draws its variation from some instrumental variable Z, which is exogenous to 
Y. In the language of experimental design, the outcome (Y) is influenced by the 
treatment (N), which draws its variation from some assignment variable (Z). A crude 
way to estimate this impact would be to calculate the difference in the average values 
of Y between families with the different values of the instrumental variable. However, 
this would give us the impact of the instrument on the outcome. If one wants to 
estimate the impact of N on Y, it is necessary to rescale this difference by dividing by 
the difference in the average value of N for different values of the instrument. This 
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yields an estimate of the impact of N on Y, where N draws its variation from Z, but all 
is expressed in the units of N.  
 
For example, the Wald estimate can be expressed as the ratio of the difference in 
average parental labour supply (Y ) between families with (1) and without (0) same 
sex children on the first two, to the difference in the average number of children ( N ) 
generated by the incidence of same sex children, as shown below.  
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The standard error of the Wald estimate is (Angrist, 1990): 
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where n refers to the sample size. For significance testing, note that the Wald estimate 
follows )1(2χ .  
 
If the instrument is truly exogenous, then the Wald estimate has a causal interpretation, 
and there is no need to provide econometric evidence. In reality, however, few 
instruments are perfect. For that reason, it is good practice to extend the Wald 
estimate to a multivariate platform, where differences in covariates can be taken into 
account. Such an approach is described in Appendix A2.3. 
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The instrumental variable (two-stage least squares) approach is the regression 
analogue to the Wald estimate. I use it in Chapters 2 and 3 to estimate the impact of 
fertility on child quality and parental labour supply, respectively. I also use it in 
Chapter 4 to estimate the impact of schooling on academic performance. The idea 
behind this approach is simple, and it is perhaps best illustrated by first discussing the 
second stage. Here, the outcome variable (e.g. parental labour supply, Y) is regressed 
on fertility (N) and other covariates (X). However, the value of the fertility variable is 
the predicted number of children generated from a first-stage regression of the actual 
number of children on the instrumental variable (e.g. the incidence of same sex 
children on the first two, Z) and the same covariates used in the second stage, as 
shown below.  
 
iiii XZNstageFirstA εαα ++=− 10: )1.2.2(  
 
iiii XNYstageSecondA µββ ++=− 10
ˆ: )2.2.2(  
 
By using the predicted value of fertility ( Nˆ ), we are effectively focusing on additional 
children that are generated by the event denoted by the instrumental variable. 
Furthermore, the estimate of interest in stage 2 ( 0β ) is already expressed on a per 
capita (per child) basis. Both of these features were encountered in the Wald estimate. 
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The only difference is that the Wald estimate does not take into account differences in 
covariates, while IV regression does. 
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One limitation of using a binary IV (whether in a descriptive or econometric 
framework) concerns the interpretation, which is that of a Local Average Treatment 
Effect, or LATE (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Put differently, the estimated effect 
applies only to the compliers (i.e. those whose treatment status changed as a result of 
the assignment). For others, we cannot estimate an effect since their treatment status 
did not change. In the case of the multiple birth IV, the compliers are families who 
were induced to have another child as a result of having experienced a multiple birth, 
as well as those who were not induced to have another child as a result of not 
experiencing a multiple birth. Unfortunately, it is impossible to identify the compliers 
in this case since we do not know anything about family size in the counterfactual 
case. The same applies to the other instruments used in this thesis (i.e. sex 
composition of the first two children in Chapter 2 and being born before or after a cut-
off date in Chapter 4). In the latter case, I expressed the variable GRADEASSIGNED 
in a continuous manner, but in reality, there are only two possible values (9 or 10). In 
effect, this is equivalent to expressing the variable in binary form (i.e. the results are 
exactly the same when a binary version of the IV is used). Thus, the results are also 
LATE.  
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The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is run by the OECD.46 
PISA differs from other assessment programmes in that it is not primarily curriculum-
based. Although PISA recognizes the importance of curriculum-based knowledge, it 
tests for this mainly in terms of acquisition of broad concepts and skills that allow that 
knowledge to be applied to real world problems.   
 
In 2000, there were three PISA tests: reading, mathematics, and science. The concept 
of literacy in each of these three domains is defined below: 
 
· Reading literacy: “The capacity to understand, use and reflect on written texts, 
in order to achieve one’s goals, to develop one’s knowledge and potential, and 
to participate in society.” 
 
· Mathematical literacy: “The capacity to identify, to understand, and to engage 
in mathematics and make well-founded judgements about the role that 
mathematics plays, as needed for an individual’s current and future private life, 
occupational life, social life with peers and relatives, and life as a constructive, 
concerned, and reflective citizen.” 
 
                                                 
46  The information in this appendix is taken directly from OECD (2002b).  
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· Scientific literacy: “The capacity to use scientific knowledge, to identify 
questions and to draw evidence-based conclusions in order to understand and 
help make decisions about the natural world and the changes made to it 
through human activity.” 
 
Sample questions appear below for each domain. The ‘Lake Chad’ text is followed by 
three questions, each testing a separate domain of reading literacy (retrieving, 
interpreting, and reflecting). The ‘Speed of a racing car’ text is followed by a question 
testing students’ mathematical literacy. Finally, the ‘Ozone’ text is followed by a 
scientific literacy question.   
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It is common practice in the literature to standardize test scores when they are treated 
as outcome variables. Standardizing involves transforming the test score (T) to a 
generic unit of measurement. The most common way to do this is by subtracting the 
mean score from the actual score, and dividing this difference by the standard 
deviation (σ), as shown below. 
 
σ/)( )1.5.2( TTZ ii −=  
 
The new variable, Z, is distributed with mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, or Z 
~ (0, 1). Some authors refer to Z as a normalized variable (i.e. if T is normally 
distributed, then Z will follow the standard normal distribution).  
 
Note that Z is expressed in standard deviations. In other words, a one unit increase in 
the standardized score signals a one standard deviation in the raw score. Similarly, a 
regression coefficient in a model where the standardized score appears as the 
dependent variable should be interpreted in standard deviation units. The benefit of 
standardizing is that results from one study can be compared to results from another 
with the same metric. The approach is not perfect, however, since the dispersions of 
different underlying distributions may themselves be different. Nevertheless, this 
approach has become so commonplace that it would be difficult to justify adopting a 
different one. 
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There is one potential pitfall associated with standardizing the test score in practice. 
When various sample selection criteria are applied in an analysis, it is important to 
realize that the point at which one standardizes the test score will matter. For example, 
if the test score is standardized at the very beginning (i.e. prior to any sample 
selection criteria), then the standardized score in the final selection criteria may not 
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This is because the first and second 
moments of the raw test score likely depend on the sample selection criteria. 
 
 
 










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In the child quality analysis in Chapter 2, which uses YITS data, I identify multiple 
birth siblings by assuming that all siblings born to the same mother during the same 
calendar year are multiple birth siblings. However, it is still possible that two siblings 
who report the same age in discrete years are not twins, even if they share the same 
biological mother. This would require the mother to give birth in January, February, 
or March, promptly get pregnant again, and have another delivery near the end of the 
year. The first delivery could not be later than March assuming that the following 
pregnancy has a nine month term. 
 
As unlikely as this seems, it is still worthwhile investigating. One way to do so is to 
turn to an extraneous data set that contains information on the exact date of birth of 
siblings. Statistics Canada’s Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) is a 
household panel survey data with information on the exact date of birth of each 
member of the household, as well as the relationship between each member (including 
the biological relationship between parent and child). Using the 1999 version of SLID, 
I find that among the 62 pairs of second and third born siblings who were born in the 
same year and shared the same biological mother, 54 of them shared the same 
birthday. Of the 8 who didn’t share the same birthday, one pair were 1 day apart, 
suggesting they may have been born around midnight. Another 6 pairs were less than 
9 months apart (in fact, they were all less than 5 months apart), suggesting that the 
date of birth may have been miscoded. For example, the year may have been 
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misreported; however, this is highly unlikely for the sampled youth in the YITS data 
since all students were born in 1984 based on school administrative records. For 
siblings of YITS respondents who aren’t part of the YITS sample, it is also unlikely 
since the parent is prompted to list household members in descending order of age, 
and then report each member’s age in discrete years. In the end, only 1 of the 62 pairs 
were more than 9 months apart, and it is possible for them to have been born in the 
same year to the same mother, without actually being twins. In other words, the 
strategy for identifying twins with the YITS data is likely to correctly identify twins in 
about 98% of the cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


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Table A2.8.1: IV regressions of lone motherhood on the number of children and other controls 
b s.e.
Number of children 0.015 0.034
Child's birth order -0.012 0.018
Child's age (months/12) -0.021 0.015
Child is a female 0.014 ** 0.007
Child is an immigrant 0.023 * 0.014
Mother's age (years in integers) -0.055 *** 0.013
Mother's age
2
 (years in integers) 0.001 *** 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma -0.028 ** 0.014
Mother has a college certificate -0.003 0.014
Mother has a bachelor's degree -0.036 ** 0.018
Mother has a professional degree -0.054 0.039
Mother has a master's degree -0.040 * 0.022
Mother has an earned doctorate -0.028 0.048
Mother is an immigrant -0.050 *** 0.011
Prince-Edward-Island -0.003 0.018
Nova Scotia 0.009 0.014
New Brunswick -0.005 0.013
Québec 0.028 ** 0.014
Ontario 0.027 * 0.014
Manitoba 0.014 0.015
Saskatchewan -0.005 0.015
Alberta 0.007 0.015
British Columbia 0.025 * 0.015
Intercept 1.581 *** 0.387
Adjusted R
2 
0.005
N 17,961
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample
consists of youth with a biological mother in the home, who are not part of a multiple birth, and the
family has had at least two births (the first being a singleton).



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b s.e.
Number of children 0.155 * 0.093
Child's birth order -0.226 *** 0.045
Child's age (months/12) 0.181 *** 0.035
Child is a female 0.344 *** 0.024
Child is an immigrant -0.269 *** 0.059
Mother's age (years in integers) 0.139 *** 0.045
Mother's age
2
 (years in integers) -0.001 *** 0.000
Father's age (years in integers) 0.019 0.027
Father's age
2
 (years in integers) 0.000 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 0.248 *** 0.039
Mother has a college certificate 0.327 *** 0.045
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.497 *** 0.058
Mother has a professional degree 0.395 *** 0.135
Mother has a master's degree 0.723 *** 0.085
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.699 *** 0.160
Father has a high school diploma 0.236 *** 0.039
Father has a college certificate 0.308 *** 0.038
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.447 *** 0.046
Father has a professional degree 0.580 *** 0.080
Father has a master's degree 0.481 *** 0.074
Father has an earned doctorate 0.715 *** 0.114
Parental income (thousands) 0.002 *** 0.000
Parental income (thousands)
2 
0.000 *** 0.000
One parent is an immigrant 0.036 0.043
Both parents are immigrants -0.017 0.040
Prince-Edward-Island -0.130 ** 0.063
Nova Scotia -0.093 * 0.048
New Brunswick -0.250 *** 0.045
Québec 0.121 ** 0.051
Ontario -0.034 0.051
Manitoba 0.029 0.055
Saskatchewan 0.077 0.061
Alberta 0.197 *** 0.056
British Columbia 0.074 0.055
Intercept -7.787 *** 1.105
Adjusted R
2 
0.166
N 15,555
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Table A2.9.1a: IV regressions of standardized reading score on the number of children and
other controls - parental income added 
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample
consists of youth with two opposite sex parents in the home (mother is biological), who are not
part of a multiple birth, and the family has had at least two births (the first being a singleton).
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b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Number of children -0.041 *** 0.012 -0.010 ** 0.005 -0.144 *** 0.028 -0.111 ** 0.049
Child's birth order 0.015 ** 0.007 0.005 * 0.003 -0.004 0.016 -0.028 0.027
Child's age (months/12) -0.003 0.008 0.007 * 0.004 0.011 0.013 -0.034 0.024
Child is a female -0.013 ** 0.006 -0.005 0.003 -0.032 *** 0.007 0.014 0.010
Child is an immigrant -0.016 0.016 0.000 0.007 -0.027 0.021 -0.097 *** 0.026
Mother's age (years in integers) -0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.005 0.007 0.013 0.037 * 0.020
Mother's age
2
 (years in integers) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 * 0.000
Father's age (years in integers) -0.008 0.009 -0.013 ** 0.007 0.017 ** 0.007 -0.003 0.014
Father's age
2
 (years in integers) 0.000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mother has a high school diploma 0.030 *** 0.010 0.009 * 0.006 0.044 *** 0.014 0.115 *** 0.024
Mother has a college certificate 0.036 *** 0.013 0.013 * 0.008 0.050 *** 0.014 0.161 *** 0.023
Mother has a bachelor's degree 0.052 *** 0.015 0.014 * 0.007 0.085 *** 0.017 0.167 *** 0.027
Mother has a professional degree 0.042 * 0.022 0.020 * 0.012 0.104 ** 0.048 0.277 *** 0.057
Mother has a master's degree 0.059 ** 0.027 0.014 0.011 0.099 *** 0.029 0.198 *** 0.037
Mother has an earned doctorate 0.200 *** 0.073 0.021 0.028 0.142 * 0.080 0.186 ** 0.080
Father has a high school diploma 0.016 *** 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.067 *** 0.011 0.053 *** 0.020
Father has a college certificate 0.024 *** 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.109 *** 0.013 0.075 *** 0.022
Father has a bachelor's degree 0.048 *** 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.162 *** 0.014 0.104 *** 0.026
Father has a professional degree 0.088 *** 0.029 0.016 0.011 0.171 *** 0.032 0.144 *** 0.038
Father has a master's degree 0.093 *** 0.024 0.014 * 0.008 0.217 *** 0.025 0.126 *** 0.031
Father has an earned doctorate 0.122 *** 0.045 0.018 0.012 0.207 *** 0.040 0.095 0.059
Parental income (thousands) 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.002 *** 0.000
Parental income (thousands)
2 
0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000
One parent is an immigrant 0.034 *** 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.060 *** 0.014 0.014 0.020
Both parents are immigrants 0.042 ** 0.017 0.028 * 0.015 0.064 *** 0.013 0.030 0.019
Prince-Edward-Island 0.019 *** 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.040 *** 0.015 0.022 0.029
Nova Scotia -0.006 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.072 *** 0.013 0.023 0.022
New Brunswick -0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.029 ** 0.013 0.011 0.021
Québec 0.168 *** 0.036 0.048 ** 0.020 0.046 *** 0.012 -0.129 *** 0.023
Ontario -0.005 0.012 -0.011 ** 0.005 0.148 *** 0.013 0.097 *** 0.023
Manitoba 0.067 *** 0.021 0.016 0.013 0.081 *** 0.015 0.102 *** 0.025
Saskatchewan 0.029 *** 0.011 0.007 0.007 0.098 *** 0.015 0.110 *** 0.025
Alberta 0.002 0.015 -0.005 * 0.003 0.110 *** 0.013 0.086 *** 0.026
British Columbia 0.060 ** 0.028 0.005 0.013 0.130 *** 0.016 0.049 * 0.025
Intercept 0.379 * 0.224 0.219 * 0.132 -0.219 0.364 0.371 0.610
Adjusted R
2 
0.089 0.043 0.225 0.100
N 15,555 15,555 15,555 15,555
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Table A2.9.1b: IV regressions of parental investments on the number of children and other controls - parental income added 
Parents have saved 
money for PSE
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of youth with two
opposite sex parents in the home (mother is biological), who are not part of a multiple birth, and the family has had at least two
births (the first being a singleton).
Attends a private 
school
Attends a private, 
non-sectarian school
Computers per child



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In the census data used for the parental labour supply analysis in Chapter 3, the 
number of hours spent on childcare and housework is categorical: none, less than 5 
hours, 5 to 14 hours, 15 to 29 hours, 30 to 59 hours, and 60 hours or more. In order to 
facilitate comparisons with the paid work results, I imputed continuous values for the 
measures of unpaid work. 
 
For bounded categories, I simply assumed a symmetric distribution and took the 
midpoint. For the (unbounded) upper category, I simply coded all values to 60 hours 
since few people spend more than 60 hours per week in any activity. Since this 
imputation approach is somewhat arbitrary, I verified its impact with Statistics 
Canada’s 2005 General Social Survey (GSS), Cycle 16, which focused on the time 
use of Canadians. This survey contains continuous variables measuring the number of 
minutes per day spent on childcare and housework (among other activities). To match 
the working sample in this study as closely as possible, I selected male-female 
married or common-law couples with at least two children. I then replicated the 
imputation approach described above. The patterns of actual and imputed hours per 
week in each activity by the number of children are quite similar, indicating that the 
imputation error is minimal. For women, average actual and imputed hours per week 
of childcare were 15.6 and 15.8, respectively. In terms of housework, average actual 
and imputed hours per week were 27.5 and 27.9, respectively. For men, average 
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actual and imputed hours per week of childcare were 7.3 and 7.5, respectively. For 
housework, the corresponding numbers were both 14.4. 
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The same sex IV is used in the parental labour supply analysis in Chapter 3, but not in 
the child quality analysis in Chapter 2. The reason is that the sex composition of 
children may influence child quality in a direct manner, according to several previous 
studies. One could make the same argument with parental labour supply since parents 
may have a preference to spend time withsame or opposite sex children. To 
investigate this hypothesis, I examined parental work patterns among couples by the 
sex composition of the first two. Since the sex composition is related to the number of 
children, which may in turn influence labour supply (Angrist and Evans, 1998), it is 
important to take this into consideration in this exercise. The approach I adopt is to 
examine couples with two singleton children, but had the second child not too long 
before the Census reference week (so that the couple likely wouldn’t have enough 
time to conceive a third child), but long enough for the mother to return to market 
work if that path is chosen. In Canada, maternity and parental benefits expire after one 
year. As a result, I consider couples whose second child was born in 2005 (the year 
prior to the Census), but at least one full year prior to the Census reference week (i.e. 
between January 2005 and May 2005). 
 
The results are shown below in Table A3.2.1 for mothers and in Table A3.2.2 for 
fathers. In all cases, the same sex coefficient is not statistically significant. In fact, the 
t-ratio is always well below 1 in absolute value. This is consistent with the notion that 
the same sex IV does not exert an independent influence on parental work patterns. 
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Table A3.2.1: OLS regressions of maternal work hours on the same sex and other controls
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Same sex -0.260 0.455 -0.134 0.423 0.275 0.478
Mother's age 2.110 *** 0.468 -0.258 0.442 -0.614 0.498
Mother's age
2 
-0.029 *** 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.012 0.008
Father's age 0.140 0.218 -0.122 0.199 -0.203 0.216
Father's age
2 
-0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003
Mother has a high school diploma 2.800 *** 0.976 1.527 0.956 -1.224 1.083
Mother has a college certificate 7.003 *** 0.958 0.452 0.930 -2.960 *** 1.045
Mother has a bachelor's degree 8.959 *** 1.076 0.046 1.024 -3.973 *** 1.151
Mother has a professional degree 11.472 *** 1.384 -1.844 1.347 -6.178 *** 1.458
Mother has a master's degree 20.467 *** 2.763 -5.323 * 2.805 -10.782 *** 2.529
Mother has an earned doctorate 14.496 *** 2.648 -3.506 2.973 -11.306 *** 2.561
Father has a high school diploma 0.638 0.911 1.126 0.825 -0.896 0.981
Father has a college certificate -0.366 0.863 0.092 0.785 -1.559 * 0.921
Father has a bachelor's degree -3.422 *** 1.008 1.138 0.898 -1.682 1.054
Father has a professional degree -7.264 *** 1.214 1.443 1.172 0.394 1.326
Father has a master's degree -7.962 *** 2.649 3.695 2.531 5.660 * 2.953
Father has an earned doctorate -6.253 *** 1.887 0.057 2.178 0.378 2.358
Mother is black -4.102 * 2.275 -4.859 * 2.597 1.041 2.385
Mother is Asian -4.641 *** 1.345 -3.834 *** 1.332 1.497 1.467
Mother is Arab -1.486 4.312 1.007 3.251 6.195 * 3.416
Mother is Latino -4.965 ** 2.373 1.367 2.198 1.828 2.871
Mother is Aboriginal -0.201 1.505 0.270 1.201 1.023 1.490
Mother is other non-white -9.548 *** 3.199 -1.420 3.088 2.712 3.491
Father is black 4.504 ** 2.136 -2.810 2.337 -1.454 2.311
Father is Asian 0.599 1.359 -4.200 *** 1.356 -1.676 1.490
Father is Arab -8.404 ** 4.071 -4.405 3.264 -3.953 3.420
Father is Latino -0.921 2.686 -7.990 *** 2.883 0.491 3.249
Father is Aboriginal 0.587 1.471 1.089 1.218 3.549 ** 1.498
Father is other non-white 0.296 3.879 1.208 3.010 1.561 3.282
Local unemployment rate (women, 25 to 54) -12.103 10.653 15.431 9.177 12.959 9.953
Local unemployment rate (men, 25 to 54) -3.146 7.230 -21.568 7.132 -23.752 7.951
Intercept -22.162 *** 7.263 57.690 *** 6.947 45.478 *** 8.040
Adjusted R
2 
0.052 0.037 0.011
N 8,729 8,729 8,729
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of married or
common-law couples with two singleton children, the second of which was born between January 2005 and May 2005.
Hours per week of 
paid work
Hours per week of 
childcare
Hours per week of 
housework
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Table A3.2.2: OLS regressions of paternal work hours on the same sex IV and other controls
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Same sex 0.275 0.478 -0.075 0.455 -0.109 0.473
Mother's age -0.614 0.498 0.582 0.463 0.421 0.492
Mother's age
2 
0.012 0.008 -0.008 0.007 -0.007 0.007
Father's age -0.203 0.216 -0.412 * 0.221 0.084 0.217
Father's age
2 
0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003
Mother has a high school diploma -1.224 1.083 0.778 1.110 0.864 1.048
Mother has a college certificate -2.960 *** 1.045 1.828 * 1.047 1.018 1.019
Mother has a bachelor's degree -3.973 *** 1.151 0.300 1.116 3.433 *** 1.118
Mother has a professional degree -6.178 *** 1.458 1.468 1.312 3.005 ** 1.431
Mother has a master's degree -10.782 *** 2.529 -4.041 2.544 8.320 *** 2.795
Mother has an earned doctorate -11.306 *** 2.561 -0.425 2.269 5.073 * 2.736
Father has a high school diploma -0.896 0.981 3.580 *** 0.945 -0.049 0.981
Father has a college certificate -1.559 * 0.921 3.735 *** 0.912 -0.620 0.923
Father has a bachelor's degree -1.682 1.054 3.583 *** 0.963 -0.574 1.048
Father has a professional degree 0.394 1.326 3.417 *** 1.183 -2.610 ** 1.246
Father has a master's degree 5.660 * 2.953 13.608 *** 2.060 -7.987 *** 2.380
Father has an earned doctorate 0.378 2.358 5.173 ** 2.046 -2.126 1.950
Mother is black 1.041 2.385 0.845 2.201 -4.332 * 2.457
Mother is Asian 1.497 1.467 -1.593 1.492 -2.537 * 1.415
Mother is Arab 6.195 * 3.416 -3.711 3.044 1.543 3.757
Mother is Latino 1.828 2.871 1.641 2.281 -0.192 2.504
Mother is Aboriginal 1.023 1.490 -2.727 1.669 2.829 * 1.651
Mother is other non-white 2.712 3.491 -3.248 3.893 -5.089 3.653
Father is black -1.454 2.311 -5.798 ** 2.393 3.230 2.321
Father is Asian -1.676 1.490 -3.485 ** 1.512 -5.186 *** 1.413
Father is Arab -3.953 3.420 -3.344 2.924 -8.015 ** 3.614
Father is Latino 0.491 3.249 -5.201 * 2.657 -6.575 ** 2.585
Father is Aboriginal 3.549 ** 1.498 -5.485 *** 1.779 5.911 *** 1.686
Father is other non-white 1.561 3.282 -2.400 2.652 -0.503 4.077
Local unemployment rate (women, 25 to 54) 12.959 9.953 17.286 11.468 4.660 10.711
Local unemployment rate (men, 25 to 54) -23.752 7.951 -71.767 9.503 6.647 7.930
Intercept 45.478 *** 8.040 40.848 *** 7.613 20.042 *** 7.711
Adjusted R
2 
0.052 0.033 0.012
N 8,729 8,729 8,729
Source: Census of Population, 2006.
Hours per week of 
paid work
Hours per week of 
childcare
Hours per week of 
housework
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of married or
common-law couples with two singleton children, the second of which was born between January 2005 and May 2005.
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For decades, regression discontinuity (RD) estimators were the domain of 
psychologists (e.g. Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960). Only recently have they 
garnered attention in the economics literature. Relatively more attention has been paid 
by labour economists, who generally demonstrate a keen interest in estimating causal 
relationships. This appendix summarizes the major features of RD estimators. Imbens 
and Lemieux (2008) provide a more detailed description. 
 
The idea behind an RD estimator is that the treatment status is influenced in some 
way by the value of some assignment variable. In particular, the influence of the 
assignment variable on the treatment status must change very suddenly at a fixed cut-
off point. The argument supporting the causal nature of the treatment effect relates to 
the fact that, around the discontinuity and in absence of the treatment, subjects are 
very similar.  
 
If the treatment value is a deterministic function of the assignment variable, we have a 
‘sharp’ discontinuity in the treatment status. A more succinct way of describing a 
sharp discontinuity is as follows: 
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where a is the assignment variable, a0 is the cut-off, and TREAT is the treatment. Note 
that TREAT is a binary variable here, but it can also take on other values. 
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In reality, discontinuities are often ‘fuzzy’, meaning that the probability or expected 
value of the treatment is a function of some variable with a break at the cut-off, or: 
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where f1(a0) ≠ f0(a0). 
 
A potential source of bias in RD estimation is manipulation effects. This refers to 
subjects changing their characteristics slightly in order to qualify for a program. The 
presence of manipulation effects can usually be tested by comparing the distributions 
around the threshold when the program is in effect compared to when it is not in 
effect. Even with manipulation effects, it is still possible to infer causality from RD. 
Under very weak assumptions, Lee (2008) concludes that the localized random 
assignment into the treatment can still occur as long as agents do not have the ability 
to sort precisely around the threshold (i.e. near the threshold, individual characteristics 
are independent of the treatment status, and the threshold status follows some 
continuous probability distribution, and thus, it is based on luck). 
 
Discontinuities usually result from policy. However, they are rare events. The reason 
is that they make for policies that may be less than ideal from a public perception 
point of view. For example, consider a child benefit that is geared towards low-
income families. Suppose that benefits fall from a substantial amount to zero when 
family income crosses a specific threshold. Is it also the case that the needs of families 
 318
are very different around that threshold? If the answer is no, then policy makers may 
prefer to gradually ‘phase-out’ the benefit as income rises. 
 
In certain situations, however, discontinuities may occur naturally. Take, for example, 
the literature on union wage premiums. Since employees in workplaces that choose to 
be unionized may be quite different than those that choose otherwise, results from 
OLS are likely to be biased due to unobserved heterogeneity. One way to estimate the 
causal relationship is to examine union certification voting patterns. If a critical 
threshold is applied (say 50% + 1 vote), then an RD design may be possible (as long 
as there are enough cases near the discontinuity). 
 
An issue arises when a policy-induced discontinuity is studied, but a naturally 
occurring discontinuity would happen in the absence of the program. A robustness 
test that addresses this concern is to re-estimate the RD in a period or jurisdiction 
when or where the program was not in effect. If we obtain the same results, this is 
evidence of a naturally occurring discontinuity. This approach is termed a 
‘falsification test’.  
 
In Chapter 4, I use RD (in an IV framework) to study the impact of an additional 
school grade on academic performance, where the school grade is instrumented with a 
binary variable indicating birth before or after a school entry cut-off date.  
 
I also apply RD in Chapter 5, where I examine the introduction of a program 
consisting of replacing government sponsored student loans with non-repayable 
grants, based on parental income and a specific threshold for eligibility.  
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The nature of the discontinuity is not the same in each chapter. In Chapter 4, students 
are assigned to a school grade based on their age. Evidence is shown to suggest that 
parents do not manipulate birthdays to alter the treatment status; however, the 
discontinuity is still fuzzy since the assigned grade need not match the actual grade. In 
Chapter 5, the treatment is grant eligibility, which is determined by parental income. 
Thus, the discontinuity is sharp in this case. Note the difference in the treatments: in 
Chapter 4, it is actual grade (not grade eligibility, or assigned grade), while in Chapter 
5, it is eligibility for a grant, as opposed to obtaining a grant. The treatment is based 
on eligibility in Chapter 5 because of the research question, which asks “What is the 
impact of introducing a grant on PSE attendance?” By design, we cannot ask “What is 
the impact of obtaining a grant on PSE attendance?” since all grant recipients have 
necessarily attended PSE. 
 
For estimation purposes, RD is quite straightforward. In the case of a sharp 
discontinuity, the idea is to estimate the impact of the treatment variable (TREAT) on 
some outcome Y, while accounting for some function of the assignment variable, δ(a), 
as shown below: 
 
iaaiaiia aXTREATYA µδββ +++= )( )3.1.4( 10 ,  
 
where TREAT=1 if a is above or below a certain threshold, and 0 otherwise. The form 
of δ(a) is obviously very important. Data permitting, this should be estimated with as 
much flexibility as possible.  
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In the case of a fuzzy discontinuity, the treatment variable is not determined perfectly 
by a discontinuity. Thus, we must instrument the treatment with a variable indicating 
the discontinuity (i.e. above or below a threshold).  
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Table A4.2.1a: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - High schools only 
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade initially assigned 0.396 *** 0.119 0.259 * 0.149 0.255 0.174
Age of the youth -15.948 9.906 -5.483 12.935 -23.070 14.281
Age of the youth
2 
0.512 0.316 0.180 0.414 0.745 0.457
Second born -0.135 *** 0.039 -0.077 * 0.045 -0.105 * 0.056
Third born -0.207 *** 0.061 -0.055 0.093 -0.260 *** 0.084
Fourth born -0.093 0.115 -0.077 0.182 -0.370 *** 0.135
Fifth born -0.307 0.423 0.727 ** 0.357 -0.707 0.911
Sixth born -0.480 0.985 -1.131 ** 0.565 0.518 * 0.269
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth -0.002 0.033 0.033 0.049 0.004 0.037
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.181 *** 0.028 0.231 *** 0.051 0.207 *** 0.051
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.397 *** 0.045 0.314 *** 0.071 0.337 *** 0.073
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.520 *** 0.051 0.533 *** 0.118 0.364 *** 0.109
Equivalent total parental income 0.046 *** 0.010 0.044 * 0.024 0.054 ** 0.024
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.139 ** 0.059 -0.112 0.080 -0.141 0.111
Two birth parents present -0.054 0.037 0.046 0.057 -0.108 0.072
Female 0.307 *** 0.028 -0.162 *** 0.039 -0.045 0.049
Related course 0.536 *** 0.139 0.462 *** 0.165 0.602 *** 0.138
Québec 0.336 *** 0.038 0.596 *** 0.059 0.371 *** 0.048
Intercept 119.078 76.670 37.320 99.624 174.774 110.605
Adjusted R
2 
0.208 0.169 0.128
N 4,857 2,713 2,668
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Reading Mathematics Science
Note: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). 
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Table A4.2.1b: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - High school only, reading sub-components
Retrieving Interpreting
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade initially assigned 0.252 * 0.132 0.480 *** 0.144 0.216 * 0.117
Age of the youth -7.777 10.157 -18.596 * 11.187 -8.497 9.728
Age of the youth
2 
0.252 0.325 0.592 * 0.358 0.276 0.311
Second born -0.126 *** 0.040 -0.127 *** 0.037 -0.078 * 0.043
Third born -0.157 ** 0.064 -0.177 ** 0.071 -0.196 *** 0.073
Fourth born 0.046 0.124 -0.176 0.122 -0.003 0.109
Fifth born -0.143 0.502 0.041 0.314 -1.330 0.883
Sixth born -0.522 0.817 -0.538 0.594 -0.366 1.137
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.014 0.027 -0.022 0.037 -0.015 0.041
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.149 *** 0.038 0.165 *** 0.027 0.137 *** 0.032
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.300 *** 0.054 0.364 *** 0.046 0.320 *** 0.045
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.499 *** 0.069 0.523 *** 0.058 0.323 *** 0.060
Equivalent total parental income 0.038 ** 0.015 0.041 *** 0.011 0.042 *** 0.012
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 0.001
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.117 0.075 -0.109 * 0.060 -0.180 *** 0.055
Two birth parents present -0.038 0.042 -0.075 * 0.041 -0.021 0.042
Female 0.122 *** 0.034 0.247 *** 0.029 0.396 *** 0.028
Related course 0.458 *** 0.137 0.482 *** 0.139 0.436 *** 0.137
Québec 0.269 *** 0.047 0.374 *** 0.041 0.169 *** 0.041
Intercept 56.229 78.467 140.645 86.537 62.598 75.286
Adjusted R
2 
0.118 0.190 0.136
N 4,857 4,857 4,857
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Reflecting
Note: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 323

-%$#

Figure A.4.3.1: Retrieving scores by date of birth
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Note: The sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade  
of the usual one for their age. 
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A. 
 
 
Figure A.4.3.2: Interpreting scores by date of birth
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Note: The sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade  
of the usual one for their age. 
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A. 
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Figure A.4.3.3: Reflecting scores by date of birth
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Note: The sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade  
of the usual one for their age. 
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A. 
 
 
Figure A.4.3.4: Mathematics scores by date of birth
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Note: The sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade  
of the usual one for their age. 
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A. 
 
 
 325
Figure A.4.3.5: Science scores by date of birth
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Note: The sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade  
of the usual one for their age. 
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A. 

Figure A.4.3.6: Reading scores by date of birth, no 
smoothing - Québec/Nova Scotia
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Note: The sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade  
of the usual one for their age. 
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A. 
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Figure A.4.3.7: Reading scores by date of birth, no 
smoothing - Rest of Canada
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Note: The sample consists of youth born in Canada who were within one grade  
of the usual one for their age. 
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A. 
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Table A4.4.1: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - No age controls
Reading Mathematics Science
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.325 *** 0.045 0.279 *** 0.049 0.298 *** 0.047 0.253 *** 0.045 0.327 *** 0.047 0.238 *** 0.062
Second born -0.127 *** 0.039 -0.121 *** 0.040 -0.110 *** 0.038 -0.087 ** 0.041 -0.061 0.046 -0.102 ** 0.051
Third born -0.218 *** 0.063 -0.168 *** 0.060 -0.178 *** 0.068 -0.210 *** 0.069 -0.076 0.088 -0.239 *** 0.080
Fourth born -0.087 0.117 0.028 0.118 -0.134 0.121 -0.049 0.108 -0.045 0.170 -0.348 *** 0.130
Fifth born -0.637 0.421 -0.474 0.501 -0.294 0.372 -1.322 ** 0.665 0.769 ** 0.378 -0.915 0.697
Sixth born -0.456 0.989 -0.496 0.832 -0.490 0.580 -0.384 1.154 -1.127 ** 0.561 0.589 ** 0.299
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.009 0.033 0.021 0.027 -0.009 0.036 -0.006 0.040 0.031 0.045 0.008 0.034
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.192 *** 0.027 0.158 *** 0.035 0.175 *** 0.026 0.145 *** 0.030 0.223 *** 0.051 0.210 *** 0.048
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.414 *** 0.042 0.306 *** 0.046 0.391 *** 0.040 0.322 *** 0.040 0.292 *** 0.072 0.324 *** 0.071
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.537 *** 0.049 0.501 *** 0.063 0.544 *** 0.054 0.336 *** 0.054 0.504 *** 0.118 0.361 *** 0.100
Equivalent total parental income 0.051 *** 0.011 0.039 *** 0.013 0.048 *** 0.011 0.042 *** 0.011 0.048 ** 0.022 0.059 ** 0.025
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 * 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.174 *** 0.057 -0.135 ** 0.068 -0.146 ** 0.057 -0.206 *** 0.050 -0.117 0.072 -0.154 0.102
Two birth parents present -0.053 0.038 -0.032 0.040 -0.076 * 0.039 -0.024 0.040 0.020 0.053 -0.118 * 0.069
Female 0.316 *** 0.029 0.132 *** 0.032 0.261 *** 0.029 0.393 *** 0.027 -0.168 *** 0.038 -0.034 0.045
Related course 0.545 *** 0.139 0.456 *** 0.140 0.502 *** 0.132 0.436 *** 0.125 0.461 *** 0.155 0.612 *** 0.115
Québec 0.356 *** 0.038 0.303 *** 0.040 0.382 *** 0.034 0.179 *** 0.036 0.630 *** 0.052 0.412 *** 0.044
Intercept -4.699 *** 0.838 -4.248 *** 0.759 -3.928 *** 0.879 -3.388 *** 0.999 -5.062 *** 1.046 -3.754 *** 0.907
Adjusted R
2 
0.214 0.138 0.180 0.155 0.202 0.142
N 5,507 5,507 5,507 5,507 3,074 3,025
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Retrieving sub-
component
Interpreting sub-
component
Reflecting sub-
component
Note: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). 
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Table A4.4.2: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Linear age specification
Reading Mathematics Science
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.309 *** 0.074 0.236 *** 0.086 0.360 *** 0.073 0.194 *** 0.070 0.249 *** 0.082 0.141 0.104
Age of the youth 0.029 0.100 0.075 0.108 -0.111 0.091 0.104 0.103 0.136 0.119 0.173 0.140
Second born -0.127 *** 0.039 -0.121 *** 0.040 -0.110 *** 0.038 -0.086 ** 0.041 -0.060 0.046 -0.101 ** 0.051
Third born -0.218 *** 0.063 -0.167 *** 0.060 -0.179 *** 0.067 -0.209 *** 0.069 -0.076 0.089 -0.239 *** 0.081
Fourth born -0.088 0.117 0.027 0.118 -0.132 0.120 -0.050 0.107 -0.049 0.172 -0.356 *** 0.132
Fifth born -0.640 0.421 -0.484 0.501 -0.281 0.360 -1.335 ** 0.652 0.765 ** 0.377 -0.939 0.678
Sixth born -0.453 0.985 -0.489 0.821 -0.501 0.598 -0.374 1.139 -1.085 ** 0.543 0.561 * 0.288
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.009 0.033 0.022 0.027 -0.011 0.035 -0.005 0.040 0.031 0.046 0.012 0.034
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.193 *** 0.028 0.161 *** 0.036 0.171 *** 0.026 0.150 *** 0.031 0.228 *** 0.052 0.220 *** 0.048
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.416 *** 0.043 0.312 *** 0.048 0.382 *** 0.040 0.330 *** 0.042 0.303 *** 0.073 0.338 *** 0.071
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.540 *** 0.050 0.509 *** 0.066 0.533 *** 0.054 0.347 *** 0.055 0.519 *** 0.120 0.383 *** 0.102
Equivalent total parental income 0.051 *** 0.010 0.040 *** 0.013 0.046 *** 0.011 0.044 *** 0.011 0.051 ** 0.023 0.060 ** 0.025
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 * 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.176 *** 0.057 -0.139 ** 0.067 -0.141 ** 0.056 -0.211 *** 0.052 -0.126 * 0.074 -0.163 0.104
Two birth parents present -0.053 0.038 -0.031 0.040 -0.076 ** 0.039 -0.023 0.040 0.019 0.054 -0.114 * 0.069
Female 0.317 *** 0.029 0.135 *** 0.033 0.257 *** 0.029 0.397 *** 0.027 -0.161 *** 0.038 -0.029 0.046
Related course 0.546 *** 0.139 0.458 *** 0.141 0.500 *** 0.130 0.438 *** 0.127 0.462 *** 0.159 0.641 *** 0.125
Québec 0.355 *** 0.038 0.300 *** 0.040 0.387 *** 0.034 0.175 *** 0.036 0.625 *** 0.052 0.405 *** 0.045
Intercept -4.995 *** 1.349 -5.031 *** 1.291 -2.778 ** 1.298 -4.463 *** 1.452 -6.418 *** 1.683 -5.618 *** 1.803
Adjusted R
2 
0.211 0.131 0.191 0.144 0.187 0.127
N 5,507 5,507 5,507 5,507 3,074 3,025
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Retrieving sub-
component
Interpreting sub-
component
Reflecting sub-
component
Note: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). 
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Table A4.4.3: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Quadratic age specification
Reading Mathematics Science
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.419 *** 0.119 0.292 ** 0.117 0.480 *** 0.129 0.249 ** 0.108 0.298 ** 0.133 0.265 * 0.151
Age of the youth -14.060 9.906 -7.115 9.760 -15.392 10.810 -6.964 9.452 -5.863 12.141 -16.737 13.748
Age of the youth
2 
0.451 0.316 0.230 0.312 0.489 0.345 0.226 0.302 0.192 0.388 0.541 0.440
Second born -0.127 *** 0.039 -0.121 *** 0.040 -0.111 *** 0.038 -0.086 ** 0.041 -0.060 0.046 -0.102 ** 0.051
Third born -0.218 *** 0.061 -0.167 *** 0.060 -0.179 *** 0.067 -0.209 *** 0.069 -0.077 0.089 -0.236 *** 0.080
Fourth born -0.101 0.115 0.021 0.116 -0.146 0.121 -0.057 0.105 -0.053 0.172 -0.363 *** 0.131
Fifth born -0.585 0.423 -0.456 0.503 -0.222 0.358 -1.307 * 0.672 0.772 ** 0.380 -0.869 0.720
Sixth born -0.455 0.985 -0.490 0.821 -0.504 0.598 -0.375 1.139 -1.088 ** 0.544 0.561 * 0.287
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.006 0.033 0.020 0.027 -0.014 0.036 -0.006 0.040 0.030 0.046 0.006 0.036
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.184 *** 0.028 0.156 *** 0.036 0.161 *** 0.026 0.145 *** 0.030 0.224 *** 0.051 0.206 *** 0.048
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.402 *** 0.045 0.304 *** 0.051 0.366 *** 0.043 0.323 *** 0.043 0.298 *** 0.074 0.318 *** 0.074
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.523 *** 0.051 0.500 *** 0.067 0.514 *** 0.055 0.338 *** 0.057 0.510 *** 0.120 0.362 *** 0.104
Equivalent total parental income 0.048 *** 0.010 0.039 *** 0.013 0.043 *** 0.010 0.043 *** 0.011 0.049 ** 0.024 0.059 ** 0.024
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 * 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.165 *** 0.059 -0.134 * 0.070 -0.129 ** 0.057 -0.206 *** 0.053 -0.121 0.074 -0.149 0.106
Two birth parents present -0.053 0.037 -0.031 0.040 -0.077 ** 0.038 -0.023 0.040 0.020 0.053 -0.116 * 0.069
Female 0.309 *** 0.028 0.131 *** 0.033 0.248 *** 0.028 0.393 *** 0.028 -0.166 *** 0.039 -0.038 0.047
Related course 0.536 *** 0.139 0.453 *** 0.141 0.489 *** 0.130 0.433 *** 0.127 0.457 *** 0.157 0.606 *** 0.127
Québec 0.362 *** 0.038 0.303 *** 0.041 0.395 *** 0.034 0.178 *** 0.037 0.628 *** 0.053 0.412 *** 0.044
Intercept 104.058 76.670 50.626 75.486 115.506 83.740 50.246 73.177 40.001 93.623 125.323 106.617
Adjusted R
2 
0.231 0.141 0.207 0.154 0.196 0.147
N 5,507 5,507 5,507 5,507 3,074 3,025
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Retrieving sub-
component
Interpreting sub-
component
Reflecting sub-
component
Note: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). 
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Table A4.4.4: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Cubic age specification
Reading Mathematics Science
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.422 *** 0.120 0.294 ** 0.119 0.488 *** 0.130 0.251 ** 0.108 0.311 ** 0.133 0.294 * 0.157
Age of the youth -9.161 22.693 -4.352 22.443 -2.961 26.229 -3.421 28.021 16.663 37.899 30.597 37.509
Age of the youth
2 
0.119 1.434 0.043 1.458 -0.352 1.641 -0.014 1.808 -1.330 2.434 -2.666 2.462
Age of the youth
3
0.007 0.032 0.004 0.033 0.019 0.036 0.005 0.040 0.034 0.053 0.072 0.056
Second born -0.127 *** 0.039 -0.121 *** 0.040 -0.111 *** 0.038 -0.086 ** 0.041 -0.061 0.045 -0.102 ** 0.051
Third born -0.218 *** 0.061 -0.167 *** 0.060 -0.179 *** 0.066 -0.209 *** 0.069 -0.076 0.088 -0.237 *** 0.079
Fourth born -0.101 0.115 0.021 0.116 -0.147 0.122 -0.057 0.105 -0.053 0.173 -0.359 *** 0.130
Fifth born -0.587 0.423 -0.456 0.503 -0.225 0.356 -1.308 * 0.674 0.768 ** 0.378 -0.879 0.718
Sixth born -0.456 0.989 -0.490 0.822 -0.505 0.607 -0.376 1.142 -1.111 ** 0.554 0.611 * 0.313
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.006 0.033 0.020 0.027 -0.014 0.036 -0.006 0.039 0.030 0.045 0.006 0.036
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.184 *** 0.028 0.156 *** 0.036 0.161 *** 0.026 0.145 *** 0.030 0.223 *** 0.051 0.204 *** 0.048
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.402 *** 0.045 0.304 *** 0.051 0.366 *** 0.043 0.323 *** 0.043 0.298 *** 0.074 0.316 *** 0.074
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.522 *** 0.050 0.500 *** 0.067 0.512 *** 0.054 0.337 *** 0.056 0.506 *** 0.119 0.352 *** 0.103
Equivalent total parental income 0.048 *** 0.010 0.039 *** 0.013 0.043 *** 0.011 0.043 *** 0.011 0.049 ** 0.024 0.058 ** 0.024
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 * 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.165 *** 0.059 -0.134 * 0.070 -0.129 ** 0.057 -0.206 *** 0.053 -0.120 0.074 -0.147 0.106
Two birth parents present -0.054 0.037 -0.031 0.040 -0.077 ** 0.038 -0.023 0.040 0.019 0.053 -0.119 * 0.068
Female 0.308 *** 0.028 0.131 *** 0.032 0.248 *** 0.028 0.393 *** 0.027 -0.167 *** 0.038 -0.041 0.047
Related course 0.536 *** 0.139 0.453 *** 0.141 0.488 *** 0.130 0.433 *** 0.128 0.454 *** 0.155 0.602 *** 0.127
Québec 0.362 *** 0.038 0.303 *** 0.042 0.395 *** 0.034 0.178 *** 0.037 0.628 *** 0.052 0.412 *** 0.044
Intercept 79.990 125.000 37.053 120.874 54.434 144.936 32.838 148.948 -70.892 201.269 -106.958 197.471
Adjusted R
2 
0.232 0.141 0.208 0.154 0.199 0.151
N 5,507 5,507 5,507 5,507 3,074 3,025
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Retrieving sub-
component
Interpreting sub-
component
Reflecting sub-
component
Note: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). 
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Table A4.4.5: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Quartic age specification
Reading Mathematics Science
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.422 *** 0.119 0.295 ** 0.118 0.488 *** 0.130 0.253 ** 0.109 0.310 ** 0.134 0.294 * 0.159
Age of the youth -9.340 22.895 -4.451 22.765 -3.110 27.078 -3.516 28.254 16.966 38.284 34.036 40.504
Age of the youth
2 
0.127 10.258 0.263 11.424 -0.005 18.308 0.316 14.473 -0.290 18.435 0.000 14.920
Age of the youth
3
0.008 0.861 -0.014 0.981 -0.010 1.542 -0.023 1.232 -0.056 1.558 -0.172 1.224
Age of the youth
4 
0.000 0.021 0.000 0.024 0.001 0.037 0.001 0.030 0.002 0.038 0.006 0.029
Second born -0.127 *** 0.039 -0.121 *** 0.040 -0.111 *** 0.038 -0.086 ** 0.041 -0.061 0.045 -0.102 ** 0.051
Third born -0.218 *** 0.062 -0.167 *** 0.060 -0.179 *** 0.067 -0.209 *** 0.069 -0.076 0.089 -0.237 *** 0.079
Fourth born -0.101 0.116 0.020 0.116 -0.147 0.122 -0.057 0.106 -0.053 0.173 -0.358 *** 0.130
Fifth born -0.587 0.421 -0.456 0.503 -0.225 0.353 -1.308 * 0.673 0.769 ** 0.378 -0.883 0.716
Sixth born -0.456 0.988 -0.490 0.823 -0.505 0.607 -0.376 1.144 -1.112 ** 0.555 0.616 * 0.315
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.006 0.033 0.020 0.027 -0.014 0.036 -0.006 0.039 0.030 0.045 0.006 0.036
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.184 *** 0.028 0.156 *** 0.036 0.161 *** 0.026 0.145 *** 0.030 0.223 *** 0.051 0.204 *** 0.048
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.402 *** 0.045 0.304 *** 0.050 0.366 *** 0.043 0.323 *** 0.044 0.298 *** 0.074 0.317 *** 0.074
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.522 *** 0.051 0.499 *** 0.067 0.512 *** 0.054 0.337 *** 0.056 0.506 *** 0.120 0.352 *** 0.103
Equivalent total parental income 0.048 *** 0.010 0.039 *** 0.013 0.043 *** 0.011 0.043 *** 0.011 0.049 ** 0.024 0.058 ** 0.024
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 * 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.165 *** 0.059 -0.133 * 0.070 -0.129 ** 0.057 -0.206 *** 0.053 -0.120 0.074 -0.147 0.106
Two birth parents present -0.054 0.037 -0.031 0.040 -0.077 ** 0.038 -0.023 0.040 0.019 0.053 -0.119 * 0.068
Female 0.308 *** 0.028 0.131 *** 0.032 0.247 *** 0.029 0.393 *** 0.028 -0.168 *** 0.039 -0.041 0.047
Related course 0.536 *** 0.139 0.452 *** 0.141 0.488 *** 0.129 0.433 *** 0.128 0.454 *** 0.155 0.602 *** 0.128
Québec 0.362 *** 0.038 0.303 *** 0.041 0.395 *** 0.034 0.179 *** 0.037 0.628 *** 0.053 0.412 *** 0.044
Intercept 81.017 400.518 29.102 480.337 41.742 699.354 20.506 587.322 -114.870 738.748 -240.118 561.924
Adjusted R
2 
0.232 0.141 0.208 0.155 0.198 0.151
N 5,507 5,507 5,507 5,507 3,074 3,025
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Retrieving sub-
component
Interpreting sub-
component
Reflecting sub-
component
Note: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). 
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Table A4.4.6: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Window of +/- three months
Reading Mathematics Science
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.322 *** 0.057 0.255 *** 0.065 0.332 *** 0.058 0.243 *** 0.053 0.257 *** 0.058 0.206 *** 0.078
Second born -0.183 *** 0.053 -0.181 *** 0.060 -0.170 *** 0.047 -0.107 ** 0.054 -0.098 * 0.055 -0.143 ** 0.062
Third born -0.258 *** 0.094 -0.141 0.098 -0.281 *** 0.097 -0.222 ** 0.096 -0.037 0.106 -0.211 * 0.111
Fourth born -0.202 0.196 -0.104 0.157 -0.158 0.202 -0.243 0.212 0.092 0.275 -0.703 *** 0.268
Fifth born -0.765 * 0.394 -0.613 0.478 -0.417 0.333 -1.424 ** 0.708 -0.949 0.665
Sixth born -1.680 ** 0.831 -1.493 ** 0.738 -1.241 ** 0.616 -1.802 ** 0.892 -1.048 ** 0.522
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.010 0.047 0.026 0.047 -0.004 0.049 0.013 0.045 -0.028 0.048 0.080 0.060
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.209 *** 0.044 0.156 *** 0.057 0.200 *** 0.043 0.159 *** 0.042 0.262 *** 0.066 0.176 *** 0.062
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.391 *** 0.054 0.319 *** 0.064 0.354 *** 0.055 0.282 *** 0.059 0.332 *** 0.098 0.300 *** 0.096
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.517 *** 0.073 0.532 *** 0.080 0.498 *** 0.087 0.267 *** 0.075 0.450 *** 0.143 0.298 ** 0.144
Equivalent total parental income 0.066 *** 0.019 0.044 ** 0.019 0.062 *** 0.019 0.057 *** 0.019 0.078 *** 0.029 0.080 ** 0.035
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 ** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.002
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.170 ** 0.071 -0.130 0.090 -0.148 ** 0.072 -0.190 *** 0.064 -0.220 ** 0.104 -0.192 0.119
Two birth parents present 0.000 0.053 0.010 0.060 -0.031 0.054 0.016 0.057 0.003 0.063 -0.076 0.081
Female 0.306 *** 0.043 0.116 ** 0.045 0.231 *** 0.044 0.438 *** 0.042 -0.111 ** 0.055 -0.021 0.072
Related course 0.377 ** 0.166 0.204 0.148 0.415 ** 0.178 0.307 * 0.166 0.237 0.186 0.690 *** 0.185
Québec 0.356 *** 0.049 0.306 *** 0.051 0.416 *** 0.045 0.143 *** 0.045 0.586 *** 0.059 0.380 *** 0.062
Intercept -4.718 *** 1.141 -4.044 *** 1.153 -4.412 *** 1.193 -3.790 *** 1.145 -2.907 ** 1.235 -5.328 *** 1.364
Adjusted R
2 
0.227 0.144 0.198 0.172 0.207 0.152
N 2,886 2,886 2,886 2,886 1,605 1,590
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Retrieving sub-
component
Interpreting sub-
component
Reflecting sub-
component
Note: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). 
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Table A4.4.7: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade - Window of +/- two months
Reading Mathematics Science
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.377 *** 0.078 0.293 *** 0.081 0.395 *** 0.084 0.255 *** 0.066 0.282 *** 0.081 0.195 * 0.106
Second born -0.152 ** 0.070 -0.151 * 0.077 -0.111 * 0.065 -0.103 0.071 -0.017 0.073 -0.122 0.090
Third born -0.238 ** 0.097 -0.115 0.103 -0.268 *** 0.098 -0.207 * 0.111 -0.015 0.163 -0.194 0.129
Fourth born -0.340 0.218 -0.135 0.215 -0.289 0.212 -0.442 * 0.247 0.048 0.328 -0.331 0.360
Fifth born -0.755 * 0.388 -0.586 0.488 -0.403 0.332 -1.444 ** 0.697 -0.918 0.652
Sixth born -1.712 ** 0.845 -1.527 ** 0.760 -1.248 ** 0.617 -1.812 ** 0.893 -1.030 ** 0.519
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth -0.010 0.054 0.004 0.057 -0.010 0.055 -0.015 0.051 -0.060 0.062 0.072 0.067
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.189 *** 0.058 0.192 ** 0.076 0.172 *** 0.054 0.107 * 0.058 0.191 ** 0.078 0.178 ** 0.073
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.383 *** 0.071 0.349 *** 0.086 0.352 *** 0.066 0.224 *** 0.072 0.260 ** 0.102 0.320 *** 0.120
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.531 *** 0.096 0.658 *** 0.103 0.502 *** 0.123 0.203 ** 0.101 0.549 *** 0.174 0.325 0.205
Equivalent total parental income 0.037 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.030 0.024 0.043 * 0.024 0.094 ** 0.037 0.133 *** 0.042
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.006 ** 0.003
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.179 * 0.095 -0.172 0.119 -0.170 ** 0.085 -0.190 ** 0.086 -0.190 0.140 -0.262 ** 0.130
Two birth parents present -0.006 0.062 -0.004 0.078 -0.059 0.062 0.033 0.065 0.043 0.069 -0.137 0.101
Female 0.350 *** 0.053 0.135 ** 0.053 0.277 *** 0.053 0.490 *** 0.052 -0.095 0.070 0.110 0.089
Related course 0.393 * 0.205 0.190 0.172 0.452 ** 0.220 0.345 0.214 0.270 0.228 0.795 *** 0.202
Québec 0.317 *** 0.058 0.275 *** 0.062 0.399 *** 0.055 0.096 * 0.053 0.499 *** 0.067 0.306 *** 0.072
Intercept -4.678 *** 1.290 -3.784 *** 1.356 -4.822 *** 1.257 -3.209 ** 1.316 -2.299 1.699 -5.295 *** 1.384
Adjusted R
2 
0.238 0.151 0.211 0.177 0.201 0.167
N 1,949 1,949 1,949 1,949 1,067 1,080
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Retrieving sub-
component
Interpreting sub-
component
Reflecting sub-
component
Note: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). 
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Table A4.4.8: IV regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade -  Window of +/- one month
Reading Mathematics Science
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade 0.407 *** 0.088 0.265 *** 0.089 0.493 *** 0.106 0.244 *** 0.080 0.332 *** 0.112 0.212 * 0.128
Second born -0.099 0.083 -0.159 * 0.091 -0.038 0.082 -0.020 0.091 0.052 0.096 -0.201 0.127
Third born -0.245 * 0.147 -0.176 0.136 -0.299 ** 0.140 -0.184 0.171 -0.035 0.279 -0.395 ** 0.195
Fourth born -0.439 0.281 -0.379 0.265 -0.244 0.275 -0.661 ** 0.315 -0.279 0.304 -0.943 *** 0.244
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.009 0.065 0.031 0.066 -0.006 0.066 0.025 0.070 -0.103 0.075 0.038 0.167
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.203 *** 0.077 0.156 * 0.089 0.153 * 0.082 0.190 ** 0.079 0.165 0.106 0.124 0.123
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.467 *** 0.092 0.402 *** 0.123 0.439 *** 0.100 0.346 *** 0.098 0.426 *** 0.157 0.322 * 0.195
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.633 *** 0.116 0.830 *** 0.122 0.635 *** 0.166 0.209 0.128 0.702 *** 0.195 0.326 0.309
Equivalent total parental income 0.075 * 0.038 0.048 0.039 0.028 0.041 0.102 ** 0.042 0.039 0.063 0.187 *** 0.064
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.003 * 0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.005 ** 0.002 0.001 0.005 -0.011 * 0.006
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.145 0.123 -0.117 0.143 -0.119 0.128 -0.174 0.132 -0.126 0.180 -0.230 0.200
Two birth parents present -0.118 0.086 -0.092 0.109 -0.116 0.085 -0.102 0.107 0.150 0.113 -0.154 0.175
Female 0.420 *** 0.071 0.168 ** 0.083 0.348 *** 0.071 0.580 *** 0.065 -0.083 0.094 0.229 * 0.120
Related course 0.341 0.292 0.227 0.297 0.557 * 0.303 0.093 0.250 0.894 *** 0.249 0.527 *** 0.165
Québec 0.354 *** 0.084 0.312 *** 0.092 0.426 *** 0.080 0.136 * 0.080 0.590 *** 0.097 0.254 ** 0.104
Intercept -5.329 *** 1.669 -4.026 ** 1.707 -5.892 *** 1.764 -3.894 ** 1.619 -2.265 1.877 -4.662 3.535
Adjusted R
2 
0.269 0.151 0.255 0.197 0.260 0.172
N 981 981 981 981 557 551
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Retrieving sub-
component
Interpreting sub-
component
Reflecting sub-
component
Note: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). 
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Table A4.4.9: OLS regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade initially assigned - Québec/Nova Scotia
Reading Mathematics Science
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade initially assigned 0.314 *** 0.096 0.219 ** 0.092 0.359 *** 0.104 0.186 ** 0.083 0.213 ** 0.100 0.211 * 0.125
Age of the youth -13.079 10.230 -6.431 9.770 -14.269 11.151 -6.381 9.553 -4.605 12.331 -16.828 14.238
Age of the youth
2 
0.422 0.327 0.210 0.313 0.456 0.357 0.209 0.306 0.154 0.395 0.546 0.456
Second born -0.124 *** 0.042 -0.119 *** 0.041 -0.107 *** 0.040 -0.085 ** 0.043 -0.059 0.047 -0.098 * 0.052
Third born -0.234 *** 0.068 -0.178 *** 0.063 -0.196 *** 0.073 -0.218 *** 0.072 -0.082 0.092 -0.249 *** 0.085
Fourth born -0.087 0.121 0.030 0.125 -0.131 0.122 -0.048 0.109 -0.048 0.178 -0.355 *** 0.135
Fifth born -0.792 * 0.450 -0.600 0.505 -0.458 0.417 -1.430 ** 0.603 0.779 ** 0.384 -1.019 0.654
Sixth born -0.420 0.956 -0.465 0.801 -0.464 0.565 -0.354 1.121 -1.031 ** 0.516 0.552 * 0.285
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.013 0.033 0.026 0.028 -0.005 0.036 -0.002 0.039 0.031 0.048 0.015 0.033
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.215 *** 0.028 0.178 *** 0.036 0.197 *** 0.027 0.164 *** 0.030 0.247 *** 0.053 0.235 *** 0.049
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.453 *** 0.044 0.340 *** 0.048 0.424 *** 0.042 0.353 *** 0.041 0.329 *** 0.073 0.355 *** 0.073
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.596 *** 0.051 0.551 *** 0.064 0.597 *** 0.055 0.381 *** 0.055 0.566 *** 0.118 0.414 *** 0.103
Equivalent total parental income 0.059 *** 0.011 0.046 *** 0.013 0.056 *** 0.011 0.049 *** 0.011 0.058 ** 0.024 0.063 ** 0.025
Equivalent total parental income
2 
-0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 * 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.205 *** 0.060 -0.161 ** 0.070 -0.174 *** 0.058 -0.229 *** 0.051 -0.149 * 0.081 -0.176 * 0.102
Two birth parents present -0.051 0.040 -0.029 0.043 -0.074 * 0.041 -0.022 0.040 0.022 0.058 -0.112 0.070
Female 0.338 *** 0.029 0.151 *** 0.032 0.282 *** 0.029 0.410 *** 0.027 -0.142 *** 0.039 -0.022 0.046
Related course 0.578 *** 0.149 0.482 *** 0.147 0.537 *** 0.140 0.458 *** 0.132 0.487 *** 0.170 0.680 *** 0.121
Québec 0.336 *** 0.040 0.285 *** 0.042 0.365 *** 0.035 0.163 *** 0.037 0.611 *** 0.054 0.398 *** 0.046
Intercept 96.469 79.254 45.336 75.627 106.822 86.450 45.737 74.003 30.372 95.165 125.932 110.403
Adjusted R
2 
0.132 0.079 0.113 0.100 0.128 0.102
N 5,507 5,507 5,507 5,507 5,507 5,507
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Retrieving sub-
component
Interpreting sub-
component
Reflecting sub-
component
Note: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). 
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Table A4.4.10: OLS regressions of standardized test scores on the school grade initially assigned - Rest of Canada
Reading Mathematics Science
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
School grade initially assigned 0.028 0.048 0.072 0.050 0.010 0.050 0.024 0.054 0.020 0.069 0.080 0.066
Age of the youth 0.259 5.379 1.851 6.339 0.358 5.840 -0.015 5.613 -0.587 7.189 -5.944 8.240
Age of the youth
2 
-0.006 0.172 -0.059 0.203 -0.008 0.187 0.003 0.180 0.019 0.230 0.197 0.264
Second born -0.117 *** 0.023 -0.098 *** 0.022 -0.127 *** 0.024 -0.058 ** 0.025 -0.093 *** 0.030 -0.159 *** 0.036
Third born -0.226 *** 0.041 -0.153 *** 0.043 -0.244 *** 0.042 -0.139 *** 0.042 -0.223 *** 0.062 -0.179 *** 0.058
Fourth born -0.129 0.085 -0.200 ** 0.083 -0.099 0.082 -0.084 0.096 -0.066 0.088 0.028 0.136
Fifth born -0.435 0.286 -0.368 0.307 -0.451 * 0.248 -0.272 0.282 -0.472 * 0.247 0.261 0.405
Sixth born -0.406 ** 0.191 -0.053 0.335 -0.142 0.198 -0.934 ** 0.364 0.495 0.362
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth 0.054 *** 0.020 0.054 *** 0.019 0.062 *** 0.019 0.026 0.018 0.103 *** 0.025 0.051 0.034
Age of parent most knowledgeable of youth
2 
0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parent with a non-university PS certificate 0.220 *** 0.028 0.191 *** 0.028 0.213 *** 0.027 0.185 *** 0.030 0.222 *** 0.032 0.225 *** 0.035
Parent with a bachelor's degree 0.522 *** 0.041 0.419 *** 0.036 0.496 *** 0.041 0.460 *** 0.039 0.492 *** 0.046 0.507 *** 0.051
Parent with a graduate or professional degree 0.723 *** 0.045 0.566 *** 0.043 0.708 *** 0.045 0.595 *** 0.044 0.739 *** 0.056 0.600 *** 0.057
Equivalent total parental income 0.026 ** 0.012 0.022 ** 0.011 0.025 ** 0.011 0.024 * 0.012 0.004 0.011 0.056 *** 0.012
Equivalent total parental income
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 *** 0.000
Two parents present, at least one not from birth -0.217 *** 0.041 -0.175 *** 0.043 -0.215 *** 0.043 -0.181 *** 0.041 -0.196 *** 0.058 -0.250 *** 0.056
Two birth parents present 0.006 0.031 0.011 0.031 -0.020 0.031 0.021 0.031 0.032 0.045 -0.017 0.044
Female 0.315 *** 0.022 0.202 *** 0.021 0.275 *** 0.023 0.370 *** 0.024 -0.104 *** 0.029 0.063 ** 0.028
Related course 0.576 *** 0.082 0.568 *** 0.082 0.509 *** 0.073 0.490 *** 0.077 0.415 *** 0.081 0.418 *** 0.074
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.376 *** 0.036 0.340 *** 0.035 0.250 *** 0.040 0.454 *** 0.037 -0.004 0.057 0.269 *** 0.060
Prince-Edward-Island 0.296 *** 0.038 0.277 *** 0.039 0.201 *** 0.038 0.352 *** 0.043 -0.055 0.059 0.058 0.063
New Brunswick - English sector 0.292 *** 0.045 0.252 *** 0.045 0.204 *** 0.045 0.366 *** 0.046 -0.112 ** 0.057 0.046 0.060
Ontario 0.456 *** 0.041 0.390 *** 0.042 0.346 *** 0.042 0.514 *** 0.039 0.045 0.057 0.210 *** 0.059
Manitoba 0.490 *** 0.040 0.444 *** 0.041 0.380 *** 0.044 0.517 *** 0.038 0.261 *** 0.053 0.335 *** 0.067
Saskatchewan 0.470 *** 0.040 0.434 *** 0.039 0.362 *** 0.045 0.491 *** 0.038 0.113 * 0.058 0.245 *** 0.060
Alberta 0.663 *** 0.043 0.601 *** 0.038 0.545 *** 0.045 0.634 *** 0.043 0.331 *** 0.054 0.522 *** 0.072
British Columbia 0.526 *** 0.043 0.494 *** 0.040 0.424 *** 0.045 0.512 *** 0.042 0.152 *** 0.056 0.327 *** 0.064
No province code -0.054 0.056 -0.103 ** 0.052 -0.094 * 0.056 0.074 0.058 -0.482 *** 0.084 -0.222 *** 0.086
Intercept -5.848 41.555 -17.817 48.973 -6.466 45.108 -2.895 43.430 1.308 55.611 41.815 63.785
Adjusted R
2 
0.171 0.121 0.148 0.135 0.130 0.142
N 17,918 17,918 17,918 17,918 9,909 9,970
Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A.
Retrieving sub-
component
Interpreting sub-
component
Reflecting sub-
component
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The omitted province is New Brunswick - French sector.  
 337

-%&)


),=
 
In an OLS regression, the objective is to minimize the sum of squared errors, and as a 
result, fit a line through the (conditional) means of the dependent variable. 
Specifically, the OLS minimand is simply ( )∑ −i ii
2' bxy , based on standard notation. 
The end result is that OLS coefficients measure the relationship between the 
explanatory variables and the conditional mean of the dependent variable.  
 
Quantile regressions are based on the least absolute deviation technique, which fits a 
line through a given series of (conditional) percentiles of the dependent variable. The 
minimand in this case is ( ){ }∑∑ −−+−≥ bxy 'bxy ' '' bxy1bxy IiIi iiii  γγ , where γ  is a 
specified percentile.  
 
The intuition behind a quantile regression is that the regression ‘penalizes’ data points 
that are above or below the regression line, much like with OLS, except that the 
penalty factors— γ  and ( )γ−1 —are chosen explicitly to try to yield a line that runs 
through the specified conditional quantile.  
 
The benefit of the quantile regression is that it permits the researcher to estimate 
heterogeneous effects (i.e. effects across the conditional distribution of the dependent 
variable). See Koenker and Bassett (1978), Buchinsky (1998), or Eide and Showalter 
(1999) for a more detailed exposition of quantile regression methods. 
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In Chapter 4, I estimate the impact of schooling on academic performance across the 
conditional distribution of academic performance in an IV framework. Abadie, 
Angrist, and Imbens (2002) developed an appropriate approach for this purpose. They 
refer to their approach as the Quantile Treatment Effects (QTE) estimator for IV. As 
with regular IV, the results of the QTE estimator apply to compliers. The approach 
consists of estimating a weight that indicates the probability that individuals comply. 
From this, weighted quantile regression can be estimated and the results are analogous 
to IV regression, but for conditional quantiles rather than conditional means. To 
calculate standard errors, the authors suggest bootstrapping. A caveat to this approach 
is that both the assignment and treatment variables must be binary.    
 
The weighting function, referred to as the ‘Abadie kappa’, is: 
 
[ ]
[ ]( )
( )
( ) [ ]
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iiiii
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where k is the Abadie kappa, Y is the outcome variable, TREAT is the treatment 
variable, X represents the regressors, and Z is the instrument (or assignment variable). 
 
The complete procedure thus involves five steps: 
 
1. Probit Z on Y and X separately for the samples where TREAT=0 and TREAT=1 
and save the predicted probabilities.  
2. Probit Z on X for the full sample and save the predicted probabilities.  
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3. Enter predicted probabilities in Equation A4.4.1 to calculate the expected 
value of the Abadie kappa. Note that since Z is binary, the expected value of Z 
is simply a probability. Trim the function to fit within the appropriate interval 
for a probability (i.e. [0, 1]). 
4. Apply the kappa values as weights in quantile regressions. 
5. Bootstrap the results to obtain standard errors.  
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One approach for studying policy changes is the differences-in-differences (DD) 
estimator. The idea behind this approach is to measure changes in outcomes (Y) 
among a group that is given a treatment (i.e. the policy change, denoted by TREAT) 
before (0) and after (1) the change, as shown in Equation A5.1.1:  
 
)1|()1.1.5( 01 =− iii TREATYYEA  
 
A challenge, however, is to find the counterfactual outcome (i.e. the outcome in the 
absence of the treatment). An obvious candidate is to examine the change in outcomes 
among a control group that did not receive the treatment, as shown in Equation A5.1.2:  
 
)0|()2.1.5( 01 =− iii TREATYYEA  
 
The difference in the two conditional expectations is known as a difference-in-
difference estimator (or double difference estimator). More generally, a differences-
in-differences estimator may include triple differences, quadruple differences, etc.  
 
In a regression framework, differences-in-differences estimators are implemented by 
interacting the treatment group dummy with a vector of time dummies. In the case of 
a double difference, we have: 
 
iiiiiiiii TIMETREATTIMETREATYA εαααα ++++= *)3.1.5( 2210   
 
 341
An important caveat is that the differences-in-differences estimator assumes common 
trends (i.e. in absence of the treatment, trends in outcomes in the control and 
treatment would be similar). To verify this assumption, researchers need a relatively 
long time-series of data prior to the treatment period (studying the trends ex-post 
treatment may be fruitless since the trends may also be affected by the treatment). 
 
Aside from the common trends assumption, differences-in-differences estimators face 
other challenges. First, there is the problem of confounding factors. Differences-in-
differences estimators are designed to study policy changes. However, policy changes 
are often ‘bundled’ as part of a larger reform. As a result, it is difficult to isolate the 
impact of specific policy changes since other policies are changing at the same time. 
Second, it is often the case that a small number of policy changes are considered. This 
increases the likelihood that confounding factors come into play. Third, policy 
changes are not always random. In fact, one could argue that effective policies are 
ones that are enacted only when they are expected to have the maximum possible 
effect. Thus, it may be difficult to generalize findings from DD estimators. Fourth, 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainthan (2004) note that most papers that employ 
differences-in-differences estimators focus on serially correlated outcomes, but ignore 
the fact that the resulting standard errors are inconsistent, which leads to 
overstatement of the t-statistics and significance levels. 
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In Chapter 5, I estimate the distance between the student’s parental residence and the 
nearest university institution. I do so by comparing the geographic co-ordinates 
(latitude and longitude) of both points. The co-ordinates of the parental residence are 
derived from the postal codes of households (available on the LAD), which was fed 
into the residential version of the Postal Code Conversion File Plus (PCCF+), a 
program developed by Statistics Canada that converts six character postal codes into 
various geographic units, including geographic co-ordinates (i.e. the latitude and 
longitude). University postal codes were collected manually from the website of the 
Association of Universities and University-Colleges of Canada (www.aucc.ca), and 
converted to geographic co-ordinates by using the institutional version of the PCCF+.  
 
Using spherical geometry, and assuming the earth to be a perfect sphere with a radius 
of 6,370.997 km, the formula for the straight-line distance (in km) between the 
student’s home and the nearest university is: 
 
]i_longrad)-radcos(s_long*ad)cos(i_latr*ad)cos(s_latr                                
ad)sin(i_latr*s_latrad)arcos[sin(*6,370.997  Distance (A5.2.1) +=
 
 
Where latrad is the latitude in radians, and likewise for longrad. The geographic co-
ordinates (in degrees and decimals) were converted to radians by dividing by 
57.29577951. Note that s_ denotes the student’s location and i_ denotes the institution’s 
location. 
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In Chapter 5, I estimate results using 40 km from a university as the distance threshold. 
This is likely to represent a long commute at a minimum (since it is the straight-line 
distance), but for many, it may require moving away from the parental home to attend. In 
either case, these students likely face higher costs of attending than students living closer 
to a university. 
 
In this appendix, I re-estimate the models using alternative thresholds ranging from 20 
km to 100 km, at 10 km intervals.47 The results appear in Tables A5.3.1 (a and b) and 
A5.3.2 (a and b), for Ontario, 2005 and Ontario, 2006, respectively. At the lower 
thresholds (20, 30, and 40 km), the non-refundable grants had a significant, positive 
effect on university attendance in Ontario for both years (2005 and 2006). For thresholds 
of 50 to 70 km, the results are only significant for 2006. Beyond 70 km, the results are 
not statistically significant for both years. 
 
                                                 
47 I adopt this approach, rather than breaking the results down by distance category, since the latter 
would involve very small cell sizes, which is less than ideal for regression discontinuity estimators.  
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≥ 20 km ≥ 30 km ≥ 40 km ≥ 50 km ≥ 60 km
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.056 *** 0.018 0.046 ** 0.021 0.055 ** 0.027 0.032 0.031 0.003 0.039
Net parental income 2.E-06 *** 2.E-07 2.E-06 *** 3.E-07 3.E-06 *** 6.E-07 1.E-06 * 8.E-07 4.E-07 1.E-06
Net parental income
2  
-4.E-12 *** 6.E-13 -4.E-12 *** 7.E-13 -4.E-12 2.E-12 5.E-12 4.E-12 9.E-12 1.E-11
Net parental income
3  
2.E-18 *** 3.E-19 1.E-18 *** 4.E-19 2.E-18 3.E-18 -1.E-17 ** 6.E-18 -2.E-17 2.E-17
Net parental income
4  
-2.E-25 *** 5.E-26 -2.E-25 *** 5.E-26 -3.E-25 1.E-24 7.E-24 *** 2.E-24 1.E-23 2.E-23
Lone-parent family -0.010 0.017 -0.003 0.019 -0.005 0.022 -0.007 0.024 -0.017 0.027
Number of children in family 0.053 *** 0.018 0.017 0.022 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.018 0.031
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.008 *** 0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.005
Female 0.162 *** 0.011 0.152 *** 0.013 0.147 *** 0.014 0.148 *** 0.016 0.147 *** 0.018
Intercept -0.068 ** 0.030 -0.055 0.036 -0.085 * 0.046 -0.042 0.054 0.008 0.071
Adjusted R
2 
0.071 0.072 0.074 0.076 0.078
N 6,790 4,435 3,250 2,515 1,975
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are
captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). The student is coded as having attended university full-time when tuition
credits surpasses 80% of the mean full-time undergraduate university tuition in the province. 
Table A5.3.1a: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time university attendance by distance threshold ranging from ≥ 20 km to
≥ 60 km (Ontario, 2005)
 
 
≥ 70 km ≥ 80 km ≥ 90 km ≥ 100 km
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS -0.025 0.045 -0.025 0.052 0.007 0.061 0.001 0.065
Net parental income -1.E-06 2.E-06 -2.E-06 2.E-06 -2.E-06 2.E-06 -2.E-06 2.E-06
Net parental income
2  
2.E-11 * 1.E-11 2.E-11 ** 1.E-11 3.E-11 2.E-11 3.E-11 2.E-11
Net parental income
3  
-4.E-17 3.E-17 -5.E-17 * 3.E-17 -7.E-17 6.E-17 -5.E-17 6.E-17
Net parental income
4  
2.E-23 2.E-23 3.E-23 2.E-23 4.E-23 5.E-23 2.E-23 5.E-23
Lone-parent family -0.050 0.031 -0.047 0.037 -0.076 * 0.041 -0.063 0.047
Number of children in family 0.038 0.036 0.044 0.041 0.065 0.047 0.033 0.052
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.007 -0.007 0.008 -0.002 0.009
Female 0.155 *** 0.021 0.153 *** 0.024 0.177 *** 0.029 0.209 *** 0.031
Intercept 0.063 0.081 0.062 0.095 0.013 0.109 0.037 0.119
Adjusted R
2 
0.078 0.084 0.110 0.127
N 1,525 1,110 800 615
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Table A5.3.1b: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time university attendance by distance threshold
ranging from ≥ 70 km to ≥ 100 km (Ontario, 2005)
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old
youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). The student is coded as
having attended university full-time when tuition credits surpasses 80% of the mean full-time undergraduate university
tuition in the province. 
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≥ 20 km ≥ 30 km ≥ 40 km ≥ 50 km ≥ 60 km
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.026 * 0.015 0.050 *** 0.019 0.059 *** 0.020 0.063 *** 0.021 0.047 * 0.024
Net parental income 1.E-06 *** 2.E-07 2.E-06 *** 4.E-07 2.E-06 *** 4.E-07 2.E-06 *** 4.E-07 1.E-06 ** 5.E-07
Net parental income
2  
-1.E-12 *** 4.E-13 -3.E-12 ** 1.E-12 -3.E-12 ** 1.E-12 -2.E-12 2.E-12 -1.E-12 2.E-12
Net parental income
3  
5.E-19 *** 2.E-19 1.E-18 1.E-18 2.E-18 1.E-18 9.E-19 1.E-18 -2.E-19 2.E-18
Net parental income
4  
-5.E-26 *** 2.E-26 -2.E-25 3.E-25 -2.E-25 3.E-25 -1.E-25 3.E-25 1.E-25 4.E-25
Lone-parent family -0.010 0.014 -0.007 0.015 0.010 0.017 0.008 0.018 0.023 0.020
Number of children in family 0.032 ** 0.016 0.030 0.018 0.023 0.019 0.032 0.021 0.029 0.023
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.005 * 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.004
Female 0.061 *** 0.009 0.056 *** 0.011 0.058 *** 0.012 0.062 *** 0.013 0.058 *** 0.014
Intercept 0.004 0.026 -0.044 0.032 -0.066 ** 0.033 -0.081 ** 0.036 -0.066 0.040
Adjusted R
2 
0.023 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.024
N 6,630 4,235 3,205 2,500 1,975
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are
captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). The student is coded as having attended university full-time when tuition
credits surpasses 80% of the mean full-time undergraduate university tuition in the province. 
Table A5.3.2a: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time university attendance by distance threshold ranging from ≥ 20 km to
≥ 60 km (Ontario, 2006)
 
 
≥ 70 km ≥ 80 km ≥ 90 km ≥ 100 km
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Eligible for NCBS 0.063 * 0.033 0.030 0.036 -0.007 0.045 0.004 0.054
Net parental income 2.E-06 1.E-06 9.E-09 1.E-06 -5.E-07 3.E-06 -6.E-08 3.E-06
Net parental income
2  
-5.E-12 9.E-12 9.E-12 9.E-12 6.E-12 3.E-11 2.E-12 3.E-11
Net parental income
3  
1.E-17 2.E-17 -2.E-17 2.E-17 1.E-17 1.E-16 2.E-17 2.E-16
Net parental income
4  
-7.E-24 1.E-23 1.E-23 1.E-23 -5.E-23 2.E-22 -4.E-23 2.E-22
Lone-parent family 0.022 0.023 0.029 0.027 0.015 0.032 0.017 0.037
Number of children in family 0.049 * 0.025 0.038 0.032 0.050 0.036 0.068 * 0.041
(Number of children in family)
2 
-0.006 0.004 -0.003 0.006 -0.005 0.006 -0.009 0.007
Female 0.051 *** 0.016 0.064 *** 0.019 0.071 *** 0.022 0.057 ** 0.026
Intercept -0.117 ** 0.058 -0.056 0.063 -0.024 0.083 -0.052 0.090
Adjusted R
2 
0.033 0.030 0.037 0.029
N 1,540 1,115 835 640
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
Table A5.3.2b: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time university attendance by distance threshold
ranging from ≥ 70 km to ≥ 100 km (Ontario, 2006)
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-old
youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). The student is coded as
having attended university full-time when tuition credits surpasses 80% of the mean full-time undergraduate university
tuition in the province. 
 
 
Although it is not clear why the effect of the grant is strongest when lower thresholds are 
used, there are at least two possibilities. Unfortunately, it is impossible to decipher which 
is the most likely candidate. 
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The first relates back to our discussion of net returns. Students raised 70 km or more 
from a university likely had to displace themselves to attend. Thus, their assessment 
of PSE as an investment in the absence of the grants may be quite negative – so much 
so that the grants may not have been sufficient to push them over the break-even point. 
For distance thresholds of 20 to 40 km, which may include many students within 
commuting distance (but at a considerable distance nonetheless), the costs of 
attending may be higher than students living closer due to direct transportation costs 
and travel time (i.e. opportunity costs), but lower than a student who has to move out 
of the parental home to attend. Thus, they may be close enough to the break-even 
point prior to the grant being offered.   
 
A second possibility relates to sample size. Regression discontinuity estimators require 
large samples in order to look very closely for ‘jumps’ or ‘dips’ around the point of 
discontinuity. With well below 2,000 observations for thresholds of 70 km or above, 
there are very few observations near the actual point of discontinuity.  
   
